1. The International Response to Japanese Aggression

3. Context
Mukden incident was the first challenge to the post-WWI international system
Washington Conference, and Kellogg-Briand Pact were attempts at that collective security

4. Reviewing the LON’s Structure
Consisted of the Assembly and the Councily
Assembly
One representative from all member states
Met yearly and had one vote
Council
Britain, France, Italy, Japan and four other members elected from the Assembly
Made the key decisions, could take action against a member

10. League’s Response to Mukden
China appealed to League, hoping to invoke Article 16
League acted cautiously, meetings attended by Japan, China, U.S*
Japanese government cooperated while the army continued its expansion, defying immediately request for withdrawal to the railway zone
League sends a fact-finding commission under Lord Lytton to Manchuria
Took several months to arrive, several months to complete a report
Before a report was filed, Japan had already established Manchukuo and claimed the Manchurians were a free people

11. League’s Response to Mukden
China appealed to League, hoping to invoke Article 16
League acted cautiously, meetings attended by Japan, China, U.S*
Japanese government cooperated while the army continued its expansion, defying immediately request for withdrawal to the railway zone
League sends a fact-finding commission under Lord Lytton to Manchuria
Took several months to arrive, several months to complete a report
Before a report was filed, Japan had already established Manchukuo and claimed the Manchurians were a free people

13. Lytton Report One year after the Mukden incident:
Acknowledged Japanese special interests in Manchuria, but said its use of force was unacceptable
Should give up territory and withdraw
Manchukuo was not independent of Chinese administration
Should become independent but under Chinese sovereignty
Wut
Recommended Sino-Japanese non- aggression pact
Did not consider Japanese resolve
Japan argued that the West was hypocritical, having secured its own territories through force
Left the League in March 1933

14. Why did the League not take stronger action against Japan?
France, with its own interests in Indo-China, had actually gained from a weakened China
Britain lacked the military means to resist Japan and its interests were not directly threatened
All nations were suffering as a result of the Great Depression
Japan was viewed as an ally in containing the Soviets
Meant that the Japanese would continue with expansion; encouraged Mussolini in 1935

15. Continued Failures of the League
China would appeal again in 1937, following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and bombing of Shanghai
League condemned Japan for breaking the Nine- Power Treaty, but it was not impotent
Pre-occupied by events in Europe, unwilling to act without the U.S.
Nine-Power Treaty Conference of condemned Japan, but produced no real measures

16. Response of China
Chiang Kai-Shek insisted on fighting the Communists, not the Japanese
Forced to suppress uprisings of his own troops
Kidnapped by Zhang Xue- liand in 1936 and forced into the Second United Front alliance with the CCP
Now fighting a “war of national resistance”

17. Chinese Resistance 1937 saw the steepening of Chinese resolve
GMD and CCP seeking “total resistance by the whole nation”
War went very badly; by 1938 Shanghai, Ghangzhou and Nanjing had all fallen and the capital had been moved to Chongqing
But the resistance ultimately proved effective
The Japanese were drawn into a protracted war which they could not win
Forced to rely on Chinese puppet governments
Most famous under Wang Jingwei, who believed the GMD could never defeat the Japanese
Three governments in China during the Second World War
GMD central, CCP north, “New Government of China” east and north
Tensions remained high between the GMD and CCP

18. U.S. Response to Japan – Early 1930s
Following isolationism in the 1930s, reinforced by the Great Depression
Hoover took minimal action even after Open Door China was broken
Not the focus and lacked a strong navy in the early 30s
Had strong investments/trade in Japan it did not want to Jeopardize
Would only issue a non- recognition of Machukuo and the violation of Kellogg-Briand Pact
Roosevelt continued the same trend; increasing export of strategic materials to Japan after 1933

20. U.S. Response to Japan – Early 1937-38
Japan now threatening American interests
Naval building of upset the balance of power
Attacks on Open Door China
Offered financial support to the GMD
Rejected British appeals to join mediation of Sino- Japanese conflict
Roosevelt limited by Neutrality Acts

21. U.S. Response to Japan – Early 1937-38
U.S.S. Panay bombed on the Yangtze River
Quick apology and compensation from the Japanese
Public opinion for isolation
Always unwilling to go past verbal condemnation
FDR: “Quarantine Speech”
Did not impose sanction, actually played a key role as U.S was the major supplier of oil, scrap iron and automobile parts

23. Changes in 1938
Roosevelt may have won out in a struggle with isolationists; used presidential powers to ignore the Neutrality Acts and provide further support to China
Japan’s “New Order in East Asia” may have been the turning point
U.S. feared Chiang would accept the “New Order” solidifying Japanese rule
Also concerned he would receive help from the U.S.S.R
Also the time of the Tripartite Pact

25. The Advance to War
January 1939, a moral embargo was placed on planes and aviation parts
February 1939, all credit to Japan suspended
July 1939, trade reciprocity suspended
July 1940, embargo on fuel and scrap metal
1940 and 1941, U.S. sending economic and military aid to China
July 1941, Japan continue southward expansion, U.S. froze all assets

26. The Advance to War Japan totally dependent on American oil
Thought Westerners were attempting an encirclement
Choices: Withdraw from Indo-China and consolidate power in China or begin a war of conquest
All negotiations demanded a full Japanese withdrawal from China