1. THE MARKET FOR "LEMONS": QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET MECHANISM
GEORGE A. AKERLOF (1970)
Koshland Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley
2001 Nobel Prize in Economics
MIT (Ph.D.) ; Yale University (B.A.)
Original: Jong-Kyung Park
Modified by Hyeonsuh Lee

2. The need for research
Microeconomic theory models in the 1960s were characterized by their generic nature in which they dealt with perfect competition and general equilibrium.
Situational and specific considerations were left out (such as information asymmetries).
The existence of goods of many grades poses interesting and important problems for the theory of markets.

3. Research Purpose The paper relates quality and uncertainty.
Explores the interaction of quality differences and uncertainty in explaining important institutions of the labor market.
Gives structure to the statement: "Business in under-developed countries is difficult.”
Determines the economic costs of dishonesty.

4. Buyer Seller Judge quality based on market statistics.
Incentive to market poor quality goods.
Reduction in the average quality of good and size of the market.
Social and private returns differ.
Government intervention increase the welfare of parties.

5. The Automobile Market
Large price difference between new cars and those which have just left the showroom.
After owning a specific car for a length of time, the car owner can form a good idea of its quality.
An asymmetry in available information has developed: for the sellers now have more knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers.

6. COIN COMPOSED OF CHEAPER METAL COIN COMPOSED OF EXPENSIVE METAL
Gresham’s law
“Bad money drives out good.”
For most cars traded will be the “lemons,” and good cars may not be traded at all.  Bad cars tend to drive out the good.
Because bad cars sell at the same prices as good cars.
 It is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good car and a bad car; only the seller knows.
CIRCULATION
COIN COMPOSED OF CHEAPER METAL
COIN COMPOSED OF EXPENSIVE METAL

7. Lemon Market Model
Where: M is the consumption of goods other than automobiles, xi is the quality of the ith automobile, and n is the number of automobiles.

8. Model with Information Asymmetry
Demand-Supply for group 1
Demand-Supply for group 2
Demand Curve
Supply Curve

9. Model with Information Asymmetry
Table : Demand and Supply in Asymmetric Case
Price and average Quality
Demand
Supply
Equilibrium
Group 1
Group 2
p < u - N
The average quality of cars is only a half of the offering price.
The buyer is uncertain about the quality of cars
Group 1 only wants to pay at P/2, while group 2 only wants to pay at 3/4p.
No cars will be sold at price p.
The price would go down, which further drives some sellers out of the market and further lowers down the average quality of cars, leading to the shrinking of the market.

10. Model with Information Symmetry
Supply
Demand
Table : Demand and Supply in Asymmetric Case
Price
Demand
Supply
Equillirium
Group 1
Group2 N -
P=1
P<1

11. Model with Information Symmetry
Equilibrium of Supply and Demand in Symmetric Case
There is no equilibrium when price is above 3/2, because group 1 is willing to sell their car, but no group is willing to buy, since the reservation price of group 2 is only 3/2 and group 1 is only 1.
When price is 3/2, only group 2 wants to buy the car, because price is still above the reservation price of group 1
When price falls below 1, the equilibrium doesn't exist since group 1 doesn't want to supply/ sell their cars.

12. One possible solution for adverse selection Group insurance
Under information asymmetry, insurance providers cannot discern between types of applicants (the healthy vs. unhealthy)
Why doesn't the price rise to match the risk?
As the price level rises, the people who insure themselves will be those who are increasingly certain that they will need the insurance.
As a result, the average medical condition of insurance applicants deteriorates as the price level rises.
Consequently, no insurance sales may take place at any price.
Price rises
Attract high risk applicants
Average health condition deteriorates
Incentive of insurance providers hurts
Insurance market shrinks
One possible solution for adverse selection Group insurance

13. Employment of Minorities
Race may serve as a good statistic for the applicant's social background, quality of schooling, and general job capabilities.
The fact that some demographic groups are preferred to others is because employers make judgments about the average behavior of an observable group of people.
Quality schooling may be a substitute for this statistic.
Workers with high ability have lower costs of pursuing attainment of education at higher levels, which can act as a signal of their productive capacity.

14. Cost of Dishonesty
In the example for the used car market, there is an incentive for the sellers to offer lemons at the market price. This lowers the expected quality of a good from the perspective of consumers; this drives legitimate goods out of business.
Dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market.
The cost of dishonesty lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated but also the cost of loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence.

15. Credit Market in Underdeveloped Countries
In India a major fraction of industrial enterprise is controlled by managing agencies.
Promoter would turn to the agency because of its reputation, which would encourage confidence in the venture and stimulate investment.
If there were symmetric information, investors would immediately know whether or not a venture was worth investing in, and there would be no need for additional spending on a managing agency to draw in more investment.
The local moneylender charges extortionate rates to his clients.
Cooperative Movement was meant to compete with local money lender.
Lender A would retain all the borrowers below a threshold of riskiness and Lender B would find itself strapped with all the higher risk borrowers(lemons).
Creates a barrier for entry in the market.

16. Counteracting Institutions
Institutions arise to counteract the effects of quality uncertainty
Guarantees
Guarantees of a good's average quality helps reduce buyer uncertainty regarding quality. the risk is borne by the seller rather than by the buyer.
Brand names
Brand names serve as an indicator of quality and allow for consumer retaliation (i.e., no longer purchasing that brand) in the case that the true quality of a good fails to reflect the expected quality of the good.
Chain
Similar to brand names, these allow nonlocal consumers who are unfamiliar with a geographic area and the things it offers to be able to expect a level of quality from a certain type of good,
Licensing
Licensing for skilled workers signal to market participants that those possessing licenses have reached a certain level of education, training or skill.

17. Conclusion
Informal unwritten guarantees are preconditions for trade and production.
Where these guarantees are indefinite, business will suffer as indicated by generalized Gresham's law.
The difficulty of distinguishing good quality from bad is inherent in the business world.
Institutions emerge to mitigate this uncertainty.

18. Discussion
A used-car salesperson may work to maintain his reputation rather than pass off a "lemon".
Reputation is usually a good asset if one intends to continue business in the market.