1. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE & ARMS CONTROL IN THE THIRD NUCLEAR AGE
Presentation by Peter Huessy of the Mitchell Institute/AFA to the SDC Symposium, June 20-21, 2016 Albuquerque, New Mexico

2. 1. The Historical Context 2. Maintain Bi-Partisan Consensus
WHERE HAVE WE BEEN? WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO DO? WHERE ARE WE TRYING TO GO?
1. The Historical Context
2. Maintain Bi-Partisan Consensus
3. Achieve Four Major Goals
A. Deter
B. Modernization and Arms Control Together
C. Use Resources Wisely
D. Promote Stability/Non-Use

3. I. More Historical Context: What Have We Accomplished?
Stockpile2 -86%
Megatonnage: -90%
1967: 31,255 Warheads
2015: 4571 Warheads
1960: Biggest Add +7178
1991-2: Biggest Cut -5300
3.165 megatons per warhead in 1957
0.216 megatons per warhead 1994
Cut from 20,491 (1960) to 2300 (1994).

4. I. The Historical Context: Systems Not in US but many remain in Russian Nuclear Enterprise
MIRVed ICBM
Heavy ICBM
Land Mobile ICBM
Rail Mobile ICBM
Air Mobile ICBM
IRBM
MRBM
SRBM
Sea Based IRBM
Sea Based MRBM
Carrier-based Naval Air
Nuclear Depth Charges
Naval Nuclear Artillery
Torpedoes
SRAM
SAM/Air Defense
Air-to-Air
Intercontinental CM
SLCM
GLCM
ASAT
Tube Artllery
Recoilless Rifle
Free-Flight Rockets
Atomic Demolitions
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

5. I. NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TO BE RETAINED
ICBM Singlet
SLBM and ORP Submarine
ALCM/LRSO
Gravity Bomb
C2/5 Warheads from 12

6. I. Common Principles: 1972 SALT-2010 START
Modernize for stability/diversity and seek reductions/limits simultaneously
Preserve Flexible Bomber Counting Rules—shift to slow flyers (if we take advantage)
De-MIRV land based ICBMs--move away from heavy ICBMs
Extend deterrent shield to allies in Asia and Europe-- limit proliferation pressures
Missile defenses key to low end/spectrum defense, complicate first strike temptations, expand options
Preserve MIRVed sea based, relatively low alert 5/12 submarines

7. Amb. Lehman’s 6 Recurring Themes in Deterrence & Strategic Arms Control:
• Reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by creating conditions that minimize scenarios in which they are most relevant • Pursue reductions in a manner to enhance security rather than simply for their own sake • Encourage balanced diversity in forces • Seek limits on fast flyers • Encourage de-MIRVing and reduce concentrations of warheads • Seek flexibility for air delivery systems

8. 3A DETER Both….. Certainty price of aggression is too high
Hold at risk what aggressor really values
Uncertainty for aggressor of successful attack
Survivability, synergism of diversity, spectrum response
Provide options for aggressor to go down less dangerous path
Provide diplomatic and other processes to back away
Both…..
“Re-establish Deterrence,”
“Bring War to End,”
“Control Escalation; Limit Damage,”
“ Avoid Adverse ‘fait accompli,’”
“Credible to Adversary, Allies, Self”
And….
Small regional conflicts could escalate to high levels.
Only a few nuclear weapons striking our cities would produce massive death and destruction.
Uncertain deterrence and defenses mean that there is no guarantee that massive casualties could be prevented.
Survival of functioning societies could be at risk.

9. 3A: Deployed, On-Alert and Retaliatory Weapons
1550 Deployed (1850 with bomber counting rules) - 89% from
800 On Alert (400 Minuteman and 5 Subs at Sea) - 90% from
Secure retaliatory warheads—5 submarines at sea & some notional number of ICBMs/bombers …….-90+%

10. Major Options for Nuclear Modernization
Impact
The major options are relatively simple:
Eliminate Minuteman or cut to 300/modernize or sustain if keep 300;
Load all allowed missile warheads on subs and go to 6-8 submarines at 1550 or 1000 warhead limits;
Eliminate ALCM and nuclear warhead.
Costs more money to sustain vs modernize; Elimination leaves <10 targets high instability, all eggs in one basket; going to 300 saves funds only >2035; savings in single billions in the current FYDP at best
Going to 6-8 subs means no two ocean fleet; no upload hedge if coupled with Minuteman elimination; reduced patrol area and target coverage.
Without cruise missiles you lose time to target speed option; you are degraded re air defenses……don’t save on the cruise missile as the conventional variant not counted in the current budget; savings would be in NNSA and the nuke warhead….

11. 3B. Force Structure Options
Rigid: 0 MM/6-8 Subs/<LRSO
Diversity: 400 MM/12 Subs/60 Bombers
Anticipate Surprise
>Notional Warheads always survivable
Hedge Allows Buildup if arms control goes away
Allows for 5 subs & two ocean deterrent fleet-- protects both Asia and Europe
Adversary targets 10 assets or less;
Submarines fully loaded 8 warheads per 16 missile—no hedge or upload capability
Puts all eggs in one basket
Highly unstable…..use becomes more likely……

12. 3C: Budget Shortfall Historical Context Historical Context
Kennedy spent $49 billion on defense and $103 billion for the entire US government—nuclear spending was some 25% of the DOD$;
At the end of the Cold War, we spent $303 billion and $67 billion for nuclear or 22%;
Under this administration we are spending $24 billion a year out of $610 billion or 3.4%....
In 2025, nuclear spending will be $28-31 billion, out of a Federal Budget of $5.5 trillion; or 0.54% (1/2 of 1%)……..

13. 3C: 2025 Gross Government Spending
Federal Gross Spending     $5.5 trillion
Intergovernmental     $-0.9 trillion  
State Direct Spending     $2.2 trillion  
Local Direct Spending     $2.4 trillion    
Total Spending     $9.2 trillion  
US Nuclear Enterprise: $32 billion or one out of every $347 spent on government in the USA or equivalent to an annual $12 billion program today…….

14. SHORING UP DEFENSE
46% of USAF aircraft cannot fly; 70% of Marine aircraft;
Current budget/oldest and smallest USAF ever
Navy and Army below pre-WWI levels
McCain’s $18B: Cancels reduction of 15,000 active Army soldiers; prevents cutting the 10th carrier air wing. Funds 36 additional UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, five Apaches, and five Chinooks and $2.2 billion for readiness. Finding offsets within total Federal Budget would get increase for defense
Marginal nuclear savings fails to help defense
There are 59 Senators who voted for +$18 billion in DOD spending; (+69 very possible);
Increase is simply to get to FY16 level of spending;
Offsets: $125B annual tax fraud;
$97B in Heritage Savings
1986 Grace Commission: $76B in vetted savings certified by the HBC/Panetta
$18B Equals .043% of the Federal Budget

15. 3D: Bottom Line: Deter Use
Purposes of nuclear modernization, arms control, deterrent strategy is to eliminate any temptation for the first use of nuclear weapons…
Bomber capability to signal and deter;
Submarine at sea continuously
Minuteman insurance policy; prompt targeting an adversary cannot remain in a sanctuary;
Missile defense stops low end attack—accidental and unauthorized as well….
Watchword: Continue to reduce consistent with strategic balance…

16. Summary: Do Alternatives Make Sense?
FORCE STRUCTURE
PRINCIPLES
Eliminating minuteman or cutting submarine force by 50% or stopping lsro saves insignificant funds in fydp
Major instability caused
Upload hedge goes away
Flexibility and diversity significantly reduced
Undoes us bomber advantage
Brings in rogue states as actors in international crises—north korea says general wilson
Reductions no longer serve stability needs
Allied uncertainty could lead to proliferation

17. Summary
Planned Costs are a fraction of previous nuclear investment costs, and at peak will not exceed 6.5% with flat defense budget for next decade…
Alternatives almost universally promote grave instability at very little savings….
Most alternatives reduce POTUS flexibility--allied extended deterrence would suffer…
Secure Retaliatory weapons a fraction of stockpile, numbers dramatically declined since height of and end of Cold War….Deterrent and arms control principles must be preserved and continued.

18. Summary
Russia and China and other nuclear powers are leading modernization efforts and will complete modernization programs before US has deployed a single new missile, submarine or bomber…
Current consensus is the result of a great deal of effort and is itself of real value
Five principles remain valid: (1)modernize and cut together; (2)missile defense adds to deterrent; (3)stability in a crisis foundational goal—includes limit on heavy missiles; (4)Triad remains most flexible, diverse and stable deterrent tool; and (5)extended deterrent to our allies matters.

19. ADDENDUM: 3B. Questionable Alternatives
C. Uncertain….
C. Uncertain
ALCM elimination means weaker, less flexible capability;
If cost of conventional ALCM production factored in, killing nuke ALCM gives no cost savings
Cruise missiles give you added speed to target;
Without such capability you are degrading seriously third leg of Triad….
Use conventional B-52 with ALCM all the time without creating instability

20. ADDENDUM: Resources and Budgets
Some Alternatives:
Some Alternatives:
Eliminating all 3 Minuteman bases but transfer personnel to the other USAF saves <$ million a year (40% of savings goes to base closing costs on average)…
Cutting submarine construction to 6-8 saves funding only in the >2035 period.
Eliminating the LRSO nuclear warhead in the FYDP saves <$2 billion;
Killing Minuteman would only save <$1-2.5 billion over the FYDP;
Sustaining Minuteman costs more than modernization…
Sustainment option eventually limits force (spares/tests)

21. 3B. QUESTIONABLE ALTERNATIVES
C. Uncertain & Costly Force
C. Uncertain Force
MM sustainment costs MORE than modernization…
Existing force does not have sufficient spares or test assets
Cut modernized MM force to 300 from 400 saves proc funding in 2035 time frame only; RDT&E $’s don’t change….
Sub fleet of 6-8 creates bathtub effect in the period….
Eliminates two ocean fleet
No hedge or upload capability if all missile warheads deployed on just sub force
Subs have to limit patrol area due to weight increase in payload

22. II. Five Common Principles: Stability, Diversity & Flexibility
SALT, START I, Moscow, New START—bombers go free
START II Heavy land based mirv ban; SALT limit launchers
SALT-New START: Emphasis on allowing MIRVed missiles at sea…
Relatively low alert rates—bulk of deterrent force
Defenses coupled with 75% cut in strategic deployed warheads, defense and offense may be combined…

23. 3C: Budgets & Resources The Wrong Way
The Right Way—What’s the Nuclear budget?
$700 billion over 25 years or through FY2041—Todd Harrison, CSIS
In then-year dollars peak four years are $36-40 billion (Per Congressman Adam Smith); drops to $30 billion a year and then further to $24 billion over 25 year period
“Trillion” dollar budget estimates erroneously include conventional bomber costs, $50 billion in added inflation; double count sustainment and modernization costs; & high uncertainty in some estimates (One ICBM mod estimate at $120 billion).