1. SAMPOL 204: Varieties of Political Regimes in Latin America
Section 1: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives on Political Regime Types. Sultanistic Regimes. Wednesday 25 January 2017, , Small Auditorium, Einar Berntzen

2. A Theory of Sultanism 1: A Type of Nondemocratic Rule
Sultanism=A type of nondemocratic regime
Authoritarian regimes: civilian one-party states (Franco’s Spain); nonhierarchical military regimes; hierarchical military regimes (like the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the Southern Cone of South America), or royal dictatorships (like those in the Balkans in the interwar years)

3. Nondemocratic regime types
Authoritarian
Patrimonial
Sultanistic
Totalitarian

4. The concept of “sultanistic regime”
“Sultanism”: an extreme case of patrimonialism, which is a form of traditional authority (in Weber’s tripartite classification of the forms of legitimate authority: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational)
The term was adopted by Juan J. Linz in his classification of nondemocratic governments

5. Patrimonialism
Weber’s notion of patrimonialism was used extensively (e.g. Guenther Roth: “Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States”, WP 1968). Given the differences between the modern states in which the patrimonial logic operates and the traditional patrimonial systems Weber had in mind, the term “neopatrimonialism” came to be widely used. But Weber’s formulation of patrimonialism’s extreme form, “sultanism”, was neglected by scholars until Linz adopted the term in his classification of nondemocractic governments.

6. Sultanistic regime
The contrast between Franco’s nondemocratic regime (authoritarian) and Trujillo’s rule led to the conceptualization of a regime type for which Linz borrowed Weber’s term “sultanism”. Weber explicitly contrasted the traditional basis of patrimonialism with the discretionary aspect of sultanism, implying that tradition played little role in the latter. Just as Franco’s rule became the archetype of an authoritarian regime, Trujillo’s became that of a sultanistic regime in Linz’s classification of nondemocratic regimes.

7. The applicability of Linz’s paradigm
Mobutu’s regime in Zaire (Young & Turner)
Juan Vicente Gómez ( ) and Marcos Pérez Jiménez ( ) in Venezuela (Terry Lynn Karl)
The Shah of Iran (Chehabi)
Marco’s regime in the Phillipines (Thompson)
Ceausescu ( ) in Romania, the Somozas ( ) in Nicaragua , the Duvaliers ( ) in Haiti (Huntington)

8. (Neo)patrimonialism and (Neo)sultanism
The regimes studied relate to Weber’s sultanistic regimes just as neopatrimonial regimes relate to Weber’s patrimonial type of traditional authority. Therefore, to be precise, they should be referred to as “neosultanistic regimes”.
For Weber the transition between patrimonialism and sultanism is “definitely continuous”: neosultanistic regimes are an extreme version of neopatrimonial forms of governance.

9. Types of Patrimonial Rule
Type of authority
Extreme form
Traditional form
Patrimonialism
Sultanism
Modern form
Neopatrimonialism
Neosultanism

10. The etymology of “sultanism”
The etymology of the term “sultanism” strikes some as “orientalist” (Hartlyn: “discretionary neopatrimonialism”). For Weber the Near East was the “classical location of sultanism”. The etymological objection to “sultanism” seems untenable, but that the term belongs to the world of traditional forms of authority poses a real problem. Linz & Chehabi adopt a nominalist approach: Since “sultanism” has already achieved some recognition among political scientists, they retain the term even though “neosultanism” would be more accurate, not to add to the terminological confusion already too prevalent in the social sciences.

11. Sultanistic rule defined
The ideal type of a contemporary sultanistic regime: It is based on personal rulership, and loyalty to the ruler is motivated by a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his power without restraint, at his own discretion and above all unemcumbered by rules or by any commitment to an ideology or value system. The binding norms and relations of bureaucratic administration are constantly subverted by arbitrary personal decisions of the ruler, which he does not feel constrained to justify in ideological terms. As a result corruption reigns supreme at all levels of society.

12. Sultanistic rule defined (cont.)
The staff of such a ruler is constituted largely by people chosen directly by the ruler. Among them we very often find members of his family, friends, business associates, or individuals directly involved in using violence to sustain the regime. Their position derives from their purely personal submission to the ruler. The ruler and his associates do not represent any class or corporate interests. Although such regimes can in many ways be modern, what characterizes them is the weakness of traditional and legal-rational legitimation and the lack of ideological justification.

13. Empirical cases of sultanism
No regime fits the ideal type perfectly, but regimes approximating the ideal type can be found all over the world:
The Dominican Republic: Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina ( )
Nicaragua: Anastasio Somoza García ( ); Luis Somoza ( ) and Anastasio Somoza Debayle ( )
Cuba: Fulgencio Batista ( )
Haiti: Jean-Claude Duvalier ( )
Panama: Manuel Noriega ( )
Iran: Pahlavi shah (1941/ /2 1979)
The Philippines: Ferdinand Marcos (1965/ )

14. Borderline cases
Alfredo Stroessner ( ) in Paraguay is one such borderline case: the army was not the personal property of the president, a Stroessner dynasty failed to be established, Paraguay’s ruling Colorado party had an identity independent of Stroessner.
Francois Duvalier ( ) in Haiti does not fit the pure type of sultanistic regime: he based his rule on the black middle classes in opposition to Haiti’s mulatto elite.

15. Clearest African cases of sultanism
Jean Bédel Bokassa ( /9 1979) in the Central African Republic
Mobutu Sese Seko ( /5 1997) in Zaire
Francisco Macías Nguema(1968-3/8 1979) in Equatorial Guinea
Idi Amin ( /4 1979) in Uganda

16. Sultanistic tendencies under communism and among democracies
Nicolae Ceausescu ( )
Kim Il-sung (1948-8/7 1994), Kim Jong-il ( / ), Kim Jong-un (2011-)
Sultanistic traits among democracies:
Eric Gairy (1967/ /3 1979, coup by Maurice Bishop) in Grenada
Vere Cornwall (“Papa”) Bird (1976/ ), Lester Bird ( ) in Antigua and Barbuda

17. Sultanism as an ideal-typical concept
As is the case with all ideal-typical concepts, no empirical reality fully matches all characteristics of a sultanistic regime. It could be argued that it would be preferable to talk about “sultanistic tendencies”, indicating a development in the direction of the ideal-typical sultanistic regime. A regime in which some sultanistic tendencies are present, but where the circle of clients is wider and the discretion of the ruler less extensive, should be called neopatrimonial.

18. Characteristics of Sultanistic Regimes
1. The Blurring of the Line between Regime and State
2. Personalism
3. Constitutional Hypocrisy
4. The Narrow Social Bases of Sultanism
5. Distorted Capitalism

19. 1. The Blurring of the Line between Regime and State
“Regime”= the patterns of allocation, use, and abuse of power in a polity. For understanding authoritarian regimes (and transitions to democracy) it is useful to distinguish between regime and state. Under sultanistic rule the distinction between regime and state is blurred, and in extreme cases of sultanism one can even speak of a fusion between regime and state.

20. The armed forces and their relation to the rest of the state apparatus
Sultanistic rulers typically maintain an atmosphere of distrust among various branches of the military and encourage mutual espionage to protect themselves from a military coup; some even use private militias to sustain their control of society: the Tonton Macoutes of the Duvaliers or the “mongoose men” of Eric Gairy.

21. Autonomy vs. Professionalism of the armed forces
It is useful to distinguish analytically between the autonomy and the professionalism of the armed forces of sultanistic regimes. The Iranian army was highly professional, but closely related to the Shah. Likewise the Nicaraguan National Guard was loyal to Somoza and fought well in the civil war. In Paraguay it was perhaps the armed forces’ relative professionalism, the outcome of the many wars the country was forced to fight against its neighbors, that prevented the state’s neopatrimonialism from degenerating into outright sultanism.

22. Single parties Sultanistic rulers sometimes create single parties:
The Philippines: Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement)
Zaire: Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution
Haiti: Comité National d’Action Jean-Claudiste
Iran: Rastakhiz (Resurgence)
The Central African Republic: Mouvement pour l’Evolution Sociale en Afrique Noire (MESAN)

23. 2. Personalism
Cult of personality: sultanistic leaders crave charisma and surround themselves with the trappings of charismatic leadership precisely because they know they lack it. They invent new titles for themselves:
Trujillo (“Generalísimo”, ”Benefactor de la patria”)
Shah: (Aryamehr=“Light of the Aryans”)
Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga=“The all-powerful warrior who will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake”, ”savior”

24. Cult of personality (cont.)
Jean Bédel Bokassa (“Emperor”)
Nicolae Ceausescu (“Conducator”, “Hero among the nation’s heroes”)
Idi Amin (“field marshal”, CBE=“Conqueror of the British Empire”)
Macías Nguema (topped all others by claiming divinity!)

25. Cult of personality (cont.)
Sultanistic rulers also like to be thought of as great thinkers and fill many beautifully bound volumes with their speeches, declarations,and proclamations in addition to (mostly ghostwritten) books. Feeling the need to legitimize their regime ideologically, they come up with an “ideology” that often bears the ruler’s name. In Haiti “Jean-Claudism” became official state ideology in In Zaire “Mobutism” became official state ideology in Ferdinand Marcos: “An Ideology for Filipinos”, Shah: ”The White Revolution”

26. Cult of personality (cont.)
The sultanist “ideology” often exalts the nation’s ancient glories and draws on an “invented tradition” to demarcate the nation from its neighbours ethnically and even racially: Pahlavi Shah’s anti-Arab emphasis on Iran’s ancient Persian heritage; Trujillo’s anti-Haitianism; Francois Duvalier’s noirisme; Ceausescu’s insistence that Roumanians are decendants of the ancient Dacians and Mobutu’s cult of the African authenticité

27. Cult of personality (cont.)
The cult of personality also leaves geographic traces: Ciudad Trujillo (Santo Domingo); Duvalierville (Cabaret); Lake Mobutu Sese Seko (Lake Albert); Lake Idi Amin (Lake Edward); Macías Nguema Island (Fernando Póo); Puerto Somoza (Puerto Cabezas)

28. Dynasticism: the prominent role of family members
Sons: Nicaragua: Somozas; Haiti: “Papa” and Baby” Doc; Dominican Republic: the dictator’s son Ramfis became brigadier general at the tender age of 9; Romania: Nicu was groomed to succed his father until his constant brawling, gambling, and philandering turned party leaders (incuding other relatives) against the succesion.
Wives: Haiti both first ladies wielded considerable influence and were involved in corruption; Imelda Marcos; Elena Ceausescu
Clan: Equatorial Guinea, the dictator filled all major positions with members of his Esengui clan. Although he himself was ousted and executed by his nephew, his dynasty endures to this day and governs in a manner only slightly less repressive than Macías Nguema’s rule.

29. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo: President of Equatorial Guinea

30. Dynasticism (cont.)
Antigua and Barbuda: Vere Bird’s two eldest sons; Vere Jr. and Lester, were cabinet members and in 1994 the younger of the two, Lester Bird succeeded his father by leading the Antigua Labor Party to yet another election victory. Jean Bédel Bokassa went so far as to abolish the republic and found a monarchy: he proclaimed himself emperor in 1976 and proceeded to crown himself in 1977.

31. Personalism and dynasticism
It is the combination of personalism and dynasticism that is specific to sultanism. The reason for the dynasticism of sultanistic regimes is perhaps that the rulers feel that they can trust only their family and kin. Most often the sultanistic rulers come from humble origins and are looked down upon by the traditional elite. Somoza García: used-car salesman; Trujillo grew up in poor circumstances; Batista was a mulatto who had worked as a seargent stenographer in the Cuban army, cane cutter, carpenter and railway worker; Ceausescu was of peasant origin

32. Personalism and dynasticism
Given the lowly origins and the tenuous social base of their regimes, sultanistic rulers often attempt to create family alliances with the old elite, so as to co-opt at least part of it. Reza Shah thus took a Qajar princess as his second wife: Somoza García married into the powerful Debayle-Sacasa family; Batista divorced his first wife and married “up”, and Jean-Claude Duvalier chose his wife from the light-skinned Bennett family

33. Empress Farah Pahlavi

34. Salvadora Debayle

35. Marta Fernández Miranda de Batista

36. Michele Bennett

37. 3. Constitutional Hypocrisy
Sultanistic rulers do not necessarily occupy the position that is constitutionally the most powerful, a policy called politique de doublure, or “politics of understudy”, in Haiti. The Somozas occasionally put a puppet in charge of the presidency; Trujillo left it to 4 different men, one of whom was his brother; Manuel Noriega in Panama continued the habit of his predecessor, General Omar Torrijos, of ruling as head of the military with a nominal president as head of state.

38. Presidents of Nicaragua (1937-79)
Anastasio Somoza García ( )
Leonardo Argüello Barreto (1-26/5 1947)
Benjamín Lacayo Sacasa (acting) (26/5-15/8 1947)
Víctor Manuel Román y Reyes ( )
Anastasio Somoza García ( )
Luís Somoza Debayle ( )
René Schick ( )
Lorenzo Guerrero ( )
Anastasio Somoza Debayle ( )
Liberal-Conservative Junta ( )
Anastasio Somoza Debayle ( )
Francisco Urcuyo (acting) (17-18/7 1979)

39. Presidents of the Dominican Republic (1930-62)
Rafael Trujillo ( )
Jacinto Peynado ( )
Manuel de Jesús Troncoso de la Concha ( )
Rafael Trujillo ( )
Héctor Trujillo ( )
Joaquín Balaguer ( )

40. Presidents of Panama (1968-89)
José María Pinilla Fábrega and Bolívar Urrutia Parrilla ( )
Demetrio B. Lakas ( )
Aristides Royo ( )
Ricardo de la Espriella ( )
Jorge Illueca (1984)
Nicolás Ardito Barletta Vallarino ( )
Eric Arturo Delvalle (acting) ( )
Manuel Solís Palma (acting) ( )
Francisco Rodríguez (provisional) (1/9-20/ )

41. Manipulation of the electoral process
The constitutional facade of sultanistic regimes made it easier for conservative anticommunists in the US of A and other Western countries to back them. The sultanistic rulers therefore maintained a nominally multiparty polity and organized elections, which the government always won.

42. Constitutional facade
Nicaragua: the Somoza family gained control of the Liberal Party in the 1930s and would split the the opposition Conservative Party before each election by making deals with some of its leaders, then prevent the electoral success of the others by fraud.
Cuba: Batista held presidential elections in 1954.
Phillipines: Marcos encouraged (and perhaps paid) a candidate to run against him in the 1981 presidential elections but let him carry only his hometown.
Iran: the Shah maintained the fiction of a two-party system until 1975.
Sultanistic rulers also often turn to plebiscites to prove their “democratic” legitimacy.

43. 4. The Narrow Social Bases of Sultanism
The ability of sultanistic rulers to stay in power depends on their freedom from the need to forge alliances with civil society. This freedom increases if they can monopolize certain economic resources. In the end the social bases of a sultanistic regime are restricted to its clients, family members of the rulers and their cronies.
It is often alleged that sultanistic leaders substitute superpower patronage for a domestic power base. The close association of most sultanistic leaders with the US of A is beyond doubt.

44. 5. Distorted Capitalism
Under the dominance of a patrimonial regime only certain types of capitalism are able to develop. The personalistic use of power for the essentially private ends of the ruler and his collaborators means that the country is run like a huge domain. The boundaries between the public treasury and the private wealth of the ruler become blurred. He and his collaborators, with his consent, freely appropriate public funds, establish profit-oriented monopolies, and demands gifts and payoffs from business for which no public accounting is given. Often the privileged are thus exploited, as landowners, merchants, and foreign capitalists buy their peace by making payments to the regime.

45. Distorted capitalism (cont.)
The ruler’s enterprises contract with the state, the ruler often shows generosity to his followers and to his subjects in a particularistic way. The economy is subject to considerable government intervention: the main aim is to extract resources. His family most often shares in the spoils. This “kleptocratic state” operates by control over essential services, monopoly ownership of critical commodities, kickbacks on contracts, and plain confiscation of property. Kleptocracy or mafia economics (“guns, goons and gold”) is not market economics.

46. Differences between Sultanism and Other Types of Nondemocratic Rule
Traditional caudillos: a product of the 19th century, military leaders (some were state-builders) who filled a vacuum of authority are different from sultanistic rulers
Totalitarian regimes: have a genuine ideology, leaders’ commitment to impersonal purposes, single party and ancillary state organizations, all pervasive state penetration of society
Authoritarian regimes: more institutionalized, rule of law exists to a larger degree

47. A Theory of Sultanism 2: Genesis and Demise of Sultanistic Regimes
I. The Genesis of Sultanism
II. The Transformation, Breakdown, and Legacy of Sultanism

48. I. The Genesis of Sultanism
Macrostructural Factors: Socioeconomic Conditions, Crisis of Sovereignty
Political Institutional Factors: Breakdown of Clientelistic Democracy, Decay of Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes
Leadership factors: The Ruler’s Personality

49. 1. Macrostructural Factors: (1) Socioeconomic Conditions
The stabilization and continuity of sultanistic regimes require a certain modernization of transportation and communication as well as the military and police organization and some civilian administration to provide funds to sustain the rule and prevent threats to it. The isolation of the rural masses, their lack of education, and their poverty are probably necessary to ensure their passive submission out of fear combined with gratitude for occasional paternalistic welfare measures made possible by a modicum of development.

50. Socioeconomic conditions (cont.)
Small countries (the Caribbean and Central America): customs fees are an important source of funds
Rentier states not bound by tradition are more vulnerable to sultanization (Sugarcane: Cuba, Dominican Republic; Oil: Venezuela, Iran (“petrolic despotism”); Copper: Zaire)
Massive doses of foreign aid and loans (Philippines: crony capitalism)

51. (2) Crisis of Sovereignty
Dominican Republic (Occupied by US marines )
Nicaragua (Occupied by US marines ; )
Cuba (Platt Amendment ( /40); Guantánamo Bay Naval Base)
Panama (The Canal Zone )
Haiti (Occupied by US marines )

52. Causes for the infringements on the sovereignty of these countries
They lie in strategically sensitive areas
Chronically unstable governments were unable to pay their debts

53. The link between foreign intervention and sultanism
Sultanistic tendencies arise when a foreign power seeks some control over a country but wants to retreat from direct occupation. The sultanistic ruler then becomes the guarantor of the external power’s interest. Therefore it is in some sense the very retreat of the foreign power that favours sultanism, since the foreign power leaves behind a partially modernized administrative and especially military apparatus that enables the ruler to concentrate power in his hands.

54. 2. Political Institutional Factors
Breakdown of Clientelistic Democracy
Decay of Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes

55. (1) Breakdown of Clientelistic Democracy
Cuba: had a constitutional government ( ), clientelistic politics and widespread corruption
The Philippines: , clientelism helped Marcos as the first sitting president to become elected to a second term in 1969

56. (2) Decay of Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes
Authoritarian regimes:
Iran: Reza Pahlavi
Haiti: Jean-Claude Duvalier
Panama: Manuel Noriega
Totalitarian regimes:
Romania: Ceausescu
Iraq: Saddam Hussein

57. 3. Leadership Factors: The Ruler’s Personality
The typical sultanistic ruler: limited education, comes from socially marginal backgrounds, shrewd but morally unscrupulous, distrustful, and vindictive, and they show an amazing capacity to lie and womanize. In addition to their hedonism, they often betray a streak of cruelty. Some dabble in the occult. The founder is often more politically savvy than his son.

58. II. The Transformation, Breakdown, and Legacy of Sultanism
The Difficulty of Political Liberalization
Sultanism and Mass Movements
After Sultanism

59. 1. The Difficulty of Political Liberalization
An established one-party state can democratize itself by allowing one or more opposition parties to contest elections. In bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, the ruling military can decide to extricate itself from the exercise of power by holding elections and handing over control to the winners of these elections. That the military ruled as an institution usually means that the extrication of the military is not contested.

60. The difficulty of liberalization (cont.)
Under sultanistic regimes the situation is different. If the sultanistic ruler decides to liberalize his regime, the chances that this might lead to democracy are limited. Since the regime is extremely personalistic, the ruler himself is the target of the opposition: compromise between the regime and the opposition becomes well-nigh impossible, since there is no neutral force to which both could appeal as an arbiter.

61. The difficulty of liberalization (cont.)
The opposition demands nothing less than the ouster of the ruler and often his trial, for it cannot lend credence to his promises to lead democratically henceforth or to abandon power peacefully, given his record of deceit and manipulation. Although there may be groups within the regime willing to defect from it, there are no trusted moderates in the regime to negotiate with, since everybody is tainted by association with the ruler. All of this means that the ruler cannot look forward to a peaceful life after his ouster. The cost of tolerating an opposition is therefore high, and this makes liberalization problematic.

62. 2. Sultanism and Mass Movements
Sultanistic regimes are more vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow (than liberal democracies or inclusionary authoritarian regimes): Cuba (1959), Iran (1979), Nicaragua (1979), and Grenada (1979)
Charismatic leaders: Fidel Castro, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and Corazon Aquino. Eden Pastora (Nicaragua) plus the myth of Sandino; Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti.

63. The role of religion Nicaragua: Christian Base Communities
Haiti: Catholic base communities (ti legliz)

64. The unreliability of sultanistic armies
The dictator has been more concerned with preventing his own overthrow by military coup than with establishing an effective fighting force.

65. Bleak prospects for democracy
After the installation of a revolutionary government, prospects for democracy are bleak. Provisional governments: The moderates in such governments are sooner or later pushed aside either by radicals (Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran) or by remnants of the old regime (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Romania)

66. 3. After Sultanism
Whether a sultanistic regime’s overthrow results in another dictatorship or a democracy, traces of it can often be found in the successor regime; the scars it leaves in a nation’s polity are deep. If the sultanistic regime is replaced by a democracy, chances are this new democracy will display strong clientelist tendencies, with the democratically elected leaders using the resources of their office to build nation-wide patron-client relationships. E.g. Joaquín Balaguer.

67. After Sultanism (cont.)
If the sultanistic regime is replaced by a revolutionary one, institution building in the new regime can be very slow (e.g. Romania).The new new system tends to pivot around the founder as long as he is alive, which means that personalism remains a feature of the system (Castro’s Cuba: “socialist caudillism”). In Cuba, as in Nicaragua, the Castro and Ortega brothers divided the presidency and the leadership of the armed forces between them, just as the Somozas and Trujillos had done before. An when the Sandinistas transferred the nationalized industries to the army after their election loss in 1990, the Ortega brothers, by maintaining their control of the army, in fact lined their pockets handsomely.

68. After Sultanism (cont.)
The “loss” of American clients in revolutions that ousted sultanistic rulers has not been easily digested by the US government. Old habits die hard: US interventions: Bay of Pigs (Cuba 1961), intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965; support for the contras in Nicaragua , and in a different way, the invasion of Panama in 1989 after the local client was no longer acceptable.

69. After Sultanism (cont.)
Conclusion: if overthrown, sultanistic regimes are more likely to be replaced by a revolutionary or an authoritarian regime than by a democracy.
Sultanistic regimes are still relevant to understand today’s world. “Guns, goons and gold” at the local level, as in some Mexican states, and Azerbaijan (Heydar and Ilham Aliyev), Uzbekistan (Islam Karimov) and Kazakhstan (Nursultan Nazarbayev)

70. AZERBAIJAN: Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003)

71. Ilham Aliyev (b. 1961) (2003-?)

72. Ilham’s wife: Mehriban Aliyeva

73. Ilham’s daughters: Leyla & Arzu

74. UZBEKISTAN: Islom Karimov (22/1 1992-2/9 2016)

75. Islom’s daughter: Gulnara Karimova (b. 8/7 1972)

76. Gulnara Karimova

77. Gulnara Karimova

78. Gulnara Karimova & Gerard Depardieu

79. Islom’s daughter: Lola Karimova (b. 3/7 1978)

80. Lola Karimova

81. Islom’s successor: Shavkat Mirziyoyev (14/12 2016-?)

82. KAZAKHSTAN: Nursultan Nazarbayev (b. 1940) (1991-)

83. Nazarbayev’s family tree of power

84. 1rst Lady: Sara Nazarbayeva (b. 1941)

85. Dariga Nazarbayeva (b. 1963), deputy prime minister (2015-16)

86. Dariga Nazarbayeva

87. Dinara Nazarbayeva (b. 1967)

88. Dinara’s crime scheme

89. Aliya Nazarbayeva (b. 1980)

90. Aliya Nazarbayeva

91. Aliya’s crime scheme