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Biography for William Swan

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Presentation on theme: "Biography for William Swan"— Presentation transcript:

1 Biography for William Swan
Chief Economist, Seabury-Airline Planning Group. AGIFORS Senior Fellow. ATRG Senior Fellow. Retired Chief Economist for Boeing Commercial Aircraft Previous to Boeing, worked at American Airlines in Operations Research and Strategic Planning and United Airlines in Research and Development. Areas of work included Yield Management, Fleet Planning, Aircraft Routing, and Crew Scheduling. Also worked for Hull Trading, a major market maker in stock index options, and on the staff at MIT’s Flight Transportation Lab. Education: Master’s, Engineer’s Degree, and Ph. D. at MIT. Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical Engineering at Princeton. Likes dogs and dark beer. I am an economist. Everyone thinks an economist can predict the stock market. If I could do that I would be so rich I could own Boeing Aircraft Company. Instead, it is the other way around. Scott Adams

2 Value of a Nonstop William Swan Chief Economist
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Marketing April 2004

3 Five Viewpoints Value --- What is it worth?
Price --- What does the Market Pay? Demand --- Does it increase travel? Market Share --- Does the airline benefit? Cost --- Is there extra cost?

4 Nonstop Value “Everyone knows” a nonstop is “worth more”
More than “standard service” “Standard Service” is an online connect Less travel time About 1.8 hours lower travel time 1 less “up-and-down” cycle (0.5 hours) Zero connect time (1.0 hours) No circuity (0.3 hours) Business value = hourly wage + overhead ? Leisure value = hourly wage – taxes ? Less travel worry No missed connections Fewer lost bags Unbroken onboard rest One less set of take-off and safety announcements

5 Utility Value Contained in Soars
Utility value for a trip includes Elapsed time Price Suitability of the time of day Nuisance of connecting process Market share model has Utility Function Determines flight choices based on values Utility function expresses consumer surplus This is precisely the value beyond price paid

6 Distinguish between Value and Payment
Marketplace economics: Create Value Get people to pay for it Part of value appears as “consumer surplus” Surplus is value beyond fare paid Nonstop value looks like about 2 hours of time Market failure to “collect” is not proof Value is still created But marginal value of time might lower

7 Operative Statement of Value
Nonstop service is “perceptibly superior” Compared to online connection Dominates at least a 4-hour window of time-of-day At least “equal value” for adjacent hours Not superior at wrong time of day Perceptibly superior criterion is important Makes nonstop first choice for demand First dibs on high-fare traffic in peak days First dibs on high load factors in off-peak days Based on matching fares

8 Important Implicit Assumption
Airline tactics for “superior” (nonstop) product Match fares Garner all high-fare demand Garner high load factor in off-peaks Greater revenues from this Compared to charging higher fares Compared to giving up “first choice” advantage Intermediate case is tempting Charge slightly higher fares, particularly in peaks Not so high as to give up “first choice” advantage Difficult balance to achieve

9 Perverse Data Possible
Data will show Majority of local O&D traffic will be on nonstop 40-75% of market, for one-a-day Nonstop tickets dominate average fare Perverse outcomes for local O&D traffic First choice for all low-fare traffic (flexible departure times) First choice for part of high-fare traffic (partial-day time windows) Nonstop mix could be heavy on low-fare Scheduling incentives also increase discount loads Local O&D discount revenues good, even discounted Relative to pro-rated connecting traffic using this leg Lower costs increase willingness to accept low fares Save connecting up-and-down cycle airplane costs Save cost of connecting passengers and bags

10 Summary of Value Nonstop creates value for sure
Roughly 2 hours trip time saved Airline unlikely to raise prices Gets higher revenues from being “first choice” Dominate high-fare demand for part of day Obtain high load factor on off-peak days Average local fare may be low Dominates low-fare market for all of day Lower cost increases willingness to carry lower fares Local revenues not diluted with pro-rate to second leg

11 Nonstop Prices Simple looks show no fare advantage
Do we believe adjusted market trends? How about side-by-side in same market?

12 Simple Look Shows No Fare Advantage for Nonstops
Regression fare formula: Fare = $166 + $0.046 * Distance Trend for US domestic fares US ticket price data by O&D available Dummy for nonstops is no help Fare = $169 + $0.045 * Distance - $14 * NON Where NON=1 if served nonstop; 0 otherwise Wrong sign, poor significance, for NON

13 Nonstop Markets Show Lower Fare Trend Before Adjusting for Market Size

14 Deeper Analysis Shows Nonstop Value is Captured
Fares decline in larger O&D markets Fare = $ *Distance-11*Ln(Pax) Ln(Pax) term means lower fares for big markets Statistical Significance of Ln(Pax) term is big Reverse causality (low fares cause high Pax) is not the explanation—because Log form attenuates Full form with nonstops: Fare = $ *Distance-16*Ln(Pax)+$36*NON $36 premium for nonstop in a market Shows value is at least partially captured

15 Bigger Markets Have Lower Fares

16 Viewing Just One Market Size Nonstop Fares are Higher

17 Nonstop Markets Trend $36 Higher, After Adjusting for Market Size

18 $36 Premium for Nonstops In comparable-sized markets, US domestic
Shows some value is captured in prices $36 for average fare Lower ($14) for discounts (25%ile fare) Values coherent with value of time This for US domestic O&D airport pairs Same market fares confirm value

19 Nonstop Premium is $20-$50 Nonstop vs. Connect in Same US O-D Market

20 $79 Premium for Atlantic Markets
Premium higher on long trips Time savings also higher Coherent with utility values Data not as certain Less consistent, year to year Fewer points, lower quality on market size Pacific markets even worse Data modified: when nonstops existed, 25% of seats offered was substituted for passenger counts. This because in DB1a data, foreign flag carriers report all onboard loads as local market in nonstop markets. So market size based on reporting is broadly overstated.

21 Atlantic Nonstop Premium is $75 Markets Served Nonstop vs
Atlantic Nonstop Premium is $75 Markets Served Nonstop vs. Connecting Markets

22 Atlantic Premium is $75-$125 Fares Nonstop and Connecting, Same O-D Market

23 Before-and-After Studies Confuse
Look at relative changes Markets served nonstop 1995 and 2000 (2q) Markets gaining nonstop services by 2000 Revenue growth is 23% higher Passengers growth is 50% higher Fares are 19% lower!! These values without size adjustments

24 Recent Nonstops Added by Low-Fare Carriers
Comparing size-adjusted fare trends Markets gaining nonstop service by 2000 Compared to markets already nonstop (in 1995) Fare trend lower in markets about to be added Fare with new nonstop barely changed Fare in older nonstop markets up 10% REVENUEs are still up 25% Different expression of demand curve

25 Conclusions about Prices
Simple look says no nonstop premium Fare trend for nonstop markets not higher Correcting for market size “fixes” paradox Strong trend of lower fares in larger markets For a size, nonstops get higher fare Results confirmed By reasonable values of time Nonstop carrier gets premium in same market But not by latest LCC before-and-after studies But recent low-fare carriers are giving value Nonstop additions creating more revenue, not higher fares

26 Demand Increases With Nonstop
Nonstop service has higher value Some of value may be captured in price Remainder of value seen as demand increase Better deal means higher demand Increased value means higher demand curve New demand point Different number of passengers Different fare Lies on higher demand curve

27 Demand Is A Curve Not a Point

28 Adding Nonstop Increases Demand About 25%
Before and after studies “Demand” curve measured as total revenue Most of increase is more passengers Fare rise can be small 25% is above nonstop fare differentials This is US domestic travel data

29 Nonstop Market Share What is “Market” What is “Share”
Demand curve with current nonstop service Old Demand curve plus one nonstop service What is “Share” Reported share of O&D passengers Share of market total revenue Share of high-fare (business) passengers Share of low-fare (leisure) passengers What is “Nonstop” One flight, with standard fare premium? Flight with all fares matched and capacity open Is observed average fare premium a mix or price result?


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