Theory and Nature of War

Theory and Nature of War
Modern Theorists I

Latter 19th Century Theorists: Prussia
Points to remember The adaptations of the Prussian Military Revolution Characteristics of the professionalism race Problems with the Schlieffen Plan GGS needed to acknowledge The adaptations of the Prussian Military Revolution included creation of a highly skilled officer corps, a general staff, planning for war in peace, developing the concept of the strategic envelopment, mission tactics, the use of railroads as strategic variables, concentrating forces prior to battle, universal conscription and reserve mobilization. Characteristics of the professionalism race included conscription and the creation of large standing armies, a large general staff, establishment of war colleges, pre-mobilization plans, and conflict over the nature of civil-military relations. Problems with the Schlieffen Plan: a focus on only the military problems to the exclusion of the political ramifications; intrinsic problems of speed, endurance and logistics; a successes that depended on poor opposing commanders. GGS needed to acknowledge the need to use diplomacy and military strategy to solve Germany’s strategic situation.

Modern Theorists I: Naval - Mahan and Corbett
8801: Lesson 8 This lesson examines how 2 maritime strategists influenced the development of maritime strategy in the early 20th Century and considers what aspects of their theories continue to affect strategic thinking today.

Overview Maritime strategy in early 20th Century
Influence on strategic thinking today

Educational Objectives
Compare the basic theories Describe how they were influenced by earlier strategists Relate “Forward…From the Sea” to these theories Explain the use of sea power as an element of military force Identify six elements that influence sea power Educational Objectives: Compare the basic theories on maritime strategy of Mahan and Corbett Describe how they were influenced by earlier strategists Relate “Forward…From the Sea” to these theories Explain the use of sea power as an element of military force employed to achieve national policy Identify six elements that influence sea power that Mahan viewed as influencing sea power.

Background Late 19th century Rising power and a declining power
Two views of Britain’s success Two historians with different approaches to the past views of sea power Background Late 19th century Imperialism Drive for colonies in Asia and Africa Reflection of European rivalries in competition for colonies Rising power and a declining power US as rising power England as a declining power Two views of Britain’s success Sea power alone As an element of national power. Two historians with different approaches to the past: selective versus broad use views of sea power: preponderance versus superiority; influence on operations ashore.

Analysis of Mahan and Corbett
The Fundamental Questions of Military Theorists Influence of historical setting? Use of historical analysis? What are his ideas? Build on or react to previous theorists? Affect on later theorists and practitioners of war? These again are the questions we will use to analyze their theories and the impact of their theories.

Alfred Thayer Mahan Background Dennis Hart Mahan Major works Insight
Purpose Son of Dennis Hart Mahan, professor of civil and military engineering at USMA, an interpreter of Jomini, Major works: 1890: The Influence of Sea Power on History ( ) 1892: The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution Both described the naval history of Great Britain: sea battles, political events, political, social, economic and military consequences. His ideas concerned the relationship between sea power and national greatness, between naval warfare and strategy. “Naval battles of the past furnish a mass of facts amply sufficient for the formulation of laws or principles which, once established, would raise maritime war to the level of a science”

Mahan’s Significance First general theory of war at sea
War at sea is a political act Defined mission for the Navy Boosted PME

Alfred Thayer Mahan Influence of historical setting?
Mahan’s sea power thesis coincided with the ideas of Darwinism Imperialism Manifest destiny Navalism Most important military writer of the period. Mahan differentiated between timeliness principles of war and fleeting tactics which are tied to technology.

Strategic Environment
Expansion West War with Mexico Civil War Industrialization Closing of the Frontier Imperialism Spanish-American War Isthmian Canal Naval Competition The United States continued it’s growth west with our acquisition of the Oregon Territory from the British and the annexation of Texas. Following closely was the Mexican-American War which consolidated United States territory from the Atlantic seaboard to the coast of the Pacific. Although this expansion occurred early in Mahan’s life, it’s effects were surely felt well into his adulthood. Before the country could fully focus on populating and developing these new territories, the issue of slavery had to be settled, and thus the Civil War. Overlaying all of these events was the rapid growth of industrialization throughout the nation and the world. With the Civil War over, the U.S. could complete the task of subduing the American Indians and in fact by the late 19th century had virtually completed this mission. European nations continued their imperialistic ways around the globe and with the deterioration of the Spanish empire in the later portion of the century, a critical vacuum in Spain’s western hemisphere colonies began to develop. Many strategic thinkers, including Mahan, feared that some other European nation might try to step through this breach, and establish a foothold in the Americas. Mahan particularly felt that the building of an canal across the isthmus of the Americas would be an added and irresistible temptation to those powers.

Strategic Environment
Technological Change Sail to Steam Armor Ordnance U.S. Navy Revival Meanwhile a naval arms race was on among the industrialized nations as each tried to outdo the other in both expanding and modernizing their fleets. Technological Change Sail to Steam Armor Ordnance U.S. Navy Revival

Alfred Thayer Mahan Use of historical analysis?
Mahan sought a useable past: history should teach lessons in the form of fundamental principles. Mahan used the comparative method which drew analogues between land warfare and war at sea, military and naval ‘science’ and the past and the present. Mahan viewed history as the manifestation of a divinely ordered plan. “Nothing could be more practical for a naval officer than the study of history in order to formulate principles and methods by which war may be carried on to the best advantage.” Mahan argues that an analysis of the rise and fall of empires in the course of history revealed that mastery of the seas had been a determinant of victory in war and of prosperity in peace. In Mahan’s view the major lesson of history was that control of maritime commerce through command of the sea was the primary function of navies. Wars are won by economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea.factor

Alfred Thayer Mahan What are his ideas? The fundamentals of strategy
Civil-military relations The importance of material and moral factors The influence of individuals on events Relationship between offense and defense The importance of chance

Fundamentals of Strategy
Thesis: Mastery of the seas made nations victorious in war and prosperous in peace. Not all nations possessed the raw ingredients of sea power were. Principles of strategy included Lines of communication Central position Interior lines Key: concentration for a decisive victory Thesis: Mastery of the seas made nations victorious in war and prosperous in peace. Not all nations possessed the raw ingredients of sea power were. Insight: The clue to the rise and fall of empires was control of the sea or lack of it. A historic factor that had never been systematically appreciated and expounded. Principles of strategy included Lines of communication Central position Interior lines Key: concentration for a decisive victory over the enemy’s main battle fleet, thereby gaining command of the sea. Mahan stressed the importance of lines of communication, the central position and interior lines.

Mahan’s Theory of Sea Power
“That overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from the sea or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which by controlling the great common, closes the highway by which commerce moves to and from the enemy’s shores.” This is one definition you’ll find in Mahan’s writings.

Characteristics of a maritime power 1. Geographic position 2. Physical conformation 3. Extent of territory 4. Number of population 5. National character 6. Character of the government Mahan postulated there were six general conditions affecting sea power. The first of these was a nation’s geographic position. Mahan felt that if a nation was not forced to defend itself by land, or induced to attack another, that this is an advantage of geography. This seems to be a pretty convoluted way of saying island. Mahan also stated that this geographic position could sometimes be further enhanced by providing a central position which will assist in the concentration of ones own forces and facilitate attacks on an adversary. The second condition is physical conformation. This refers to the relative access of a nation to the sea both from it’s coast and from the interior via navigable rivers and bays. Numerous and deep harbors are a source of strength in this area. Extent of territory is third and refers to the length of the coastline and the character of the harbors available. As you can tell there is some overlap in these first three criteria. They are grouped by Mahan into what the called “the natural conditions.” The fourth condition is the number of the population. This is not just the raw total number of a nations citizens, but must be tempered and compared with the number engaged in sea-going vocations or at least suited to such. Fifth is the national character. Mahan felt that sea power was based on peaceful and extensive commerce and that therefore the national character must include a strong leaning towards mercantilism in order to be successful. He claimed that the love of money was a good thing and was the key feature of all nations which had shown greatness upon the sea. Sixth is character of the government. In a nutshell, the government has to be faithful to the the will of the people and provide intelligent direction. It should also promote the growth and strength of sea going commerce and build a brilliant navy. These points were covered in your reading in great detail. In each case Mahan provides numerous historical examples in support of his thesis. These elements were universal and timeless in character. 1. Geographic Position: An island was an advantage, not force to defend itself. 2. Physical Conformation: access to seas from interior via rivers and bays. Numerous and deep harbors 3. Extent of Territory: length of coastline and character of the harbors 4. Number of Population: number engaged in sea-going occupations or suited to them 5. National Character: strong leaning towards commerce and business 6. Character of the Government: faithful to the will of the people, provide intelligent direction, promote eth the growth and strength of sea-going commerce and build a strong navy.

Production Shipping Colonies Mahan himself stated the meaning could be covered by three items. By production, Mahan meant the ability and necessity of producing products for exchange or trade. He felt that by this trade, national wealth would be accumulated. By shipping Mahan referred to both Naval ships and merchantmen and strongly felt that both were essential to Sea Power. A healthy sea borne commerce Lastly, Mahan felt that colonies were required as not only markets for our goods, but as protected points for our lines of communications upon the sea. The fairly short legs of the coal fired warships of the day, forced frequent stops to refuel and the need for protected harbors in which to rearm and replenish. Mahan’s ideas comprised a trinity of commerce, colonies and bases. A healthy sea borne foreign commerce Reliable terminals of trade as sources of raw materials and as markets The means to protect the lines of communication and the terms of trade at the terminals by force.

Battleships and Merchantmen Sea Lines of Communication Overseas Bases Concentration of Forces Decisive Battle “Communications dominate war….” Need bases for fuel, ammo, and food. According to Mahan, navies should Build in time of peace Concentrate the battle fleet in time of crisis and or war In war engage the adversary’s main naval forces. Navies were better instruments than armies: Less blunt Less symbolic of aggressive intent More mobile More responsive to political direction.

Battleships and Merchantmen Sea Lines of Communication Overseas Bases Concentration of Forces Decisive Battle Mahan felt the sea power required both the fleet to fight the sea battle, but also and just as importantly, a robust merchant marine to carry goods to and from our colonies and foreign trading partners. Mahan was also a believer in the battleship and in designing it to maximize fleet combat power, not necessarily individual ship combat power. It is worthy of mention that Mahan rejected guerre de course as a proper or effective strategy for a navy. He carried this argument through to his recommendation for the makeup of the fleet, intentionally rejecting cruiser and small ship construction in favor of armored battleships. Mahan believed Sea lines of communication were of vital importance and that without secure ones, a nations strength and economic well being were in great danger. As a corollary those same SLOCs are critical for allowing the fleet to operate away from the home country. The ability to protect your own locs and interdict an adversary's are at the root of national power and is the prerogative of the sea powers. The only way to keep the SLOCs secure was through the acquisition of overseas bases which could provide for the loading and storage of vital supplies such as fuel, ammo, and food. They also act as safe havens for merchantmen engaged in our overseas trade. Mahan insisted that concentration was the predominant principle of naval warfare. This was driven home at the war college to the point where the phrase “Never divide the fleet” became the USN’s mantra. The object of the fleet should always be the enemy’s fleet which you should seek to destroy in decisive battle and with your subsequent command of the sea, ultimate victory will soon follow.

Command of the Sea through naval superiority. That combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces national wealth and greatness. Command of the Sea through naval superiority. That combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces national wealth and greatness.

Principles of Naval Warfare
Central Position Interior Lines Secure SLOCs

Additional Principles of Naval Warfare
Concentration of Forces: “Never divide the fleet” Offensive Operations Superior to Defensive Overseas Bases Decisive Battle (vice Commerce Raiding) Blockade After Command of the Sea Achieved Mahanian Pillars of Naval Strategy Concentration to gain local superiority by using naval mobility The predominant principle: to be superior in one quarters while holding the enemy in the other. Objective: the proper objective for was the organized military force of the enemy. Guerre de course (commerce raiding) was not a proper or effective strategy for a navy. Overseas bases: a successful maritime strategy then depended upon naval bases and access to them by the fleet: distant coaling stations.d were needed. And secure SLOCs Offensive: was must be waged offensively and aggressively. Control of the sea by reducing the enemy’s navy is the determining consideration in a naval war. France’s fault was using her fleet defensively, yielding the weather gauge, over-reliance on commerce raiding. Communications - positions, lines logistics dominate.

Additional Principles of Naval Warfare
Concentration of Forces: “Never divide the fleet” Offensive Operations Superior to Defensive Overseas Bases Decisive Battle (vice Commerce Raiding) Blockade After Command of the Sea Achieved Mahan felt the sea power required both the fleet to fight the sea battle, but also and just as importantly, a robust merchant marine to carry goods to and from our colonies and foreign trading partners. Mahan was also a believer in the battleship and in designing it to maximize fleet combat power, not necessarily individual ship combat power. It is worthy of mention that Mahan rejected guerre de course as a proper or effective strategy for a navy. He carried this argument through to his recommendation for the makeup of the fleet, intentionally rejecting cruiser and small ship construction in favor of armored battleships. Mahan believed Sea lines of communication were of vital importance and that without secure ones, a nations strength and economic well being were in great danger. As a corollary those same SLOCs are critical for allowing the fleet to operate away from the home country. The ability to protect your own locs and interdict an adversary's are at the root of national power and is the prerogative of the sea powers. The only way to keep the SLOCs secure was through the acquisition of overseas bases which could provide for the loading and storage of vital supplies such as fuel, ammo, and food. They also act as safe havens for merchantmen engaged in our overseas trade. Mahan insisted that concentration was the predominant principle of naval warfare. This was driven home at the war college to the point where the phrase “Never divide the fleet” became the USN’s mantra. The object of the fleet should always be the enemy’s fleet which you should seek to destroy in decisive battle and with your subsequent command of the sea, ultimate victory will soon follow.

Alfred Thayer Mahan Mahan
Build on or react to previous theorists? Jomini? Clausewitz? Jomini? Clausewitz?

Mahan the Jominian Scientific, Prescriptive Enduring Principles
Objective - Enemy Battle Fleet Concentrate Forces at the Decisive Point Decisive Battle Lines of Communication In what ways was Mahan Jominian? First of all, both felt that strategy was the key to warfare. That all strategy is controlled and defined by invariable scientific principles and that these principles as applied to strategy were constant and enduring. Both based their articles of strategy on the study of past masters Napoleon for Jomini, and the Royal Navy for Mahan. In the land battle Jomini emphasized focus on the enemy army while at sea Mahan stressed the object should be the enemy fleet. The decisive battle with your forces concentrated at the correct point and time was the goal. Lines of communication were also stressed by both as well as the importance of interior lines. Mahan somewhat divorced strategy from politics and diplomacy. Subordinated strategy to policy as a central theme.

Alfred Thayer Mahan Mahan
Affect on later theorists and practitioners of war? Most important military writer of the period.

Mahan’s Influence Read widely in both Europe and Japan
Shipbuilding and Expansion Spanish-American War Panama Canal Wrote 20 books and over 137 articles Mahan was published in many leading journals of the day including Atlantic monthly, forum, and of course proceedings. He also received honorary degrees from Harvard and Yale. Both Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, and Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the Secretary of State for Naval Affairs in Germany, read and respected Mahan’s works and used them to formulate German naval strategy in the buildup prior to the first world war. In Japan, the government placed translations of Mahan’s works in all schools, and adopted “The Influence of Sea Power upon History, ” as a textbook at the naval and military colleges. Mahan was a strong advocate for an isthmian canal, believing it necessary for the protection of the United States by allowing the fleet to swing quickly from one ocean to another as required to defeat any enemy. This fit nicely with his dictum, “Do not divide the fleet.” Importantly, Mahan also had friends in high places. Required reading at the NWC in early 20th Century Somewhat overtaken by war-gaming in the inter War Years Some influence in WWII Overcome today by the idea of interdependence of armed services.

Mackinder’s Heartland (1904)
Control of a central strategic or pivotal area determined greatness: the heartland.

Once said of Mahan… “... the peculiar psychology of the Navy Department, which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church.” - Henry L. Stimson This quote is from Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War from 1940 to He felt there was a peculiar psychology within the Navy Department, which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic, into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church.”

Alfred Thayer Mahan What are his ideas about
The fundamentals of strategy Civil-military relations The importance of material and moral factors The ability of individuals to affect events Relationship between offense and defense The importance of chance in war

Critique of Mahan Use of history Over-emphasis on sea power
Necessary v sufficient cause Use of history: research should not be the prime concern of historians. Historian should select and group material top present a comprehensive picture. His main concern was “the artistic grouping of subordinate details around a central theme.” Over-emphasis on the element of sea power in the determination of historical results Similar to Mackinder, Huntington in their single factor theories. Oversimplification by omission: other factors could explain Britain's victory over France: land operations, diplomatic success, terrain and geography, financial burdens. Necessary versus sufficient cause: insight hardened into conclusion which was then supported by the appropriate facts. Probably the most influential military writer the US has produced so far.

Mahan’s Relevance Today?
Merchant Marine SLOCs, Overseas Bases Concentration, Decisive Battle Sea Power and Great Power Sea Power and National Strategy Today our merchant marine is shrinking as well as our ship building industry and pool of active mariners. Much of this is due to the tax advantages of Liberian and Panamanian registry. I’m not sure if this makes us weak but it certainly does not make those two countries naval powers. What is probably important is that we control shipping and have access to markets. GATT and other trade treaties also have their impact by opening markets in the global economy. SLOCs are still important and the navy expends a great deal of energy conducting freedom Of navigation Operations to ensure that critical passages stay open. Look at what happened when the Iranians attempted to interdict the flow of oil through the straits of Hormuz. Overseas bases have become less important as the Navy has become better at Underway replenishment. We still have to plug in some where but our line up of allies throughout the world gives us whatever access we need. We still concentrate for the decisive battle. During the Gulf War carriers and amphibious ships came both coasts. Sea power is still a requirement to be a great power. In fact if you submit to the premise that we are currently the only great power left, you must also recognize that we are also the only Navy still around with global presence. There is a connection. The Navy is a critical player in our national strategy. The naval services are usually the first on the scene in any crisis and are specifically designed and trained to control the situation and facilitate the introduction of follow-on forces.

Sir Julian Corbett Background Briton Works Purpose A Clausewitzian,
concerned with the position of Britain at the end of the 19th century, a declining naval power Faced with a limited budget and limited manpower resources Interested in obtaining local command of the sea as opposed to Mahan’s emphasis on total command of the sea Official historian for the Royal Navy Provided the royal Navy with a coherent doctrine of maritime strategy Emphasized modernizing naval policy and assisted in the formation of a group of reformers.

Sir Julian Corbett The Fundamental Questions of Military Theorists
Influence of historical setting? Use of historical analysis? What are his ideas? Build on or react to previous theorists? Affect on later theorists and practitioners of war?

Sir Julian Corbett Influence of historical setting?
In 1904 Britain moved from an imperialist 19th century strategy to a protectionist 20th century strategy as Britain faced emerging powers. Concerned with the position of Britain at the end of the 19th century: A declining naval power Faced with a limited budget and limited manpower resources Criticized the inefficiency of naval education which combined the evils of formal education with afloat sea training. Advocated alternating periods of training at sea with power In 1904 the Admiralty began the concentration of the battle fleet in home waters, a turn away from previous policy to the new alignments necessitated by the rise of German naval power.Britain

Sir Julian Corbett Use of historical analysis?
Took a wide view of history and focused on the wide scope of national and international events. Wrote about current events rather than historical events. Combined meticulous research with broad generalizations about national policy and grand strategy Britain’s success as a first-rate power involved the combined interplay and exploitation of all her naval, military economic, and diplomatic resources in a comprehensive policy.

The British Way In Maritime Warfare
Limited, not absolute war

Requirements for Limited War
Object must be limited in area Of limited political importance Remote or capable of being isolated:

Limited Wars Maritime Nations Eighteenth Century Wars of England
Crimean War ( ) Spanish-American War (1898) Russo-Japanese War ( )

Sir Julian Corbett What are his ideas about?
The fundamentals of strategy The fundamentals of strategy Rejected the simplistic notion of the battle as decisive in itself, arguing that it was only a means to an end. Britain’s success as a first-rate power involved the combined interplay and exploitation of all her naval, military, economic, and diplomatic resources in a comprehensive policy. The object of naval warfare was to directly or indirectly secure or deny control of the sea. The ultimate purpose of naval forces working in the service of the government’s wider policy objectives was to pressure the enemy in various ways, to assist the army, the diplomats and the country’s allies. Command of the Sea meant control of maritime communications and the passage of public and private property in the area. Not privateering, but the blockading of ports in a tactical commercial blockade. Control of the sea can be general or local; permanent or temporary, but never absolute. General and permanent control means that the enemy cannot interfere with our maritime trade and overseas operations so seriously as to effect the issue of the war and that the enemy cannot carry on his own trade and operations except at such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of practical strategy. The true value of sea power lies in its influence on the operation of armies. The fleet and the army were one weapon. Relationship between offense and defense The importance of chance in war

What a maritime strategy must do
Support or obstruct diplomacy Protect or destroy commerce Further or hinder military operations ashore

Corbett’s Trinity Support diplomacy Protect or destroy commerce
Support or defeat shore operations Factors affecting sea power

Sir Julian Corbett What are his ideas about? Civil-military relations
The function of fleet has been to support diplomatic effort , protect or destroy commerce, further or hinder operations ashore. The success of the Anglo-Saxons has been to a large degree conditioned by the fact that their historical evolution created institutions that simply assumed the supremacy of political over military considerations and the dangers inherent in r4esorting to violence in pursuit of policy.

The importance of material and moral factors The importance of material and moral factors Preponderance depended on Relative strength, physical or moral, the interrelation of naval positions: naval bases terminals of LOCs or trade routes, focal areas of LOCs The preponderant power usually seeks a quick decision while the weaker side will seek to avoid or postpone a decision in hope of turning the balance in its favor. Cautioned against the dangerous tendency of naval thought to confine itself to perfection of the weapon and to neglect the art of using it.

The ability of individuals to affect events The ability of individuals to affect events: Attempted to explain Britain’s success as a maritime power from the perspective of the men who had actually developed and executed its policies.

Sir Julian Corbett What are his ideas about ?
Relationship between offense and defense Relationship between offense and defense Naval strategy is concerned with dispute over control of the sea in an offensive or defensive manner. Not in the same manner as conquering territory. Concerned with right of passage, a means of communication that affects national life. Similar to Clausewitz’s ideas

The importance of chance in war The importance of chance in war

The fundamentals of strategy Civil-military relations The importance of material and moral factors The ability of individuals to affect events Relationship between offense and defense The importance of chance in war The fundamentals of strategy Civil-military relations The importance of material and moral factors The ability of individuals to affect events Relationship between offense and defense The importance of chance in war

Principles: Clausewitz
All wars tend to the absolute The object is enemy's army Only the offensive matters Napoleon, master of war Cult of the decisive battle From Clausewitz: All wars tend to the absolute The object is enemy's army Only the offensive matters Napoleon, master of war Cult of the decisive battle

Blue Water School Fleet engagements decisive
Command of the seas absolute Battleships the key to victory Mahan

Real Command Of The Sea SLOCs, SLOCs, and SLOCs Corbett

The Navy’s Projectile: The Army
Small Forces, Strategically Targeted

Sir Julian Corbett Build on or react to previous theorists?
Corbett influenced by Clausewitz Use of history Interrelationship of the elements of national power. Naval strategy an integral part of the art of war. Mahan influenced by Jomini: Fundamental principles from the past Importance of mass at the decisive point thru concentration, central position and interior lines, relationship between logistics and combat. An imperialist

Sir Julian Corbett Affect on later theorists and practitioners of war?
Most important military writer of the period.

Critique of Corbett Applicability Utility
Only applicable to maritime powers Not a pocket reference guide

Summary: Corbett Questions?

Issues for Consideration
Jomini and Mahan Concept of sea power Guerre d’escadre Navies vice Armies Six Critical Elements Corbett’s Basic Premise Balanced Fleet Concept Land vice Naval Warfare Guerre de Course Jomini and Mahan Concept of sea power Guerre d’escadre (decisive fleet engagement) Navies vice Armies? Mahan’s Changing Views Six Critical Elements Corbett’s Basic Premise Balanced Fleet Concept Land vice Naval Warfare: navies were cheaper Guerre de Course: privateering or commerce raiding

Issues for Consideration
Jomini Mahan Sir Julian Corbett concurred with Mahan on: Command of the sea is of prime importance Commerce raiding (or "guerre de course) is the strategy of the weaker power Lines of communication are crucial in warfare Corbett and Mahan based viewpoints on different thinkers Mahan’s influence: Jomini whose work depended heavily on fixed principles that could be stated with mathematical precision and comprehensiveness. Sir Julian Corbett's influence, Clausewitz, stressed: The relationship of strategy to government policy The interdependence of all elements of national power; The contingency of any set of principles regarding war. Sir Julian Corbett's Differences from Mahan Command of the sea is important, the normal state of affairs is an uncommanded sea Control of the sea, as and where required, is often sufficient The interdependence of land and sea forces is crucial to the success of a national military -effort Technology may in some cases influence outcome more than tactics; strategic thinking itself may have to be changed. While winning a decisive battle against the enemy's main fleet is a worthy ideal, in actuality the Navy may have other, more important missions in support of national policies.

Concept of Sea Power Employment of the fleet Forward…From the Sea
Employment of the fleet: Mahan’s changing views Forward…From the Sea: Mahan: Forward deployed forces Sea control and maritime supremacy Strategic sealift Emphasis on bases “lines of strategic approach” Sea power is more economical than land power Corbett: Away from a global maritime threat Multinational or ad hoc coalition Massing of naval units can complement Army and Air Force units to provide a joint force Naval forces of combined arms, forward presence. Sea control

Guerre d’escadre Large fleet of capital ships?
Why a large fleet of capital ships? Necessary to win the decisive battle to achieve command of the sea.

Navies versus Armies Armies were not necessary for the defense of an island. Navy could strangle an enemy's force by a blockade.

Six Critical elements Characteristics of a Maritime Power
Geographic Position Physical Conformation Extent of Territory Number of Population National Character Character of the Government These elements were universal and timeless in character. 1. Geographic Position: An island was an advantage, not forced to defend itself. 2. Physical Conformation: access to seas from interior via rivers and bays. Numerous and deep harbors 3. Extent of Territory: length of coastline and character of the harbors 4. Number of Population: number engaged in sea-going occupations or suited to them 5. National Character: strong leaning towards commerce and business 6. Character of the Government: faithful to the will of the people, provide intelligent direction, promote eth the growth and strength of sea-going commerce and build a strong navy.

Corbett Basic Premise Concept of the balanced fleet
Fundamental difference between Land Warfare Naval Warfare Basic Premise: Command of the sea means control of maritime communications. Concept of the balanced fleet to gain and maintain sea control through combined operations The balanced fleet was necessary to gain and maintin sea control through all sorts of operations. Fundamental difference between Land Warfare and Naval Warfare had to do with control of communications rather than conquest of territory.

Summary Mahan and Corbett
Mahan postulated there were six general conditions affecting sea power. The first of these was a nation’s geographic position. Mahan felt that if a nation was not forced to defend itself by land, or induced to attack another, that this is an advantage of geography. This seems to be a pretty convoluted way of saying island. Mahan also stated that this geographic position could sometimes be further enhanced by providing a central position which will assist in the concentration of ones own forces and facilitate attacks on an adversary. The second condition is physical conformation. This refers to the relative access of a nation to the sea both from it’s coast and from the interior via navigable rivers and bays. Numerous and deep harbors are a source of strength in this area. Extent of territory is third and refers to the length of the coastline and the character of the harbors available. As you can tell there is some overlap in these first three criteria. They are grouped by Mahan into what the called “the natural conditions.” The fourth condition is the number of the population. This is not just the raw total number of a nations citizens, but must be tempered and compared with the number engaged in sea-going vocations or at least suited to such. Fifth is the national character. Mahan felt that sea power was based on peaceful and extensive commerce and that therefore the national character must include a strong leaning towards mercantilism in order to be successful. He claimed that the love of money was a good thing and was the key feature of all nations which had shown greatness upon the sea. Sixth is character of the government. In a nutshell, the government has to be faithful to the the will of the people and provide intelligent direction. It should also promote the growth and strength of sea going commerce and build a brilliant navy. These points were covered in your reading in great detail. In each case Mahan provides numerous historical examples in support of his thesis. Mahan and Corbett Two views of naval strategy.

Points to remember: Mahan’s beliefs Corbett and sea control
FFS and Corbett and Mahan Mahan’s Six General Conditions Mahan’s beliefs: Sea power as an instrument of war based on his study of Jomini Both C. and J. believed that the statesman and the commander occupies related fields Mahan applied Jominian principles of concentration and mass to naval strategy and tactics The values of the central position and interior liens applied to naval strategy and tactics. Corbett and sea control: localized, never total or absolute FFS and Corbett and Mahan have in common: From Corbett: power projection from sea to land and forcible entry From Mahan: the use of N&MC assets to seize and defend advanced naval bases such as ports and airfields. Mahan’s Six General Conditions Geographic Position Physical Conformation Extent of Territory Number of Population National Character Character of the Government

Finally The other line always moves faster.
A Smith and Wesson beats four aces.

Theory and Nature of War

Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "Theory and Nature of War"— Presentation transcript:

Similar presentations

About project

Feedback

Log in

Auth with social network:

Theory and Nature of War

Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "Theory and Nature of War"— Presentation transcript:

Similar presentations

About project

Feedback