1. “Secret voting, Public counting”

2. Agenda Credentials How is cheating done
How should we automate our elections
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
Concerns about PCOS
Other alternatives to election automation
Conclusion

3. TransparentElections.org.ph We are NOT vendors of election systems
We are IT practitioners from way back
We have been advocating for election automation since 1993
We were members of the TWG that helped craft RA 9369
We are the team that ran Namfrel’s parallel counts from and we used computers in all those counts.

4. TransparentElections.org.ph
Concerned citizens w/experience on electoral count in Namfrel and Comelec ( ):
Christian S. Monsod – former chair Namfrel/Comelec
Gus Lagman – headed Namfrel Count in 10 electoral exercises; past president (4-terms), Phil. Computer Society
Ed Castaneda – past president, Phil. Computer Society
Dr. Bill Torres – president, Phil. Internet Service Organization
Didi Manarang – former Principal, SGV
Maricor Akol – president, PhilNITS
Ito Gruet – director, Phil. Software Industry Ass’n
Lito Averia – IT Security expert
Bill Luz – former Secretary-General, Namfrel
JR Contreras – past president, Phil. Internet Service Org.
Jade Deinla – president, Xinapse
Joel Layson – IT systems expert

5. TransparentElections.org.ph Resources from the academe (UP):
Dr. Jaime D.L. Caro, Professor and Chair, Dept. of Computer Science, U.P.
Dr. Prospero C. Naval, Associate Professor, Dept. of Computer Science, U.P.
Dr. Henry Adorna, Associate Professor, Dept. of Computer Science, U.P.
Prof. Rommel Feria, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Computer Science, U.P.
Anne Ivy Mirasol, Instructor, Dept. of Computer Science, U.P.
Francis Limgenco, Project Manager, Diliman Computer Science Foundation/Software Edge
Noel Feria, Programmer
Michelle Lee Moscatel, Programmer
Fatima Leyno – Programmer
Khristine Fajardo – Programmer
Victor Endriga, Documentation Specialist
Cherrielynn Dinio, Project Coordinator

6. TransparentElections.org.ph Other resources from the academe (Ateneo):
Dr. Pablo Manalastas, Retired Professor, Dept. of Information Systems and Computer Science, Ateneo de Manila University
Dr. Rafael Saldana, Associate Professor, High Performance Computing Group, Ateneo de Manila University
Dr. Felix Muga, Associate Professor, High Performance Computing Group, Ateneo de Manila University

7. How is cheating done?

8. Retail cheating
Vote-buying (carbon paper, ballot marking, “Lanzadera”)
Ballot box snatching
Ballot box stuffing
“Flying voters”

9. To vote once & only once…

10. Manipulation of precinct counts
Votes counted as
Recorded in words as

11. Wholesale Cheating

12. Manipulation of provincial results
Municipal
Certificate of
Canvass
Provincial
Certificate of
Canvass

13. Manipulation in the official municipal & provincial canvass
Official Official
municipal provincial Illegal
canvass canvass votes
Mun. A ,000
City B ,000
Illegal votes from 22 other towns in this Province for a senatorial candidate in the 1995 elections equaled 112,994.

14. Anatomy of
DAGDAG-BAWAS

15. Province 5 Cand. A % Cand. B Total Voters Total % COC: 87,520 100%
NAMFREL:
15,925
20%
58,292
75%
77,967
89%
NAMFREL Trend:
1,951
7,142
COC Increment:
9,553
11%

16. Province 5 Cand.A % Cand. B Total Voters Total % COC: 33,634 38%
49,803
57%
87,520
100%
NAMFREL:
15,925
20%
58,292
75%
77,967
89%
NAMFREL Trend:
1,951
7,142
COC Increment:
17,709
185%
(8,489)
-89%
9,553
11%

17. Province 5 COC: 33,634 38% 49,803 57% 87,520 100% NAMFREL: 15,925 20%
Cand. A %
Cand. B
Total Voters
Total %
COC:
33,634
38%
49,803
57%
87,520
100%
NAMFREL:
15,925
20%
58,292
75%
77,967
89%
NAMFREL Trend:
1,951
7,142
COC Increment:
17,709
185%
(8,489)
-89%
9,553
11%
Dagdag Bawas:
15,758
(15,631)
Dagdag bawas =
31,389

18. Dagdag-Bawas Summary 598,560 Dagdag-Bawas % Total Voters Province 1
103,359
75.8
136,297
Province 2
153,761
64.9
236,768
Province 3
134,505
57.9
232,010
Province 4
60,615
41.33
146,652
Province 5
31,389
35.86
87,520
Province 6
53,798
19.4
277,318
Province 7
38,844
12.35
314,577
Province 8
22,289
9.17
242,944
Estimated Total
598,560

19. Retail cheating is bad; it impacts the results of local elections
But wholesale cheating is much worse; it impacts the results of national elections; and it happens because of the long canvassing period

20. And so to minimize, if not eliminate cheating, and to speed up the election process, an automation law was enacted in 1997 (R.A. 8436), then amended in 2007 by R.A. 9369

21. How should we automate our elections?

22. The Manual Election Process
the VOTING period hours
PRECINCT COUNTING 12 hours
CANVASSING days!
Municipal canvassing
Provincial canvassing
National canvassing
It’s very obvious which phase should be automated!

23. Looking at it from another perspective
If we change the voting system, then we have to train million voters on the new system; we also have to train some 500,000 teachers.
If we automate the precinct counting, then the process loses its transparency; counting will not be seen by the voting public; automated cheating becomes a real possibility.
If we automate only the canvassing, then we still cut down the election process from 40 days to maybe 5 days. We can still prevent wholesale cheating (dagdag-bawas).

24. The question to ask is …
Did the Comelec consider these basic facts before it decided on which technology to use?

25. COMELEC’s Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)

26. OMR (Precinct Count Optical Scan, or PCOS)
Voters mark pre- printed ballots
Voters feed ballots into OMR (PCOS)
Ballots drop automatically into ballot box
At end of voting, votes counted; ERs printed
PCOS electronically sends ERs and scanned ballots to CMBOC w/c will print SOV, COC
ERs also sent to NBOC w/c will forward data to dominant party, dominant opposition, citizens’ arm, and media
CMBOC sends SOV/COC to PBOC w/c will print Prov SOVs and COCs
PBOC sends PSOV/PCOC to NBOC w/c will print final results
OMR (Precinct Count Optical Scan, or PCOS)
CITY/MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS
PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS
NATIONAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS
DOMINANT
PARTY
OPPOSITION
CITIZENS
ARM
MEDIA &
OTHERS
VOTING CENTER
OMR
PRECINCTS

27. Precinct Count Optical Scan
the VOTING period hours
(80,000 precincts; 1,000 voters per)
PRECINCT COUNTING 02 seconds
ER printing hour
CANVASSING days

28. Concerns about Comelec’s OMR-based automation plans
Reliability of the machines/system
Readiness of the Comelec to manage full automation
Software is proprietary/counting not transparent

29. The newspapers reported that the automation of the last ARMM election was successful.
Was it?

30. Problems with DRE
Problems in the initialization of voting machines since some of the BEIs committed repeated errors in punching their pin codes. Designated IT experts had to take over the initialization process to speed up the process because this has caused delay in voting.
Operational delays in starting the machine due to defective DREs which were however immediately replaced.
Incidents of automatic machine shut down while the voters were casting their votes. It was resolved by replacing the electronic voting machines (EVMs).
Many BEIs were unfamiliar with the EVM due to the overnight substitution of BEIs with untrained persons which could have been perpetrated by interested parties.

31. Problems with DRE (cont.)
Many voters and BEIs were unfamiliar with the system since there was hardly any opportunity to see and test the DRE before the elections, this could be attributable to lack of voter education due to time constraints.
There were several instances where illiterate voters and those who were not familiar with the new system were being accompanied by another person inside the precincts as coach. The relationship between the voter and his/her companion was not properly validated. These so called coaches do not only guide the voters inside the voting precincts but even control the hand of the voter as to who to vote. Even some of the BEIs and watchers have been seen coaching the voters as well.
On the secrecy of voting, there were no booths to cover the DRE machines enabling the voters of another adjacent DRE machine to see the votes being cast.
Size of the candidates’ pictures (too small) made the image unclear.

32. Problems with OMR
Votes shaded in the OMR ballot were exposed to tampering. Reports of unscrupulous erasures were documented.
The distribution of the official OMR Ballots were likewise exposed to the threat of advance shading.
The voters would sometimes accidentally scratch or ink- blot the OMR ballots which hampered its optical scanning.
The folding and unfolding of OMR ballots resulted to some extent in time inefficiency at the counting centers.
In a number of the PPCRV’s poll watchers reports, some BEIs, accidentally perhaps, tore off the bar code of the ballots resulting in their rejection.
The BEIs had the lack of procedural knowledge on the disposition of invalid ballots.

33. Problems with OMR (cont.)
Valid ballots that were crumpled, folded (to fit in the size of the ballot box) and those that contained unnecessary markings or smudges as well as those lightly shaded ballots were rejected, which slowed down the counting.
The number of ballots to be counted per ACM was not as it was projected. There are discrepancies in the counting of ballots between those who actually voted with results counted. An example of this was experienced in one of the precincts of Shariff Kabunsuan where the actual number of voters is 371 but the machine counted only 276, there was a discrepancy of 95 ballots papers. But, after the BEIs conducted a recount the machine counted 365.
Incidents of over voting in some precincts that used OMR, such as Bumbaran, Lanao del Sur, were also encountered because of BEIs voting in their assigned precincts. In these cases the result was invalidated (treated as zero) and COMELEC had to override it.

34. Problems with OMR (cont.)
The Counting and Canvassing System (CCS) was not programmed to accommodate failure of elections in some municipalities, such as Balindong, Lanao del Sur and Basilan, thus the machine had to be shut down to force the system to close the counting. There were incidents wherein the system would not close the counting and canvassing since it showed that it didn’t count 100% of the total votes from all the precincts though all precincts were able to count the votes.
Some ACMs to include laptops and printers overheated, stopped functioning and had to be re-started.
Constant paper jamming (of the OMR Ballots).
The attached full 196-key Keyboard in the ACM is open to programming intrusion.

35. Concerns about Comelec’s automation plans
Reliability of the machines/system
Readiness of the Comelec to manage full automation
Software is proprietary/counting not transparent

36. Post-election Report of the Advisory Council on the Use of Automated Election System (AES) in the 2008 ARMM Elections October, 2008
“The existing IT infrastructure in COMELEC is inadequate to meet the complexities of an automated election process …”
“In effective change management, project implementers must first undergo rigid training so that its trickle effect to the voters at the precinct level becomes more efficient.”

37. Congressional oversight committee hearing
When the Comelec decided on the technology to use, they still didn’t know the font-size of the candidate names on the ballot.
And they have not even done a time-and- motion study on how fast or how slow it would take a voter to fill up a ballot.

38. PDI inch 7/7/ ballot??

39. With that kind of ballot, we are not now looking only at losing the transparency of precinct counting, we are also looking at compromising the secrecy of the ballot!

40. Calendar of Activities
Activity
Start
Finish 1
Recommendation of technology to be used
Done 2
Preparation and approval of Request for Proposal 3
Release of Budget 4
Publication of Invitation to Bid 5
Issuance of Invitation to Bid and Bid Documents 6
Pre-bid Conference 7
Public Bidding 8
End-to-end demonstration of proposal 9
Bid evaluation and post-qualification 10
Issue Notice of Award 11
Contract preparation and signing 12
Approval of Contract 13
Issue Notice to Proceed

41. Activity
Start
Finish 14
Customization of systems and systems development 15
Delivery of systems and machines 16
Testing of systems and machines 17
Field Test 1 18
Field Test 2, if needed 19
Mock election 20
CAC/TEC Systems Certification 21
COMELEC Systems Acceptance 22
Training of COMELEC technical personnel 23
Training of COMELEC field personnel on operation 24
Conduct of public demonstration using machines

42. Activity
Start
Finish 25
Creation of machine configuration, ballot face, etc. 26
Printing of official ballots 27
Setting of configuration of machines 28
Setting of configuration for ARMM 29
Testing machines in their actual configuration with the ballots 30
Testing machines in their actual configuration with the ballots for ARMM 31
Deployment of machines/transmission equipment 32
Deployment of machines/transmission equipment for ARMM 33
Preparation of transmission sites 34
Preparation of transmission sites for ARMM

43. Activity
Start
Finish 35
Training of operators/DOST certification 36
Training of operators/DOST certification for ARMM 37
Preparation of voting/counting/canvassing sites 38
Preparation of voting/counting/canvassing sites for ARMM 39
Final testing and sealing of machines 40
Final testing and sealing of machines for ARMM 41
Shipment of ballots 42
Shipment of ballots for ARMM 43
Election Day for ARMM 44
Election Day for the rest of the country 45
Counting , canvassing &proclamation of winners for provincial, city and municipal positions 46
Canvassing & proclamation of winners for national positions

44. Some of the risks created by the Comelec’s choice of technology
Erroneous printing of the ballots – There will be some 1,630 versions of the ballot, one for each city/district/municipality:
President
Vice-President 5
Senators 48
Party List 120
Congressman x = 1,000
Governor x =
Vice-Governor x =
Provincial Board 12 x =
Mayor x 1,610 = 3,220
Vice-Mayor x 1,610 = 3,220
Councilors x 1,630 = 24,450
Total ,328 (will likely be higher)
The probability of making mistakes is very high. And the consequences of such mistakes could be fatal.

45. Erroneous delivery of the ballots – After printing, the right set of ballots will have to be delivered to the 1,630 cities/districts and municipalities.
They have to train some 500,000 teachers assigned as members of the Board of Election Inspectors, for it is they who will assist the voters.
They have to implement a massive campaign to train million voters. There has to be some assurance that all voters will be reached.
Assuming they will assign one technician to each precinct, then they have to hire and train 80,000 such technicians.
The software of each PCOS unit would have to be fed with the right parameters, corresponding to the city/district or municipality the unit would be assigned to.
Because of the Comelec’s decision to let the voter himself feed his ballot into the machine, any breakdown would mean a delay in the voting process.
It won’t be easy to determine the right deployment strategy for the 2,200 extra PCOS units because of many remote areas in our more than 7,000 islands.

46. Erroneous marking, smudges, poor calibration/alignment could cause rejection of the ballot. Since no replacement ballot would be given, this would mean disenfranchisement of the voter.
Voters could intentionally introduce substances/materials into PCOS that would result in its malfunction; consequently, causing failure of elections in the precinct.
Nobody would see the counting! Embedded malicious code in the machines could rig the results. It won’t be detected.
It is possible to download malicious code into the machine. While cheating will always be attempted no matter what system, the important thing is that they can be detected.
Given that nobody would see the counting, the voting public would likely not trust the results.
Any delay can put the whole project in jeopardy. As it happened, the contract signing alone already delayed them by six weeks. More delays can be expected in the coming months.

47. Concerns about Comelec’s automation plans
Reliability of the machines/system
Readiness of the Comelec to manage full automation
Software is proprietary/counting not transparent

48. It’s not the people who vote that count, it’s the people who count the votes.
Joseph Stalin

49. And who will count the votes come May, 2010?
The software that will run the PCOS machines

50. And who will write that software?
The foreign company that will supply the PCOS machines.

51. As it is right now, we are leaving the outcome of our elections in the hands of a foreign company. And the implementers, meaning the Comelec.
And not in the hands of the voters, as it should be!

52. An organization in the US called Black Box Voting
In designing technology for elections, we must ensure that it will enable “the counting of votes in public rather than counting them in secret. We do not consent to any form of secret vote counting, administered and controlled by government insiders and their vendors”.

53. That’s why the most worrisome features of PCOS are ...
Possible to download malicious code into the machines, eg., instructions to add illegal votes to favor some candidates!
Possible to embed malicious code into the machines!
System has too many vulnerabilities; probability of failure of elections is high.

54. There are more than enough reasons why …
the framers of RA 9369 specified that there should first be a pilot run in two HUCs and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.

55. So, are there other alternative solutions to election automation?

56. There are several …
CCOS – Centralized Counting Optical Scan (~ P3B; pilot: ~ P1B)
OES – Open Election System (P3.5B; pilot: ~ P1B)
COES – Centralized Open Election System (~ P.6B; pilot: ~ P.2B)

57. Open Election System (OES)

58. Open Election System - PC Encoding
Votes cast & tallied as in manual voting
ERs brought to school encoding (PC) center
ERs validated then posted on the web w/ BEIs digital signature
CMBOC will access database, produce SOV, COC
All interested parties may access and process the data by themselves
All interested parties can send SMS to watchers to verify figures
PBOCs access DB; produce Prov SOVs and COCs
NBOC accesses DB for final results
CITY/MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS
PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS
NATIONAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS
DOMINANT
PARTY
OPPOSITION
CITIZENS
ARM
MEDIA &
OTHERS
VOTING CENTER
DOMINANT
PARTY
OPPOSITION
CITIZENS
ARM
MEDIA &
OTHERS
ENCODING CENTER
PRECINCTS

59. Open Election System the VOTING PERIOD 08 hours
PRECINCT COUNTING 12 hours
ENCODING at SCHOOL 12 hours
ER printing at school hours
CANVASSING days

60. Open Election System All steps transparent to the voting public
Manual voting and precinct tallying
Two “trusted” documents – the ballot and the ER
ER data and canvassing results available to the public
All data quickly verifiable all the way to original source documents (the “trusted” documents)
Software used is open and available to the public
Cost affordable at P3.5B max. (Comelec only buys PCs/servers, and contracts out communication reqmts, mgnt of process)
Can be completed anywhere from 3-5 days
No need for voter training on use of machine for >40M voters
PCs/servers can be donated to public schools after each election; no storage concerns
Not dependent on the trustworthiness of the implementers

61. There are only 3 Issues that they throw at OES
R.A says voting, counting, canvassing, electronic transmission must be automated
PCOS voting is also manual, not automated.
“... the Commission, is hereby authorized to use an automated election system ...” Not mandated.
2007 elections not automated.
Sections talks only of manual processes.

62. “Automated election system,
“Automated election system, … which has been demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other electoral process.”
Manual voting and counting is what we’ve been using in all past elections
PCOS (OMR) will also use PCs and servers for canvassing; most automation technologies use PCs for consolidation

63. Too much human intervention; teachers tally the votes;
What’s wrong with human intervention? More difficult to cheat – one has to buy off a lot of people (doesn’t wholesale cheating happen at canvassing where there are fewer people?)
Easier to buy off a small group of specialists who hold the key to the software.

64. Should the COMELEC adopt OES, then they only need to …
Bid out PCs, servers, and communications requirements (buy PCs from many suppliers in major cities; reduced logistics for Comelec)
Bid out management and implementation of the project (one firm per region to spread out task)

65. Why are we relentless in our campaign to convince the Comelec to drop the PCOS approach?

66. Because …
It is possible for the group that holds the key to the software to rig the results of the May, 2010 elections.

67. Because …
Given the inexperience of the Comelec and the complexity of the process, we are truly looking at a “disaster that’s waiting to happen”!

68. Schedule of Payments of P7.2B Contract Fee
Project Initialization, Set up Project Management Team and Project
Systems inc. all SW licenses and firmware …………………………… %
Delivery of Development Set (20 units) …………………………………
Report on Transmission and Logistics …………………………………
Delivery of Functional System and Software Agreement ……………
Delivery of EMS and CCS (HW, SW and Website) ……………………
Complete System inc. Customization and Voter Education Materials/
Website ………………………………………………………………………
Field Testing, Mock Election, TEC Systems Certification, Training of
Trainors ………………………………………………………………………
Delivery of PCOS Machines (Nov – 12K; Dec – 30K) …………………
Second Delivery of PCOS Machines (Jan – 30K; Feb – 10.2K) ………
Commencement of Ballot Production ……………………………………
Delivery of Ballots ……………………………………………………………
Configuration of Machines, Final Checking of Systems, inc.
Transmission and Sealing …………………………………………………. _5_
Subtotal ………………………………………………………… %
Election Day Services & Completion Report and Final Acceptance in
lieu of Retention of Warranty security, w/in 30 days from receipt of
Final Report ……………………………………………………………………… %

69. RFP WAS 56 PAGES LONG BUT HAD NO TERMS OF PAYMENT!

70. P 1, 795 Billion Payment Innovations
Project Initialization, Setup Project Management Team (PMT) and Project Systems including all SW licenses and firmware
10%
Delivery of Development Set (20 units) 5%
Report on Transmission and Logistics
Delivery of Functional System and Software Agreement 70

71. NOT in RFP! NOT in Smartmatic Financial Proposal!

72. How can setting up be many times more than doing the job?
PROJECT INITIALIZATION, SETUP PROJECT MANAGEMENT TEAM (PMT) AND PROJECT SYSTEMS INCLUDING ALL SW LICENSES AND FIRMWARE 10%
Payment Term
Financial Proposal
P 719 million
Components
Project Management
-P99,999,999.00
PCOS Application
-P20,786,802.18!
BMS Application
P21,223,021.07
How can setting up be many times more than doing the job?

73. DELIVERY OF DEVELOPMENT SET (20 UNITS)
Payment Term
Financial Proposal
P 359 million nearly P18 million per unit
Actual cost
P 45,419 x 20
= P 908, 380

74. REPORT ON TRANSMISSION AND LOGISTICS
Payment Term
Financial Proposal
P 359 million Report (written on gold paper?)
Provision for Electronic Transmission P200 million (P 199,999,997.51)
Total warehousing, deployment and pull out (P 916,381,355)
Total (P 1.12 billion)
How can a report be 30% of the actual services? This will make the Guinness Book of Records!

75. P 359 million Delivery of Functional System and Software Agreement
Payment Term
Financial Proposal
P 359 million
EMS Analysis and Design P0.00 Tools and Programs for EMS and PCOS P0.00 Analysis and and Design for CCS P0.00 Tools and Program P0.00
Section 7.3 p 30 of RFP states “The ownership of the Analysis, Design, and executable programs of all the application developed should be given to COMELEC at no additional cost”
What is COMELEC paying for?!

76. From what we have gathered, there is no country in the world that went from “pure manual” to “full automation” in one electoral exercise.
There certainly is wisdom in that.

77. Thank you!