1. Overview of Basic Concepts in Emergency Preparedness and Response
Emergency Response
Overview of Basic Concepts in Emergency Preparedness and Response
Day 10 – Lecture 2

2. Objective
To learn about the concepts and principles apply to different practices and sources with the potential for causing radiation exposure or environmental radioactive contamination warranting emergency intervention, and to all countries and regions that might need to implement emergency intervention
Lecture notes:
Concepts of emergency response presented in this lesson are based on the principles published by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and those recommended by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG).
The concepts and principles apply to all practices and sources with the potential for causing radiation exposure or environmental radioactive contamination warranting emergency intervention, and to all countries and regions that might need to implement emergency intervention.
The types of practices covered include: fixed and mobile nuclear reactors; installations for the mining and processing of radioactive ores; installations for fuel fabrication and other fuel cycle installations; installations for the management of radioactive wastes; the transport of radioactive materials; sources of radiation used in industrial, agricultural, medical, research and teaching applications; installations using radiation or radioactive materials; and satellites using radiation sources or reactors. Emergencies arising from radiation sources of unknown or untraceable origin are also covered.

3. Content Objectives of emergency response and preparedness
Basic responsibilities
Assessment of threats
Functional and infrastructure requirements
Concepts of operations
Summary
Lecture notes:
We will start the lesson with the objectives of emergency response. To fulfill these objectives a sound preparedness is needed. Therefore the system for good emergency preparedness will be presented: basic responsibilities will be set and assessment of threats explained. Then functional (response) and infrastructure (preparedness) requirements will be presented. Finally concepts of operations for each threat category will be explained. We will conclude the lesson with a short summary and a list of references where you can get more detailed information.

4. Introduction Preparedness for emergency response is needed because
Accidents happen
Preparedness helps save lives and minimize risks to health and environment
Response with preparedness costs less than response without it
Response without preparedness can affect credibility of authorities
The objectives of the lesson are to present goals, principles and basic concepts of emergency response in case of nuclear or radiological emergencies
Lecture notes:
Despite all the precautions that are taken in the design and operation of nuclear facilities and the conduct of nuclear activities, there remains a possibility that a failure or an accident may lead to an emergency. In some cases, an emergency may lead to the release of radioactive materials within facilities and/or into the public domain, which may necessitate emergency response actions(such emergencies may include transport accidents). That is why adequate preparations have to be established and maintained at local and national and, where agreed between countries, at the international level to respond to emergencies.
In this lesson we will therefore present and discuss goals, principles and basic concepts of emergency response in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5. Objectives of Emergency Response
To mitigate the consequences of an emergency or event at its origin
To prevent the occurrence of deterministic effects in individuals
To render first aid and to treat injuries
To reduce, using reasonable steps, the occurrence of stochastic effects in the population
To limit the occurrence of non-radiological effects in individuals and in the population
To protect the environment and property
Lecture notes:
The primary protection and safety objectives are as follows: 
“Protection objective: to prevent the occurrence of deterministic effects in individuals by keeping doses below the relevant threshold and to ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to reduce the occurrence of stochastic effects in the population at present and in the future.” 
“Safety objective: to protect individuals, society and the environment from harm by establishing and maintaining effective defences against radiological hazards from sources.”
In the context of nuclear or radiological emergencies, the practical goals of emergency response are presented in this slide.
The application of steps to meet these goals (undertaking interventions) is always governed by the principles derived from the recommendations of the ICRP. These principles are:
“Justification of intervention: Any proposed intervention shall do more good than harm.”
“Optimization of intervention: The form, scale and duration of any intervention shall be optimised so that the net benefit is maximised.”
See also Lesson X.1.1.

6. Objectives of Emergency Preparedness
To assure the capability to respond in a timely, effective, appropriate and coordinated manner to any nuclear or radiological emergency at all levels:
User or facility level
Local level
Regional level
National level
International level
Lecture notes:
The goals of response are best achieved in line with the intervention principles by having a sound emergency preparedness programme in place as part of the infrastructure for protection and safety. Emergency preparedness also helps to build competence and confidence that the emergency would be managed effectively. The practical goal of emergency preparedness may be expressed as in this slide.

7. Basic Responsibilities
Adequate preparations must be established and maintained at local and national and, where agreed between countries, at the international level to respond to emergencies
The arrangements for emergency response actions both within and outside facilities, if applicable, or elsewhere under the control of the operator, are dealt with through the regulatory process
Lecture notes:
Jurisdictions of the various orders and levels of government vary substantially between countries. So also do the legal authorities of the various organizations that could be involved in emergency response. Emergency situations by their very nature are different from normal operations. Different authorities and responsibilities are involved, different procedures, even different legal instruments can be invoked to authorize emergency powers from those in place in normal operations.
The country must adopt legislation to clearly allocate responsibilities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency and for meeting the requirements. This shall include establishing or identifying an existing governmental body to act as a national coordinating authority, whose function, among others, is to resolve differences and incompatible arrangements between the various participating parties. This authority shall ensure the functions and responsibilities of operators and response organizations are clearly assigned and understood by all response organizations and that mechanisms are in place for enforcing compliance therewith.
For in depth reading see references on cover page.

8. Basic Responsibilities (cont’d)
The regulatory body has to require that emergency plans be prepared for the on-site area for any practice or source, that could necessitate an emergency intervention
The regulatory body must ensure that these plans are integrated with those of other response organizations as appropriate before the commencement of operation
Lecture notes:
The regulatory body must ensure that these plans are integrated with those of other response organizations as appropriate before the commencement of operation. The regulatory body must ensure also that these plans provide reasonable assurance of effective response in accordance with these requirements in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. The regulatory body must require that the emergency plan will be tested in an exercise before commencement of operations of a new source or practice. At suitable intervals exercises of the emergency plan have to be conducted, some of which have to be witnessed by the regulatory body.
In planning for and in the event of emergencies, the regulatory body must act as an adviser to the government and response organizations in respect to nuclear safety and radiation protection.
The national coordinating authority and response organizations must ensure that the development of arrangements for response to a nuclear or radiological emergency is coordinated with the arrangements for response to conventional emergencies. The regulatory body has to ensure that such coordinating agreements are implemented adequately by the licensees.

9. Basic Responsibilities (cont’d)
The country must periodically ensure, by means of an appropriate organization, that a review is conducted in order to identify any practice or event that could necessitate an emergency intervention
It must also ensure that an assessment of the radiological threat is conducted for those practices
Lecture notes:
That means that the country has to determine the level of preparedness required by determining which emergency threats apply. A national threat assessment should be conducted to identify practices and facilities that may possibly necessitate emergency interventions within the country. This includes facilities outside the country as well.

10. Assessment of Threats
The nature and extent of emergency arrangements have to be commensurate with the potential magnitude and nature of the hazard associated with the facility or activity
The threat assessment must be periodically reviewed to take into account changes in to the threats within and outside the country and the experience and lessons from previous events involving relevant practices and sources
Lecture notes:
A threat assessment shall be conducted to identify practices and facilities and other types of events that may possibly necessitate emergency interventions within the country. The assessment shall consider the full range of potential events. The threat analysis (and emergency planning) should also consider emergencies involving a combination of nuclear/radiological and conventional emergencies (events) such as an earthquake. The threat associated with nuclear installations in nearby countries shall also be considered. The threat assessment shall identify the populations at risk, and should estimate to the extent reasonable, the likelihood, nature and magnitude of the various radiological threats. The threat assessment shall be so conducted as to provide a basis for detailed requirements for emergency response and preparedness in terms of: emergency source management; strategies for protective action; protection of emergency workers; public information; and the other functional areas critical to an effective response.

11. Assessment of Threats (cont’d)
The threat assessment has to identify installations, sources, practices, on-site areas, off-site areas or locations for which nuclear or radiological emergencies could warrant:
precautionary urgent protective actions to prevent severe deterministic health effects
urgent protective actions to reduce stochastic effects
agricultural and ingestion countermeasures and long term protective measures
protection for the workers undertaking an intervention
Lecture notes:
The threat assessment must also identify locations at which there is a significant probability of encountering a dangerous source that has been lost, abandoned, stolen or illicitly transported. This should include consideration of large scrap metal processing facilities, national border crossings, or abandoned military or other facilities that may have used large sources.
A minimum level of threat has to be assumed to exist for all countries and jurisdictions. This threat level includes situations involving such sources of exposure as sources illegally brought into the country and falling satellites equipped with sources or radioactive materials.

12. Threat Categories
Nuclear and radiation threats are grouped according to the five threat categories
Categories I through IV represent decreasing levels of threat and therefore decreasing emergency preparedness and response requirements
Category IV is the minimum level of threat assumed to exist everywhere and thus always applies possibly along with other categories
Category V is a special category and may apply along with other categories
Lecture notes:
Before any planning can begin, the practices and activities for which emergency response planning is necessary must be identified. Emergency planning could be different for each practice. However, this can be simplified by grouping practices into five threat categories, each presenting common features in terms of the magnitude and timing of the hazard. Categories I through IV represent decreasing levels of threat and therefore decreasing emergency preparedness and response requirements. Category IV is the minimum level of threat assumed to exist everywhere and thus always applies possibly along with other categories. Category V is a special category and may apply along with other categories. Note that these threat categories are only used as a convenient way to provide guidance on planning and are not used during an accident. These categories apply to both facilities or uses and governmental jurisdiction for which various levels of planning is warranted.
In summary, these categories are used to implement the graded approach to emergency preparedness arrangements and to specify requirements that are commensurate with the potential magnitude and nature of the hazard as identified by the threat assessment.

13. Threat Categories Threat Category Radiological Threat I
Severe deterministic health effects off-site II
Warranting urgent protective actions off-site, deterministic health effects on-site
III
No urgent protective actions off-site are warranted, severe deterministic health effects on-site IV
Minimum level of threat – all countries V
Food contamination due to transboundary contamination necessitating food restrictions
Before any planning can begin, the practices and activities for which emergency response planning is necessary must be identified. Emergency planning could be different for each practice. However, this can be simplified by grouping practices into five threat categories, each presenting common features in terms of the magnitude and timing of the hazard. The slide shows the five emergency threat categories. Threat categories I through IV represent decreasing levels of threat and therefore decreasing emergency preparedness and response requirements. Threat category IV is the minimum level of threat assumed to exist everywhere and thus always applies possibly along with other categories. Threat category V is a special category and may apply along with other categories. Note that these threat categories are only used as a convenient way to provide guidance on planning and are not used during an emergency. These threat categories apply to both facilities or uses and governmental jurisdiction for which various levels of planning is warranted. 
Emergency planning for threat category I facilities is the most demanding. For the national agency, planning and implementing the capabilities to handle emergencies at threat category I facilities will ensure that the capability exists to handle emergencies of the other categories. Threat category IV applies everywhere because these emergencies can occur anywhere. Thus guidance for the threat category IV represents the minimum level needed for all jurisdictions.

14. Threat Category I and II
Power reactors and facilities with large amounts of spent fuel or dispersible radioactive material
Primary risk: atmospheric release
Facilities with potential for uncontrolled criticalities
Primary risk: gamma and neutron shine dose
On-site dose rates may be very high
(>10 Gy/h)
Beta emitter contamination
Serious detrimental psychological and economical impact
For reactors and facilities with large amounts of spent fuel or dispersible radioactive material, the primary risk comes from atmospheric releases. For the most severe releases (general emergencies - see the following slides) postulated at threat category I facilities, the risk of serious deterministic health effects can only be substantially reduced by taking urgent protective actions, before or shortly after a release. For these emergencies and lesser general emergencies at category I and II facilities, immediately restrict consumption of food that could be directly contaminated and promptly initiate monitoring to determine if urgent protective action is warranted to avert doses consistent with international guidance. Deposition from severe releases warranting relocation or restrictions on food consumption may occur at a considerable distance.
For facilities with the potential for uncontrolled criticalities, the gamma and neutron shine dose from a criticality dominates the hazard; airborne releases are not significant. In the event of a criticality, prompt monitoring is necessary to determine if urgent protective actions are warranted.
In all these facilities, the off-site releases or doses from criticalities are probably unpredictable and the release could result in very complex doses off-site. However, in most cases, emergency action levels can be identified that will indicate serious conditions in time to classify the emergency and initiate a response before a significant release or exposure occurs.
In all these facilities, the on-site dose rates during an emergency may be very high (e.g. >10 Gy/h) and there is a risk of beta emitter contamination and other hazardous conditions (e.g. steam) in areas where staff action may be needed to mitigate the emergency.
The actions carried out to respond to the long term consequences of these emergencies can have a serious detrimental psychological and economic impact on the public, as demonstrated by the Chernobyl accident, if they are not based on internationally accepted criteria considering their long term sociological, psychological and economic impact.

15. Threat Category III Reactors < 2 MW (th)
Irradiators, industrial radiography, teletherapy, fuel fabrication, spent fuel storage, reprocessing of spent fuel
Primary risk: significant exposure on site (high dose rates, beta emitter contamination)
No credible emergencies postulated for which urgent off-site protective actions are warranted
This threat category has no credible emergencies postulated for which urgent off-site protective actions are warranted. These emergencies may, however, cause considerable concern and unnecessary actions among the population. In addition, there may be the risk of contaminated persons, packages or equipment leaving the site.
Emergencies at these facilities may occur with little warning and should result only in significant exposure on site. However, for most emergencies, the facility can develop emergency action levels for classifying emergencies that ensure prompt, effective on-site response.
On site there may be high dose rates, beta emitter contamination or other hazardous conditions in areas requiring action by the staff to mitigate the emergency. Therefore, people responding on site must be provided with specialized protective equipment and training.

16. Threat Category IV Applies to emergencies involving
Uncontrolled sources
Transport
Severe overexposure
Terrorist threats or criminal activities
Primary risk: overexposure, facility contamination, public contamination
Threat category IV planning applies everywhere and represents the minimum level of preparedness appropriate for all countries. In general, this applies to emergencies involving:
uncontrolled sources
transport
severe overexposure
terrorist threats or criminal activities
Uncontrolled source emergency applies to emergencies involving medical symptoms of radiation exposure, lost or stolen dangerous sources, dangerous mobile sources, facility contamination, public contamination, re-entry of radioactive satellites, and nuclear weapons.
A transport emergency could result in the release of radioactive material, loss of shielding or loss of criticality control. There are hundreds of emergencies involving transportation of radioactive material each year. The vast majority of the emergencies involve small spills or damaged containers, with no significant consequences.
Once diagnosed, several overexposures have been inadequately treated due to the inexperience of the medical staff, resulting in considerable unnecessary suffering.
Terrorist threats and criminal activities may involve bomb threats, bombings, sabotage, attacks, kidnapping, hostages, theft of radioactive or fissionable material, or other criminal acts potentially resulting in an actual or perceived radiation emergency. The objective of the perpetrators may be to create “terror” among the public with the resulting psychological and economic impact. Experience shows that the public’s perception of the risk posed by the threat may be as or more important than the actual risk. Consequently, the one other most import aspect of the response will be providing the public with timely, informative (understandable) and consistent information on the true risk.

17. Threat Category V
For areas within the food restriction radius for the affected facility in threat category I or II
Primary risk: country wide contamination
Restrictions on food and agricultural products may be needed
Threat category V planning is for areas within the food restrictions radius. The Chernobyl accident resulted in contamination exceeding the international guidance on food restriction at more than 1000 km from the plant site.
The affected facility (threat category I or II) should have declared a general emergency (see the following slides) and notified the IAEA or the affected countries before the plume arrives. However, first indication of the emergency may be the detection of airborne contamination. An entire country could be contaminated at levels warranting restrictions on food and agricultural products. The pattern and levels of contamination will be very complex, varying both temporally and spatially. Laboratory analysis of food samples will be needed to confirm concentrations warranting restriction.
Question
Is your country in the threat category V?

18. Planning Areas and Zones
On-site area
Off-site area
Zones
Precautionary Action Zone (PAZ)
Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone (UPZ)
Food restrictions planning radius
For most accident types, emergency response takes place over two distinct areas:
On-site area: The area surrounding the facility within the security perimeter, fence or other designed property marker. It can also be the controlled area around a radiography source or contaminated area. This is the area under the immediate control of the facility or operator. For transportation accidents on public roads or territories, there is in effect no on-site area.
Off-site area: The area beyond that under the control of the facility or operator.
For facilities with the potential for accidents resulting in major off-site releases (threat categories I and II), the level of planning will vary depending on the distance from the facility. For these facilities, planning can be discussed for two emergency planning zones, as shown in next slide.
Precautionary action zone (PAZ)
Pre-designated area around a facility where urgent protective actions have been pre-planned and will be implemented immediately upon declaration of a general emergency. The goal is to substantially reduce the risk of serious deterministic health effects by taking protective actions within this zone before or shortly after a release.
Urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ)
Pre-designated area around a facility where preparations are made to promptly implement urgent protective actions based on environmental monitoring and facility conditions. The goal is to make provisions to effectively implement urgent protective actions to avert the doses specified in international standards.
Food restriction planning radius: the radius that could be affected by emergencies at a threat category I or II facility resulting in levels of ground deposition necessitating food restrictions consistent with international standards.

19. Concept of Emergency Planning Zones
These zones should be roughly circular areas around the facility, their boundaries defined by local landmarks (e.g. roads or rivers) to allow easy identification during a response. It is important to note that the zones do not stop at national borders as shown in the slide. The size of the zones can be determined by an analysis of the potential consequences.

20. Response and Planning Zones Sizes
Facility
PAZ
UPZ
FRPD
Category I
0.5 – 5 km
5 – 25 km
50 – 250 km
Category II
None
0.2 – 5 km
2 – 100 km
Category III
PAZ – Precautionary Action Zone
UPZ – Urgent Protective Planning Zone
FRPR – Food Restrictions Planning Radius
This slide provides generic ranges for the size of the various response and planning zones for different threat categories and facility types. Ranges are provided in recognition of the great uncertainties involved. The actual boundary of the zones should be established to conform to geographical features such as roads, rivers, or political boundaries. This is required to allow practical application of the zones in the event of an emergency. The size used should be scaled to the corresponding potential threat. That is the higher end of the suggestion range should be used for facilities at higher end of the applicable facilities. Site-specific studies could also be used to determine boundaries.
Category I and II Food Restrictions Planning Radius (Category V radius)
It is the area where preparations for effective implementation of protective actions to reduce the risk of deterministic and stochastic health effects from and ingestion of locally grown food should be developed in advance. More time will be available to take effective actions within this zone. In general, protective actions such as relocation, food restrictions and agricultural countermeasures will be based on environmental monitoring and food sampling.
Question
Is there a need for defining any emergency planning zones in your country? If YES, what are the planning zones sizes?

21. Planning Zone vs. Response Zones
Planning Zones are for planning, i.e. this does not mean that protective actions will not be required outside those zones
It is important to make a clear distinction between emergency preparedness and emergency response. Emergency preparedness addresses the plans, arrangements and capabilities that we think may be required for responding effectively to an emergency. Emergency response is what we do when an emergency occurs.
Remember that difference. Planning zones are for planning, not for response. With the exception of the precautionary action zone, where response decisions usually affect the entire zone, the fact that a planning zone is only 10 km does not mean that no protective action will ever be taken outside of 10 km. Based on the assessment at the time of the accident, for example environmental readings, there may be a need to act beyond 10 km. On the other hand, there may not be a need to take the action all the way to 10 km. The fact that planning is done within 10 km simply means that the risk inside that 10 km zone is large enough to warrant planning. Also, in general, provided that the plans are effective, they can be extended at the time of an accident to include areas beyond the 10 km zone. This is the concept of contingency planning.

22. Planning Levels and Responsibilities
Effective emergency response requires mutually supportive and integrated emergency planning at three levels:
User
Off-site
International
Lecture notes:
Effective emergency response requires mutually supportive and integrated emergency planning at three levels: user (facility, operator), off-site and international level. The responsibilities of each are explained in next slides.
Photos
Upper: first level – user: nuclear power plant
Middle: second level – off-site: environment may be affected
Lower: third level – international: IAEA in Vienna, Austria

23. Responsibilities – User Level
To mitigate the emergency
To protect people on-site
To notify off-site officials and providing them with recommendations on protective actions and technical assistance
To provide initial radiological monitoring
Lecture notes:
User level – the staff at the facility or the personnel using the material at the time of the accident. They are responsible for:
the immediate actions to mitigate the accident;
protecting people on-site;
notifying off-site officials and providing them with recommendations on protective actions and technical assistance, and
provide initial radiological monitoring.
For transportation emergencies, this includes the shipper, the owner of the source and the transporter.

24. Responsibilities – Off-site Level
Local officials: to provide immediate support to the user and prompt protection to the public in the vicinity
National and regional officials: to plan and response on the national level
to plan longer term protective actions
to support local officials in the event their capabilities are exceeded
Lecture notes:
Off-site level - organisations responsible for the protection of the public. This includes:
Local officials: the government and support agencies responsible for providing immediate support to the user and prompt protection of the public in the vicinity. This also includes the police, fire fighting and civil emergency services or medical personnel who may be the first to learn of an accident. This may include officials from different countries if the facility is near a border.
National and regional officials: the governmental agencies responsible for planning and response on the national level. These agencies are typically responsible for tasks that do not need to be implemented urgently to be effective. This includes:
longer term protective actions, and
support of local officials in the event their capabilities are exceeded.

25. Responsibilities – International Level
To implement Notification and Assistance Convention
IAEA, countries
“Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident” and “Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency”. The parties to the Notification Convention commit to notify forthwith those countries that may be physically affected by an accident.
To provide technical, humanitarian or medical assistance
UNDHA, WHO, others
Lecture notes:
International level – organisations responsible for providing international assistance. This includes:
IAEA implementation of the “Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident” and “Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency”. The parties to the Notification Convention commit to notify forthwith those countries that may be physically affected by an accident. These notifications can be made to directly or through IAEA. Areas in countries where urgent protective actions should be taken should be notified directly and not through IAEA. Under the Assistance Convention countries have committed to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of an accident.
Organisations such as UNDHA or WHO that can provide technical, humanitarian or medical assistance in the event of an accident.

26. Emergency Classes and Conditions
Response to an emergency requires rapid and coordinated response
This can be accomplished by using internationally agreed classification system:
General emergency
Site area emergency
Facility emergency
Alert
Uncontrolled source emergency
Lecture notes:
Threat category I, II, III and IV users should have the capability for prompt identification of a radiation emergency and determination of the appropriate level of response. That means, among others, also a system for classifying all potential emergencies warranting emergency intervention to protect workers or the public in accordance with international standards. The following five classes of emergency that address different types of emergencies are defined: 
General emergencies at threat category I and II facilities.
Site area emergencies at threat category I and II facilities.
Facility emergencies at threat category I, II or III facilities.
Alerts at category I, II and III facilities.
Uncontrolled source emergencies at threat category IV.
The emergency classification system for threat category I, II, III and IV installations, facilities or practices has to address all potential nuclear and radiological emergencies. The criteria for classification must be predefined emergency action levels (EAL) that address abnormal facility conditions; security events, radiological releases, environmental measurements and other observable symptoms. The classification system should be established with the aim of initiating a response quickly enough to allow for effective emergency source management, protective actions implementation and protection of emergency workers.
Each class should represent approximately the same level of threat and initiate approximately the same level of response when declared at different facilities within the country.

27. General Emergency Threat Category I and II
Should be declared when an actual or substantial risk of a release of radioactive material warranting immediate implementation of urgent protective actions off-site exists
Actions should be promptly taken to:
mitigate the event
protect people on-site
protect people within PAZ and UPZ (as appropriate)
Lecture notes:
General emergencies are emergencies at category I and II facilities involving an actual or substantial risk of a release of radioactive material or irradiation (from loss of shielding or a criticality) warranting immediate implementation of urgent protective actions off-site. Upon declaration of this level of emergency, actions should be promptly taken to mitigate the event and to protect the people on-site and within the precautionary action zone and urgent protective planning action zone as appropriate.
For each threat category I or II installations an off-site notification point within each country with territory within the emergency zones should be designated responsible for receiving emergency notifications of actual or potential radiological or nuclear emergencies. This notification point should be continuously available to receive and immediately initiate the appropriate pre-planned off-site response to a notification or request for assistance.
Off-site notification point: Responsible for initiation of interventions in the vicinity (e.g, within precautionary and urgent protective action planning zones) and providing support to the operator or facility.

28. Site Area Emergency Threat Category I and II
Should be declared when a major decrease in the level of protection for those on-site and near the facility occurs
Actions should be promptly taken to:
mitigate the event
protect people on-site
make preparations to implement protective actions off-site (if necessary)
Lecture notes:
Site area emergencies at category I and II facilities are emergencies involving a major decrease in the level of protection for those on-site and near the facility. Upon declaration of this level of emergency, actions should be promptly taken to mitigate the event, protect people on-site and to make preparations to implement protective actions off-site if that should become necessary.
Threat category I, II, III or IV installations, facilities or practices should have a person on-site at all times with the authority and responsibility to classify an abnormal condition and without consultation, promptly notify the appropriate off-site notification point upon classification; provide sufficient information for an effective off-site response; and to immediately initiate appropriate on-site response. They should be provided with a suitable means for alerting on-site response personnel and the off-site notification point.
Note: For threat category IV this only applies for periods when operations pose a significant risk.
Off-site notification point: responsible for initiation of interventions in the vicinity (e.g, within precautionary and urgent protective action planning zones) and provide support to the operator.

29. Facility Emergency Threat Category I, II and III
Should be declared when a major decrease in the level of protection for workers on-site occurs
Actions should be promptly taken to:
mitigate the event
protect people on-site
Note: this class does not represent an off-site threat
Lecture notes:
Facility emergencies at threat category I, II or III facilities are emergencies involving a major decrease in the level of protection for people on-site. Upon declaration of this level of emergency, actions should be promptly taken to mitigate the event and to protect the people on-site. This class of emergency does not represent an off-site threat.
Operators of a category I, II, III and IV practice or facility should ensure that adequate provision be made for identification of an event warranting emergency intervention and generating adequate information promptly and communicating it to the responsible authorities for:
the early prediction or assessment of the extent and significance of discharge of radioactive substances to the environment or exposures;
rapid and continuous assessment of the emergency as it proceeds; and
determining the need for protective actions.

30. Alert Threat Category I, II and III
Should be declared when an uncertain or significant decrease in the level of protection for the on-site personnel or the public occurs
Actions should be promptly taken to:
Assess and mitigate the event
Increase the readiness of the on- and off-site response organisations (as appropriate)
Lecture notes:
Alerts at category I, II and III facilities are emergencies involving an uncertain or significant decrease in the level of protection for the public or on-site personnel. Upon declaration of this level of emergency, actions should be promptly taken to assess and mitigate the event and to increase the readiness of the on and off-site response organisations as appropriate.
Declaration of a particular class of emergency at a threat category I, II, III and IV installation, facility or practice should promptly initiate the appropriate level of coordinated and pre-planned on-site and off-site emergency response. For each class of emergency the responsibilities and initial response actions of all response organizations should be defined. Upon declaration of a class of emergency all response organizations should promptly initiate their assigned initial actions appropriate for that class.

31. Uncontrolled Source Emergency
Occurs in case of lost, stolen or loss of control of a threat category IV dangerous sources
First responders should take appropriate actions to minimise the consequences of emergency
Lecture notes:
Uncontrolled source emergencies are emergencies involving loss, theft or loss of control of a category IV dangerous source or practice to include re-entry of a satellite with significant amounts of radioactive material.
The country should have the capability to receive notifications of and formulate a response to events for which detailed local plans can not be formulated in advance.
The country should also make known to the IAEA and to other States, directly or through the IAEA, its single warning point of contact responsible for issuing and receiving emergency notifications and information from the IAEA. This warning point should be continuously available to receive and immediately respond or initiate a response to an notification, request for assistance, or request for verification from the IAEA. The country should promptly inform the IAEA and, directly or through the IAEA, neighbouring countries and other concerned states of any changes that may occur in relation to the point of contact.
The notifying country should forthwith notify directly or through the IAEA those countries that may be affected by a transboundary emergency. The notifying country should also promptly notify the IAEA of a transboundary emergency. The notifying country should respond to requests from other countries and the IAEA for information relating to the transboundary emergency situation in particular with regards to the impact on other nations, protection of foreign nationals, property and goods and influence on international travel and trade.
The country should have the capability to immediately and directly notify any state in which urgent protective action should be taken to include countries with territory within the precautionary action zone and urgent protective action planning zone.

32. International Nuclear Event Scale – INES
The emergency classification should not be confused with the International Nuclear Event Scale – INES
INES is designed to indicate how serious an event was after it is understood and is NOT the basis for the response
Lecture notes:
The emergency classification should not be confused with the International Nuclear Events Scale (INES). INES is designed to indicate how serious an event was after it is understood and is not the basis for the response. Determining the INES rating
is impossible early in an event,
does not form part of the initial response,
should not delay any response actions.
The INES is designed for communicating to the public the severity or estimated severity of an event and cannot be the basis for emergency response actions.

33. Preparedness and Response
Two sets of requirements
Functional (response) requirements
Infrastructure (preparedness) requirements
Infrastructure requirements must be fulfilled to ensure that functional requirements of response can be performed when needed
The functional or ‘response’ requirements apply in the event of a radiation (radiological or nuclear) emergency. The ‘response’ requirements are the aims or objectives of the response. In order to ensure that the capability to meet the ‘response’ requirements exists, if needed, the requirements listed under ‘infrastructure’ or ‘preparedness’ apply as part of the planning and preparation process.
Many response requirements refer to the “capability” or “arrangements” to perform an activity. The “capability” or “arrangements” includes having in place the necessary authority and responsibility, organization, personnel, procedures, facilities, equipment and training to perform the task or function when needed during an emergency.

34. Functional Requirements
Establishing emergency management and operations
Identifying, notifying and activating
Performing mitigatory actions
Taking urgent protective actions
Providing information and issuing instructions and warnings to the public
Protecting emergency workers
Establishing emergency management and operations: The on-site emergency response must be promptly executed and managed without impairing the performance of the continuing operational safety functions. The off-site emergency response must be effectively managed and coordinated with the on-site response. The emergency response must be coordinated between all responding organizations Information necessary for making decisions on the allocation of resources must be appraised throughout the emergency. Jurisdictions and response organizations (including other States) that fall within the precautionary action zone or the urgent protective action planning zone must coordinate their emergency responses and must provide mutual support.
Identifying, notifying and activating: When circumstances necessitate an emergency response, operators must determine the appropriate emergency class or level of emergency response and must promptly initiate the appropriate on-site actions and notify and keep informed the off-site notification point. Upon notification of an emergency, the off-site notification point must promptly notify all appropriate off-site response organizations. Upon notification the off-site response organizations must promptly initiate a pre-planned and coordinated response appropriate to the emergency class or level of emergency.
Performing mitigatory actions: First responders must take appropriate actions to minimise the consequences of emergencies involving events in threat category IV. The operator must promptly take the necessary actions to minimise the consequences of abnormal conditions or emergencies involving the sources or practices under their responsibility. Trained emergency services must be readily available to support response at installations in threat categories I, II and III.
Taking urgent protective actions: All appropriate measures must be taken to save lives. Urgent protective actions must be taken that effectively limit the occurrence of severe deterministic health effects and to avert dose consistent with international standards Urgent protective actions must be appropriately adjusted to take into account any new information that becomes available relating to the emergency. A protective action must be discontinued when it is no longer justified.
Providing information and issuing instructions and warnings to the public: Instructions on actions to be taken in response to an emergency must be provided to the public near a threat category I or II facility before an event Upon declaration of an emergency the public must be promptly warned and informed of the actions they should take. There must be no undue delay that could jeopardise the effectiveness of the protective actions.
Protecting emergency workers: Measures must be taken protect emergency worker consistent with the relevant international standards.

35. Functional Requirements (cont.)
Assessing the initial phase
Managing the medical response
Keeping the public informed
Taking agricultural countermeasures, countermeasures against ingestion and longer-term protective actions
Mitigating the non-radiological consequences of the emergency and the response
Conducting recovery operations
Assessing the initial phase: The magnitude and future development of the hazard must be appraised throughout the emergency. Radiation monitoring, environmental sampling and assessment must be carried out in order to identify new hazards and to refine the response strategy. Information about emergency conditions, emergency assessments and protective actions recommended and taken must be promptly made available to all relevant response organizations throughout the period of the emergency. Relevant information must be recorded, retained and used throughout the period of the emergency.
Managing the medical response: On presentation of medical symptoms or other indications of a possible radiological emergency the medical practitioner or other responsible party must notify the appropriate notification point and must take appropriate immediate actions. Appropriate treatment must be provided to individuals receiving doses that could potentially result in severe deterministic health effects.
Keeping the public informed: The public must be provided with timely, informative, honesty, consistent, and appropriate information throughout an emergency.
Taking agricultural countermeasures, countermeasures against ingestion and longer term protective actions: Agricultural countermeasures and long term protective actions must be taken to avert dose consistent with international standards Long term screening must be conducted of exposed persons and others affected as a result of the emergency in order to detect and to limit the long-term incidence of psychological and stochastic health effects among the public and emergency workers. Radioactive waste and contamination must be appropriately controlled.
Mitigating the non-radiological consequences of the emergency and the response: The non-radiological consequences of the response must be considered in order that the response actions do more good than harm.
Conducting recovery operations: The transition from the early phase of the emergency to long term emergency operations and the return to normal must be planned and implemented in an orderly manner consistent with international requirements.

36. Infrastructure Elements
Authority
Organisation
Coordination
Plans and procedures
Logistical support and facilities
Quality assurance and programme maintenance
Lecture notes:
This figure shows the common infrastructure elements that should be in place to ensure that the critical response functions listed in previous slides can be performed in the event of an emergency.
Authority: Authority for developing and maintaining emergency preparedness and to take respond actions for a nuclear or radiological emergency should be established by means of Acts, legal codes or statutes. The emergency arrangements should include a clear allocation of responsibility, authority and coordination during all phases of the response.
Organisation: The organizational relationships and interfaces between all the major response organization should be established.
Co-ordination: Clear mechanisms for the co-ordination of emergency response between, and protocols for operational interfaces between, operators and local, regional and national governments should be developed, as applicable.
Plans and Procedures: A general plan should be developed for responding to the range of potential nuclear or radiological emergencies. This plan should clearly designate the organization responsible for development and maintenance of a coordinated National response capability; describe the responsibilities of the operators and the relevant response organizations, and describe the co-ordination with the plans used in response to conventional emergencies.
Logistical Support and Facilities: Adequate tools, instruments, supplies, equipment, communication systems, emergency facilities and documentation to perform the critical functions identified should be provided.
Training, Drills and Exercises: The operator and response organizations should implement a means for selection and an on-going training program to ensure the personnel have required knowledge, skill and abilities to perform their assigned response functions.
Quality Assurance and Programme Maintenance: The operator and response organizations should establish quality assurance processes to assure a high degree of availability and reliability of all critical supplies, equipment, communication systems and facilities for use in an emergency, in such a manner that these are unlikely to be unusable under postulated emergency conditions.

37. Integrated Planning Concept
Response to radiation emergency may be caused by or may involve different types of hazards
Natural (e.G. Storms)
Technological (e.G. Radiation)
Biological
Criminal activity
Plans and procedures for response to all hazards should be structured into coherent and interlocking system
The response to a radiation emergency may be caused by or may involve different types of hazards, including natural (e.g. storms), technological (e.g. radiation), biological or criminal activity (e.g. theft, sabotage, terrorist attacks). The response to each of these hazards probably involves different response organizations with their own response terminology, cultures and plans. Consequently, the plans and procedures for response to all hazards should be structured into a coherent and interlocking system.
Question
Is in your country integrated planning concept implemented?

38. Integrated Planning Concept
At the top level should be a national emergency plan for an integrated response to any combination of hazards. The radiation emergency plan (NREP) will be a part of this “all hazards” plan. If there is no national “all hazards” plan, the NREP must address in detail the integration with the response of other organizations during emergencies involving a combination of actual or perceived hazards.
The national radiation emergency plan (NREP) is a general description of the roles and responsibilities of all the responding organizations and their relationships. It is a summary of the more detailed plans and ensures that all the other planning is integrated and compatible. At the next level, there are the plans developed by individual agencies, governmental jurisdictions, and facilities or operators. The final level represents the procedures (e.g. implementing instructions and operational procedures) and resources that will be used during an emergency to carry out the plans.
In order to optimise the use of resources and the response effectiveness, it is recommended that response plans be highly coordinated and consolidated. Planning should not be done by one organization or agency without consultation of the others. Responsibilities should be assigned jointly with the participation of all concerned parties.

39. Concepts of Operations Threat Category I
The facility staff
Classifies the emergency
Notifies jurisdictions within PAZ and UPZ
Takes all possible actions to prevent or reduce the release
Provides protective action recommendations to off-site officials (within 15 min)
Rapidly monitor in PAZ and UPZ until relieved by off-site officials
Lecture notes:
The facility staff classifies the emergency and declare a general emergency before a release. Upon declaration of the emergency the facility staff notifies the jurisdictions within the PAZ and UPZ (including jurisdictions within other states) and provides a recommendation for protective actions to off-site officials within about 15 minutes of declaration.
The facility staff takes all possible actions to prevent or reduce the release and ensures that the people on-site (to include those responding from off-site) are protected from all possible hazards.
Until relieved by off-site officials, the facility staff rapidly conducts monitoring of the PAZ and UPZ to determine if additional protective actions are needed.
Note:
PAZ – precautionary action zone
UPZ - urgent protective action planning zone

40. Concepts of Operations Threat Category I – cont’d
Local officials
Provide police, fire fighting and medical assistance to the site (if requested)
Decide on the protective actions for the public
Inform the public (within 1 hour)
National level officials
Notify IAEA and other countries
Support the local officials
Conduct monitoring further from the site
Conduct joint media briefings
Coordinate longer-term protective actions
Lecture notes:
Local officials provide police, fire fighting and medical assistance to the site if requested. They decide on the protective actions to recommend to the public and alert PAZ and UPZ (for example sound sirens) and inform (for example provide a radio message) the public within 1 hour of being notified of the general emergency. The public promptly take the actions recommended. The national level officials notify IAEA and all countries where food restrictions are warranted. Following a release, default operational interventions levels (OIL), calculated in advance, are used by officials to assess environmental data. Triage centres are established within 24 hours outside the evacuated area to screen and determine the level of treatment for the overexposed public and on-site personnel. Overexposed people are assigned to predestined and prepared hospitals that are located outside the affected area. The national level officials support the local officials and conduct monitoring further from the site and coordinate longer-term protective actions. Soon after the public is alerted (e.g., sirens sounded), the media is briefed by a single government spokesperson. Joint press briefings are given (at the joint media centre) on a periodic basis with participation by the operator, local and national officials.
Programmes developed to deal with the long-term impact are carefully developed, based on internationally accepted criteria considering the long-term sociological, psychological and economic impact. Methods for compensation are carefully considered and intended to address the consequences of the event.

41. Concepts of Operations Threat Category II
The facility staff
Classifies the emergency
Notifies jurisdictions within the UPZ
Takes all possible actions to prevent or reduce the release or shine dose
Provides protective action recommendations (within 15 min)
Monitor near the site until relieved by off-site officials
Lecture notes:
The facility staff classifies the emergency and declare a general emergency before or shortly after a release or off-site exposure and notify the jurisdictions within the UPZ. The facility staff provides protective action recommendations to off-site officials within 15 minutes of declaration. The facility takes all possible actions to prevent or reduce the release or shine dose. The facility operator ensures that all people on-site (to include those responding from off-site) are provided with the appropriate protection from radiological and other hazards. Until relieved by off-site officials, the facility staff conducts monitoring near the site to determine if additional actions are needed.

42. Concepts of Operations Threat Category II – cont’d
Local officials
Provide police, fire fighting and medical assistance to the site (if requested)
Recommend, within 1 hour, protective actions to the people within the UPZ
National level officials
Support the local officials
Conduct monitoring further from the site
Conduct joint media briefings
Lecture notes:
Local off-site officials recommend, within 1 hour, that the people within the UPZ go inside and listen to the radio for further instructions based on the recommendation of the facility. They do not wait until they perform monitoring before issuing protective action recommendation. Following a release, default operational interventions levels (OIL), calculated in advance, are used by officials to assess environmental data. Local off-site officials provide police, fire fighting and medical assistance to the site if requested. National level organizations support the local officials and conduct monitoring further from the site and coordinate longer-term protective actions. Soon after the public is alerted the media is briefed by a single government spokesperson. Joint press briefings are given (at the joint media centre) on a periodic basis with participation by the operator, local and national officials.

43. Concepts of Operations Threat Category III
The facility
Declares a facility emergency
Notifies local off-site officials
Ensures that all people on-site are provided with appropriate protection
Conduct the environmental monitoring
Lecture notes:
The response concentrates on immediate life saving actions on-site, obtaining prompt fire fighting, police and medical support from off-site and informing the public.
The facility declares a facility emergency and notifies local off-site officials. The operator ensures that all the people on-site (to include those responding from off-site) are provided with appropriate protection. If there are serious over exposures, the facility staff gathers information concerning the circumstances of the overexposure and other information helpful to reconstruction of the dose. The facility staff conducts environmental monitoring promptly to ensure that no protective actions are needed off-site and to cconfirm that anybody or anything leaving the facility is not unacceptably contaminated.

44. Concepts of Operations Threat Category III – cont’d
Local off-site officials
Provide police, fire fighting and medical assistance to the site if requested
Inform the media
National level officials
Support the local officials
Assist in obtaining specialised treatment through the IAEA (if needed)
Conduct joint media briefings
Lecture notes:
Local off-site officials provide police, fire fighting and medical assistance to the site if requested. Contaminated or exposed persons are transported to and treated at local hospitals in accordance with procedures developed in advance. The physicians treating exposed individuals consult with doctors with experience in dealing with severe accidental overexposures. The national level officials support the local officials and assist in obtaining specialized treatment of exposed persons through the IAEA, if needed. Local and national officials promptly inform the public and media of the event. Soon after the public is notified the media is briefed by a single government spokes person. Joint press briefings are given (at a joint media centre) on a periodic basis with participation by the operator, local and national officials.

45. Concepts of Operations Threat Category IV
First responders
Take life saving actions
Notify local off-site officials
Local officials take precautions to confine radioactive material and to protect people in the immediate vicinity
National officials
Dispatch survey and response personnel
Request assistance through IAEA (if needed)
Brief the media
Lecture notes:
First responders take life saving actions (i.e., rescue from fire) without delay or waiting for monitoring and thereafter notify local off-site officials responsible for hazardous materials emergencies. When local officials are notified of a potential hazard, they take immediate precautions to confine the radioactive material and protect people in the immediate vicinity. National officials provide advice to local officials and dispatch survey and response personnel, if required. Following an initial assessment, national monitoring, decontamination, media relations and medical teams mobilize experienced personnel from throughout the country. If additional radiological assistance is needed, national officials request it through the IAEA under the Assistance Convention. IAEA provides additional radiological support under its ERNET (Emergency Response Network) programme. IAEA arranges for consultation by physicians experienced in treating exposures that can result in severe tissue damage or that are lives threatening. If there is public or media interest, the media is promptly briefed by a single official spokes person.

46. Concepts of Operations Threat Category V
The country where the accident occurs notifies the potentially affected states
Upon receipt of notification national officials
Provide instructions to the public and farmers
Conduct monitoring and sampling
Develop programme to deal with long-term impact
Lecture notes:
The country where the accident occurs notifies the potentially affected states and IAEA of a potential transboundary release (general emergency). IAEA, in accordance with the Notification Convention, also notifies potentially affected states.
Upon receipt of the notification of an event potentially affecting them, national officials provide instruction to the public and farmers on measures to take to protect the food supply. They also conduct monitoring and sampling to determine what food control actions is required. Decisions are based on OILs determined in advance taking into consideration local conditions such as a limited food supply. These criteria should be consistent with international guidance and coordinated with neighbouring states.
Programmes developed to deal with the long-term impact are carefully developed, based internationally accepted criteria considering the long-term sociological, psychological and economic impact.

47. Chance favors prepared
Summary
Accidents do happen
Concepts of emergency response are based on ICRP principles and IAEA recommendations
Good planning in advance of emergency can substantially improve the response
Chance favors prepared
The response to a radiation emergency is basically the same as the response to any accident involving hazardous material
Let’s summarize the main subjects we did cover in this session.
We presented and discussed the goals, principles and basic concepts of emergency response in case of radiation emergency. We learned that the response to radiation emergency is basically the same as the response to any accident involving hazardous material and only good planning and sound preparedness in advance of an emergency can substantially improve the response.