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2017 Empirical Philosophy Workshop – VUW Dan Weijers & Peter Unger

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1 2017 Empirical Philosophy Workshop – VUW Dan Weijers & Peter Unger
Watch the James Dean and Duration Neglect hypotheses crash and burn: Lessons for experimenters 2017 Empirical Philosophy Workshop – VUW Dan Weijers & Peter Unger

2 The general approach Thought experiments are often used to elicit views about the value of things Thought experiments can mislead us in ways we are not aware of 2 & 3 are dubious and can be challenged by x-phi 1 isn’t dubious, but x-phi might reveal that people don’t accept it An experience machine life has more happiness than a normal life If happiness is all that really matters in life, then the vast majority of people would choose an experience machine life over a normal life The vast majority of people would not choose an experience machine life over a normal life Therefore, happiness is not all that really matters in life

3 Deconstructive replication
Test the original scenario Ask why they chose that Assess the justifications and relevant biases literature to see what modifications are required Make 1 change at a time, test new scenarios on similar groups, compare results There is this amazing experience machine designed by super-duper neuropsychologists… Would you live the rest of your life in such a machine? Yes No Briefly justify your choice for 1.

4 The target One aspect (so far) of Diener et al.’s length of life cases
Diener, E., Wirtz, D., & Oishi, S. (2001). End effects of rated life quality: The James Dean effect. Psychological Science, 12(2),

5 Work in progress warning
Formal statistical analyses have not yet been run Formal qualitative analyses have not yet been run

6 Hypotheses about the value of happy lives of various lengths
The Common Sense Hypothesis Longer lives are more desirable than shorter lives The James Dean Hypothesis Shorter lives are more desirable than longer lives The Duration Neglect Hypothesis The length of a life doesn’t affect its desirability Doesn’t have a preference

7 (Partial) Replication of Diener et al.
Jen [Jan] was a never-married woman without children. Her life was extremely happy, with enjoyable work, vacations, friends, and pleasant leisure. Jen died suddenly and painlessly in an automobile accident, when she was 30 [60] years old. Taking Jen’s life as a whole, how desirable was her life? How much total happiness would you say that Jen experienced in her life? Please briefly explain your answer to questions 1&2: Most un-desirable 1 2 3 4 Neutral 5 6 7 8 Most desirable 9 O Most un-happy 1 2 3 4 Neutral 5 6 7 8 Most happy 9 O

8 results Diener et al. took the average of the desirability and total happiness responses for each respondent, and then compared the average of respondents’ judgments about the 30 and 60 year life. We did the same Diener et al.: “The age variable failed to have a significant effect,... This finding confirms the phenomenon of duration neglect…” Our results are similar Study Jen (30-year life) Jan (60-year life) Jan - Jen Diener et al. 6.13 6.48 0.35 Weijers & Unger 6.26 6.15 -0.11

9 Implications for philosophy? If Diener et al. Were right, then…
Prudential value: what is good for us Used in moral theory, political philosophy, applied ethics, and public policy Should governments focus on making our lives happy at the cost of them being long? No speed limit Decriminalize drugs Subsidize alcohol and drugs Scrap cancer research in favor of subsidizing vacations Quantitative hedonism: lives are valued by summing the net happiness of each moment Prudential theories that value lives in a way different to the vast majority of people are bad theories The vast majority of people do not value lives by summing the net happiness of each moment Therefore, quantitative hedonism is a bad theory

10 Or we can take a closer look: Qualitative analysis
Method There are 9 main categories of answer. Which main category an answer fits in depends on 3 things: The question that motivated the thought experiment (related to what it is supposed to show) The exact wording of the scenario and questions The respondents’ answers to the questions Then group by meaning within categories Categories Malicious response Opposite justification Imaginative resistance Overactive imagination Reasonable resistance Useful response No justification Reasonable rejection Demonstrates misunderstanding

11 Deconstructive replication: quant/Qualitative analysis
Categories Malicious response Opposite justification Imaginative resistance Overactive imagination Reasonable resistance Useful response No justification Reasonable rejection Demonstrates misunderstanding Uses % of 6+7 answers can be used to assess a thought experiments fit for purpose Compare “fit for purpose” scores of scenario wording changes to ensure they improve % of1+2+9 (+3+4+7?) can be used to gauge the relative suitability of sample groups Sub-groups of 3, 4, 5, & 8 used to criticize original & inform creation of new scenarios Sub-groups of 6 used as support for theories Could just use #s from 6 or 6+7 for quant analysis

12 Or we can take a closer look: Methodology
Potential methodological problems Many respondents de-valued the lives because the women were “never-married… without children” Evaluating a life without a comparator is difficult “Total happiness” data might not be relevant to desirability The scale and labels might cause problems (“most desirable” and “most undesirable” are ambiguous) Potential solutions Rewrite the scenario so it doesn’t mention whether they were married with children or not Compare Jen’s (30) and Jan’s (60) lives directly against each other Do not combine the “desirability” and “total happiness” responses Run the study with a simpler response mechanism (whose life is more desirable, or are they equal?)

13 Or we can take a closer look: Harder test for JDH & DNH
Scenario setup tweaks Having 3 options might help participants think more carefully about the potential differences between the lives Increasing the age gap should make the difference between the lives more salient Making the judgments about a life you will have (rather than the life of a stranger) should make the participant take any differences in value more seriously Tweak details E.g., Compare Jen’s (30), Jay (45), and Jan’s (60) lives directly against each other E.g., Compare Jen’s (25) and Jan’s (75) lives directly against each other E.g., “There are two lives…” “…and assuming you are forced to choose one to live yourself…”

14 And we can combine tweaks
Which enables the investigation of… Whether some tweaks only seem to have an effect in the presence or absence of other tweaks The average effect of each tweak across slightly different contexts The total effect of all of the tweaks combined So we can learn (approximately)… About any interrelationships between tweaks The relative importance and absolute effect of each tweak Just how bad the original study was, and how people really value the desirability of happy lives of different lengths

15 Tweak 1: Clean “never married” etc.
Clean: “Imagine someone was extremely happy for every year of their life, until they died suddenly and painlessly in an automobile accident at age 30 [60].” RESULTS General increase Results now favor commonsense Study Jen (30-year life) Jan (60-year life) Jan - Jen Weijers & Unger Rate 1 (BS) 6.26 6.15 -0.10 Rate 1 (BS)-clean 6.73 7.32 0.58 Rate both (WS) 5.81 6.60 0.79 Rate both (WS)-clean 7.22 8.23 1.02

16 Tweak 2: Directly comparing the lives
Study Jen (30-year life) Jan (60-year life) Jan - Jen Weijers & Unger Rate 1 (BS) 6.26 6.15 -0.10 Rate both (WS) 5.81 6.60 0.79 Rate 1 (BS)-clean 6.73 7.32 0.58 Rate both (WS)-clean 7.22 8.23 1.02 Respondents were presented with both lives at the same time (i.e. within subjects design) with the same question wording as before RESULTS Increase for 60 year lives Results favor commonsense even more

17 Tweak 3: Desirability results only
Instead of combining “desirability” with “total happiness”, we just took the desirability measure RESULTS Increase (for WS) evaluations of 60 over 30 year life Study 30 combined 60 combined Combined 60-30 30 desire only 60 desire only Desire only 60-30 Diener et al. Rate 1 6.13 6.48 0.35 ? Weijers & Unger 6.26 6.15 -0.10 5.74 5.35 -0.40 Rate both (WS) 5.81 6.60 0.79 4.72 6.21 1.49 Rate 1-clean 6.73 7.32 0.58 6.12 6.66 0.54 Rate both (WS) clean 7.22 8.23 1.02 6.40 7.83 1.43

18 Tweak 4: Directly comparing the lives
Study Jen (30-year life) Jan (60-year life) Jan - Jen W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 2-option 7.22 8.23 1.01 W & U, Rate both (WS), clean, 3-option 6.43 7.71 1.28 W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 2-option, bigger age gap (25-75) 6.25 8.04 1.79 W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 3-option, bigger age gap (25-75) 5.02 7.54 2.52 W&U, Rate both (WS), dirty, 2-option 5.81 6.60 0.79 W&U, Rate both (WS), dirty, 3-option 5.74 6.62 0.88 Added a middle option (Jay: 45) RESULTS Mixed: this had a ‘commonsense’ effect on ‘total happiness’ judgments, but not ‘desirability’

19 Tweak 5: Bigger age gap Made Jen die at 25 and Jan 75 RESULTS
Study Jen (30-year life) Jan (60-year life) Jan - Jen W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 2-option 7.22 8.23 1.01 W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 2-option, bigger age gap (25-75) 6.25 8.04 1.79 W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 3-option 6.43 7.71 1.28 W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 3-option, bigger age gap (25-75) 5.02 7.54 2.52 Made Jen die at 25 and Jan 75 RESULTS Results favor commonsense even more

20 Tweak 6: Making it personal
“There are two lives…” “…and assuming you are forced to choose one to live yourself…” RESULTS Results favor commonsense even more, especially if just desirability is used Study Jen (30-year life) Jan (60-year life) Jan - Jen W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 2-option 7.22 8.23 1.01 W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 2-option, personal 5.64 7.62 1.98 W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 3-option 6.43 7.71 1.28 W&U, Rate both (WS), clean, 3-option, personal 4.84 6.39 1.55

21 Combining Tweaks Including all 6 tweaks, compare to our replication of D’s original RESULTS Huge difference: 4.04 on a 1-9 scale (over 50% movement!) The totally tweaked version strongly supports commonsense Study Jen (30-year life) Jan (60-year life) Jan - Jen W&U, Rate 1 (BS) 5.74 5.35 -0.40 W&U, clean, Rate both (WS), desi only, 3-option, bigger gap (25-75) personal 4.00 7.64 3.64

22 Differences tweaks made
Using desirability only Simple average of comparisons (doesn’t take varying sample sizes into account) Tweak # of com-parisons Average contribution 1) Cleaning up “no kids” etc language 3 +0.54 2) Within subjects design (rate 2), rather than BS 2 +1.39 3) Desirability scores only, rather than combo average with total happiness scores 10 +0.82 4) 3rd option added in middle 4 -0.27* 5) Bigger age difference (most instead of 30-60) +1.20 6) Making it personal, rather than about a stranger +0.79 *But did increase total happiness contribution

23 conclusion Specific Some students think they think that length of life doesn’t matter Most students (probably) think that length of life is important, but far from the only intrinsically important thing in life i.e., there is probably a partial duration neglect effect when we evaluate lives in ideal conditions At least with these kinds of evaluations (“online” vs “narrative/3rd person/objective” may be different) General Experimental philosophy/ psychology is hard It takes a long time Multiple methods should be combined for more robust results It’s no wonder many experiments’ results aren’t highly replicable! Always ask the qualitative question Some people believe very unusual things


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