1. DOKLAM STAND OFF- AN ANALYSIS

2. BACKDROP Bilateral relations at a low in the recent past
India’s Grouses
a. NSG stone walling
b. Intransigence by blocking the listing of Masood Azhar.
c. CPEC section of OBOR
China’s Grouses
a. Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang
b. Visit by US ambassador to Tawang.
c. India’s tilt towards the US especially in the Asia Pacific context.
d. India’s rejection of BRI.
Frictions as above bound to manifest itself at the first opportunity

3. CHUMBI VALLEY

4. DOKLAM PLATEAU AS PER GOOGLE MAP

5. CHINESE VERSION

6. CHINESE VERSION

7. PLA MAP

8. 1890 TREATY PROVISION
Under Article 1, the boundary of Sikkim and Tibet was defined as the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Teesta River in Sikkim and its tributaries from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu River and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commenced at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and followed the above watershed to the point where it met Nepali territory.
Contrary to Chinese claim, Nehru’s 26th September 1959 letter to Zhou, cited by China, was a point-by-point refutation of the claims made by the latter on September 8, Nehru made is amply clear in his rebuttal that the 1890 treaty defined only the northern part of the Sikkim-Tibet border and not the tri-junction area. Nehru wrote, “rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India with the Tibet region of China in the same sector." The Chinese had quoted Nehru's statement out of context, as Nehru in his reply had made it clear boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan did not fall within the scope of the discussion, “This Convention of 1890 also defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet; and the boundary was later, in 1895, demarcated. There is thus no dispute regarding the boundary of Sikkim with the Tibet region.”[27]
According to India's interpretation of the treaty and delineation of the boundaries, the phrase "crest line" assumes more significance. This is in accordance with the general principle of boundary delineation across the world for the treaties agreed on the basis of 18th and 19th century understanding of maps and cartographic practices.
India asserts that the crest line or the ridge that runs from the border of Nepal ends at a place called Batang La. Bhutan also maintains the same demarcation.
There is also an overriding obligation on Bhutan under the 2007 Friendship Treaty to ensure no part of its territory is used for activities that are harmful to Indian security interests in the region.

9. THE INCIDENT
On June 16, 2017, according to separate statements by both the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Bhutan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a group of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) engineers reportedly began construction of a motorable road from the terminal “turning point” at the end of a track that had existed since at least and possibly much earlier. According to the Bhutanese government, the PLA sought to construct a motorable road from Dokola [also known as Doka La] in the Doklam area toward the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri [also romanized as Jampheri].
The area is extremely critical to India’s security as it overlooks the Siliguri corridor. China, on the other hand, has held a tough position on Doklam and has been upgrading infrastructure networks, including roads in nearby areas, on the lines that it has built in Aksai Chin.

10. STAND OFF POINT

11. TYPICALITIES
China is systematically changing the famous ‘taoguang yang hi’ (TGYH) approach that underpinned its foreign policy since the late 1980s.
The TGYH approach, created in the context of a China after the Tiananmen Square massacre and what it saw as an existential global threat as other Communist regimes crumbled, was summed up in Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of 1992:  “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” (peaceful rise?) That era is now clearly over
The Doklam incident is significantly different from recent ones in Depsang (Daulat Beg Oldi sector of Ladakh, 2013), Chumar (eastern Ladakh, 2014) or Demchok (Ladakh, 2016).  First, this time China is attempting to change the status quo as it has existed since the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement. The Chinese gambit of building a road in this strategically important sector pushes Chinese de facto control below Bhutan’s claim-line, about 5km southwards, thus changing the status of the border tri-junction.
In 2012, special representatives from both sides had a broad understanding that tri- junctions will be finalised in consultation with the third country concerned. China is now unilaterally trying to get away from that.
This incident is not just about India and China, but about a third country: Bhutan. Delhi’s measured tone indicate what is at stake: India’s strategic equation with Bhutan itself.
Unlike in past incidents when both sides mutually agreed to withdraw troops, this time China is setting pre-conditions for talks. And for a change China is the aggrieved party.
As of now, China’s position remains that diplomacy can only be possible after India unilaterally withdraws its troops back to its side of the international border.

12. WHY DOKLAM
Gain control of the Doklam plateau for tactical military reasons by building a road into the Doklam plateau. The Batang La tri-junction at the narrow end of the Chumbi Valley—wedged between East Sikkim and West Bhutan—leaves China very little depth or width to deploy its forces.
The border, as it stands today affords India a tactical advantage since its forces based in North and North-east Sikkim can easily cut off the Chinese deployment in the narrow Chumbi Valley should China try any misadventure here.
The Chinese forces in the narrow Chumbi Valley are currently in the line of sight and fire of Indian forces poised on the ridges along the Sikkim-Tibet border.
Aware of this vulnerability, the Chinese want the Doklam plateau since any troops stationed there will be away from visible observation and beyond artillery range of Indian forces either based in North or north-east Sikkim. Moreover, once the Chinese gain control of the plateau, they can easily roll down the Zimplri ridge and undermine Indian defences in the Siliguri Corridor that connects rest of India to the seven north- eastern states.
The Chinese are unilaterally changing the tri-junction point. This is in violation of the understanding we have reached with them in As the MEA statement has noted, the construction of the road will involve a significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India.
Tactical military compulsions apart, there is a geostrategic reason why China chose to up the ante. That Beijing made its first public statement on the standoff at a time when Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in the US for his first meeting with President Donald Trump clearly shows China’s annoyance with India’s perceived tilt towards the US. Could also be peeved with India’s refusal to join the Belt and Road Initiative.

13. CHINA’S REACTIONS Suspending Kailash Mansorvar Yatra through Nathu La
The Chinese defense ministry warned India to learn the "historical lessons" from the major military reversals it suffered in 1962
Chinese foreign ministry insisting that the "precondition for any meaningful dialogue" would be for Indian troops to "unconditionally" pull back from Doklam
"full combat readiness" exercise with tanks aimed at delivering a clear warning to New Delhi, according to Chinese state media. (though this video of live firing exercise near Lhasa was in the first week of June)
"We firmly believe that the face-off in the Donglang area will end up with the Indian troops in retreat. The Indian military can choose to return to its territory with dignity or be kicked out of the area by Chinese soldiers," China's nationalist tabloid Global Times said on July 5. "This time we must teach New Delhi a bitter lesson."
An article on the PLA's English-language website, China Military Online, has warned that "if a solution isn't reached through diplomatic or military communication or the issue isn't handled properly, another armed conflict ... is not completely out of the question.“
turned down a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and PM Modi on the sidelines of G 20 summit at Hamburg as it would not be productive under the present circumstances. seemed like a deliberate diplomatic rebuff. (India though stated that it had not requested for such a meeting)
China issuing an advisory to their citizens to exercise caution when moving about in India. Nations issue such notices as a last resort when they perceive threat to law and order in another country or hostility due to rising tensions between them.
if India did not unilaterally resolve the stand-off, by withdrawing its troops blocking the Chinese ingress into Bhutanese territory, then China may relook at Sikkim's merger with India
Ex Chinese diplomat’s statement in a media discussion that India has three options; `withdraw, capture or be killed ‘
Chinese media linking the incident to rising Hindu Nationalism.
All in all is it War mongering by the state controlled Chinese media?

14. WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA AND CHINA
The first scenario is that one side or the other will make a unilateral concession, either China abandoning its road construction in disputed territory or India withdrawing troops to allow China to proceed unimpeded. This scenario is most unlikely.
The second scenario is the Chinese use of force to expel India's troops, resume road construction and 'teach India a lesson before China's advantage is eroded'. Whether through war mongering by the media or by open threats from former Chinese diplomats, Beijing certainly wants New Delhi to think that this is a serious possibility. Some Indian experts agree, warning that Chinese signals echo those seen before past wars.
The geography of Doklam, the Indian force levels in the area of contest giving them an upper hand could mean that any Chinese attack would not be guaranteed to succeed, forcing Beijing into a choice between defeat and major escalation.
But even if so, a wider war would be devastating for China's strategic objectives in Asia and the world. It would explode the idea of peaceful rise and accelerate the process of India's convergence with the United States and Japan. Though Tibet is a 'core interest', China's position there is not materially affected by a few kilometres of road.
Then the possibility of China escalating elsewhere, either to seize territory as a bargaining chip to swap for Indian concessions in Doklam, or merely to punish India in order to weaken its resolve in Doklam. Despite the public Indian posture of not too much concern, Indian officials would be seriously concerned by this prospect, with eastern Ladakh, in the western sector of the India-China border, seen as especially vulnerable.

15. WAY AHEAD FOR INDIA AND CHINA
The fourth scenario, and the most hopeful, is a diplomatic settlement. India would agree to withdraw its forces from Doklam, in exchange for China ceasing the extension of its road. But would a straight swap, be enough for China? New Delhi might need to offer wider concessions, such as a softer Indian line on the Belt and Road Initiative, to secure agreement. Will India be satisfied with the status quo, may be it will depend on how much India can depend on Bhutan not breaking ranks.
China's own domestic political circumstances may also complicate matters, with the 19th National Congress of the Community Party, where Xi Jinping hopes to consolidate his already formidable grip on power, just a few months away. It may be harder to make concessions until after that gathering, while it may even suit Beijing to keep the crisis simmering through this period.
In all likelihood, the Doklam crisis will not lead to war. China has a long record of using public threats to coerce adversaries, but the consequences of a war with China would be far out of proportion with the issue at stake. However, a quick solution (either unilateral or mutually agreed) is also unlikely. As the crisis stretches on, China is likely to seek ways to pressure India, both on the border and elsewhere, and this will not only compound the cycle of competition but may cause irreparable damage to bilateral relations.
BOTTOM LINE 
The Doklam Plateau gives the PLA the advantage of outflanking from the south west, the defences of Sikkim, where we have a major terrain advantage vis the Chumbi Valley. The implications are strategic. We not only lose our major advantage of a strategic offensive / counter offensive from Sikkim but also give the PLA a launch pad for an offensive through the Rangpo River valley towards Kalimpong without violating the neutrality of Bhutan. The probability of war may be low, but the bottom line is that India cannot afford to surrender its strategic advantage and create a vulnerability by allowing the PLA to take possession of the Doklam Plateau. It is pertinent to mention that all the disputed areas that the Chinese claim along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) are related to strategic or tactical advantages in event of a war.

16. THANK YOU