1. Russia- DPRK Reset Button: Implications for Denuclearization By Igor Khripunov November 2011

2. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. Russia- DPRK Relations: Six Stages of Evolution 1.North Korea and the Soviet Union 2.Mikhail Gorbachev’s restructuring, transparency, and democratization 3.Post-Soviet search for an optimal strategy (1992-late 1990s) 4.Multipolarity Surge 5.Post-May 2009 fallout 6.2011 Reset Button

3. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 1. North Korea and the Soviet Union North Korea’s Institute of Nuclear Energy established in 1952 North Korea’s Defense Minister visited Russia’s Totsk range where a 40kt nuclear bomb was tested In 1956, Kim Il-Sing visited the USSR and had a tour of the first nuclear power plant in Obninsk In 1956, DPRK signed an agreement to participate in activities of the International Nuclear Center in Dubna DPRK and the USSR concluded in 1959 Agreement on Technical Assistance to DPRK for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Construction of IRT-1000 and IRT-2000 reactors and transfer of a wide range of technologies including Pu-239 separation Supply of 80% enriched U-235 Training of thousands of students and participation in numerous joint research projects

4. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 2. Mikhail Gorbachev’s Restructuring, Transparency, and Democratization Rapprochement with the West Recognition of the Republic of Korea Pyongyang’s support of the August 1991 coup Scale down of weapons deliveries Less generous assistance

5. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 3. Post-Soviet Search for an Optimal Strategy (1992-late 1990s) Continued drift to the West Economic aid made conditional on debt repayment Nonrenewal of the Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance (1961) Russia’s proposal of a five-point comprehensive solution in 1994 elicited little response from Pyongyang and Washington

6. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 4. Multipolarity Surge A lack of reciprocal goodwill from the West, continued concern regarding NATO expansion toward Russia borders and perceived threats of emboldened U.S. unilateralism Moving away from the U.S.-dominated unipolar construct Emerging power centers form coalitions, both formal and informal, using multilateral mechanisms and expanding their spheres of military, economic, trade, cultural and other cooperation Since the late 1990s, Russia and the DPRK have signed over 40 intergovernmental and inter-ministerial agreements including the February 2000 Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with Russia and the DPRK

7. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 4. Multipolarity Surge: New Spirit of Closeness with the DPRK Securing Russia’s presence and interests around the periphery as a buffer North Korea welcomed Putin’s reforms, in particular strengthening national governance, streamlining economic reforms and partially exonerating leaders of the Soviet past Shared concerns over Washington’s hegemonic global status and its influence in the region Russia’s package solution in 2003: a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, North Korean compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the 1994 Agreed Framework, security guarantees to the DPRK, and resumption of humanitarian and economic assistance programs. However, neither Pyongyang nor Washington took the Russia proposal seriously. The Korean crisis ceased to be a freestanding issue for Russia, but rather one that was closely interwoven with other global problems in an emerging multipolar world

8. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 5. Post-May 2009 Fallout Japan Former politicians and defense officials pushed the government to consider weapons modernization option including nuclear option A defense panel of the Liberal Democratic party recognized the need to develop “active missile defense,” meaning the ability to attack a potential enemy before it attacks Japan A space panel agreed to the missile detection plan as a part of a new space policy commitment, a year after Japan dropped a decade-old ban on the military use of space Japan renewed its interest in buying the U.S. F-22 Raptor Russia and China started to grasp the new serious risks to themselves posed by the geopolitical fallout from the Spring 2009 tests and their global repercussions

9. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 5. Post-May 2009 Fallout South Korea Debates on redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or development of national nuclear deterrence U.S. government approved the sale of GBU-28 “bunker buster” bombs capable of destroying underground nuclear facilities and artillery in hidden caves Conventional weapons buildup including F-16 fighter jets, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and other advanced systems Debates have accelerated on the topic of building indigenous submarines including long-term plans for nuclear-powered submarines Growing concerns about vulnerability of ROK nuclear power plants in the wake of the Fukushima accident

10. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 5. Post-May 2009 Fallout United States The U.S. has boosted its missile-defense capability throughout the region, including Japan (which has fielded sea-based defenses), South Korea and Hawaii The U.S. has committed to an “extended nuclear deterrence” to South Korea A secret U.S.-Japanese agreement was reportedly leaked in the press regarding a possible introduction of nuclear weapons in specific circumstances Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates: “The DPRK is implementing a road-mobile missile program which needs to be stopped” In a short or medium term perspective, concerns about the DPRK threats to induce magnetic pulses by nuclear explosives in the atmospheres over U.S. territory (Fukushima)

11. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 6. 2011 Reset Button A series of Russia, ROK and DPRK ministerial meetings preceded the moment when both countries pushed the button on their relations Kim Jong-Il’s visit to Russia and China in August 2011 (resumption of the Six- Party Talks without preconditions) Reset package of three projects: 1.Construction of a gas pipeline from Russia along the Korean Peninsula to South Korea (1000km long, cost estimated at $2.5B, earliest completion in 2017) 2.Installing power transmission lines above this route 3.Completing a Trans-Korean railway system to be linked to the Trans- Siberian Railway (Khasan-Radjin sector to be completed before the end of 2011) Tacit and express approval and support of ROK government

12. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 6. 2011 Reset Button Across-the-board rapprochement Russia is about to write off the DPRK’s debt (around $11B) Joint Navy search-and-rescue exercises and mutual visits Expedited delivery of humanitarian assistance to the DPRK (50,000 tons of grain) Expanded cultural programs A series of Kim Jong-Il’s interviews in the Russian media (ongoing throughout the fall of 2011) Caveat: Russia’s public is increasingly negative about the DPRK’s nuclear program and treats North Korea as a second rate partner

13. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 6. 2011 Reset Button: Motivation Russia’s angle: Reach for new oil and gas markets in East Asia (Moscow’s energy strategy aims for an increase in the oil market from 8% currently to 22- 25% in 2030, while gas from 0% currently to 20% in 2030) Counterbalancing China’s growing clout Preventing the DPRK from becoming overly dependent on China Stability in the region as key to economic revival in Russia’s Far East Avoidance of disruptive scenarios in North Korea Much needed foreign policy initiatives after the diplomatic failure in Libya, support for the unpopular regime in Syria, and continued involvement in Iran’s nuclear program NATO and ABM deployment in Europe Potential for Russia to be a bridge between Europe and Asia

14. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 6. 2011 Reset Button: Motivation The DPRK’s angle: Concept of “Powerful and Prosperous Nation”: political thought, military strength, and a robust economy Popular discontent and emerging middle class Uneasiness about China’s influence and efforts to revive the policy of maneuvering between Russia and China Dealing with growing international isolation Succession challenges Restoration and modernization of aging industrial sector designed and built by the Soviet Union

15. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 6. 2011 Reset Button: Challenges The DPRK’s unpredictability: closing the gas valve, succession timeframe, etc. Prospects of resuming missile and nuclear tests Applicability of UN sanctions Compatibility of the DPRK’s energy infrastructure with natural gal Ability to pay for natural gas supply $10B as estimates cost of modernizing North Korea’s power infrastructure The West’s concerns over saving and boosting the Kim regime Gasprom’s lack of enthusiasm Liquefied natural gas (LNG) versus natural gas for the ROK

16. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. 6. 2011 Reset Button: Denuclearization The reset package does not have strings attached, and thus is different from KEDO There is no formal link or preconditions for resumption of the Six-Party Talks After the regime change in Libya, North Korea’s nuclear program is no longer a bargaining chip but rather a major pillar of the regime’s survival strategy If the Six-Party Talks resume, the DPRK is likely to make concessions but an irreversible and complete denuclearization will apparently come not from coordinated international pressure, but a self-initiated decision in a timeframe determined by North Korea The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit is the first test

17. © Copyright 2011, The University of Georgia. Not for reproduction, distribution or use without the express written consent of the University of Georgia. The reset button pushed by Russia and the DPRK with South Korea’s consent has generated a fair share of optimism, but also complexities, uncertainties, and doubts. It will certainly take some time to sort these out and see how well this initiative eases tensions and facilitates denuclearization