1. Does Death Qualification Standard matter? An Analysis of Mock Juror Decision-Making Matthew P. West Christine M. McDermott, MA Jena Garrick Emily F. Wood Monica K. Miller, PhD, JD The annual meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society Atlanta, GA, 2016

2. Post-Gregg Capital Trial Gregg v. Georgia (1976) Bifurcated o Phase 1: Guilty v. Not Guilty o Phase 2: Life Sentence v. Death Penalty Aggravating Circumstances (Aggravators) o Make the defendant more deserving of death sentence (e.g., the crime was especially heinous) o Statutory Mitigating Circumstances (Mitigators) o Make the defendant more deserving of life sentence (e.g., the defendant was mentally impaired at the time of the crime) o Statutory and non-statutory (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978)

3. Verdict “Calculator” Step 1 o Jurors endorse aggravating and mitigating circumstances Step 2 o Jurors weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances Result o The “appropriate” verdict (i.e., life sentence or death penalty)

4. Capital Voir Dire Prospective jurors undergo “death qualification” o Probed for attitudes and feelings toward the death penalty o Whether those attitudes or feelings would prevent them from fulfilling their duty as juror (i.e., inhibit impartiality) o Different standards for exclusion have been specified

5. Death Qualification Effects Associated with convictions and death penalty (Haney, 2005) Positively related to aggravator endorsement (Butler & Moran, 2002) Negatively related to mitigator endorsement (Butler & Moran, 2002)

6. Witherspoon Standard ”[J]urors may be excluded for cause if they make it ‘unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.’” (Witherspoon v. Illinois, 1968, footnote 21)

7. Wainwright v. Witt, 1985 Some courts interpreted Witherspoon as, “exclude any juror who unambiguously reports they would always give a life sentence” (Burns v. Estelle, 1979) Witt Standard: Any prospective juror “whose views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with their instructions or their oaths” could be excluded (Wainwright v. Witt, 1985, footnote 5)

8. Morgan v. Illinois, 1992 In many ways can be interpreted as a logical necessity of Witherspoon If a prospective juror can be excluded for indicating they would always vote for a life sentence, a prospective juror who indicates they would always vote for a death sentence should also be excluded The prospective juror who would always vote for death would be unable to consider mitigating evidence, which is required by statute to be considered and weighed in determining a verdict (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978)

9. Morgan Standard The belief that “death should be imposed ipso facto upon conviction reflects directly on an individual's inability to follow the law” Therefore, Witherspoon and Witt standards are (ironically) not comprehensive enough (by their own standards)

10. Operationalization Witherspoon-Morgan standard o Prospective jurors who would “automatically” do something o Prospective jurors who would always render a death penalty, or jurors who would always render a life sentence, are excludable Witt standard o Prospective jurors with feelings that would affect their ability to fulfill their oath are excludable o A juror who is “for death” or “for life,” should not automatically be precluded from jury service (although a juror who indicates either position provides enough evidence to be challenged for cause; Wainright v. Witt,1985)

11. Current Study Theoretical importance o No study (we are aware of) has directly examined the effects of death qualification incorporating a “Morgan standard” o The last study to examine the effects of death qualification in aggravator and mitigator endorsement was published almost a decade ago (and also did not incorporate a Morgan standard) Practical importance o Ring v. Arizona, 2002 and Hurst v. Florida, 2016 Death qualification may indirectly increase likelihood of death penalty o What standard should researchers use?

12. Current Study H1: Participants who are excludable according to the Witt standard or the Witherspoon-Morgan standard will be less likely to render a death sentence than non-excludables RQ: Will participants death qualified according to the Witt standard differ in aggravator endorsement or mitigator endorsement from participants death qualified according to the Witherspoon-Morgan standard?

13. Method Survey N = 457 participants recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk Procedure o Death qualification questions o Read trial summary (State v. Daniels, 1994) o Rated extent to which aggravating (e.g., “the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain”) and mitigating circumstances (e.g., “the defendant is a good candidate for successful psychological rehabilitation”) were present in case on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) o Indicated sentencing verdict on a certainty Likert scale from 1(LWOP) to 7 (Death Penalty)

14. Method Materials o Trial summary including judge’s instructions and attorney arguments (State v. Daniels, 1994) o 4 aggravating circumstances based in North Carolina statute (e.g., α = 0.60) o 3 mitigating circumstances based in North Carolina statute + 1 non-statutory mitigator item (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978; α = 0.71)

15. Death Qualification Questions Death penalty attitudes o 1 = Always vote for death penalty o 2 = In favor of death penalty, but wouldn’t always give it o 3 = Doubts about the death penalty, but would give it if necessary o 4 = Never vote for death penalty even if legally appropriate Juror performance o Sentiments toward the death penalty would, or would not, impair performance as juror in accordance with oath

16. Operationalization Witherspoon-Morgan standard o “Excludables”: jurors who would always vote for death penalty (“1s”) or jurors who would never vote for death penalty (“4s”) Witt standard o “Excludadbles”: jurors who report their sentiments toward the death penalty would impair their ability to fulfill their oath

17. Analysis Plan MANOVA IVs o Witt excludables v. non-excludables o Witherspoon-Morgan excludables v. non-excludables DVs o Mean endorsement of aggravating circumstances o Mean endorsement of mitigating circumstances o Sentencing verdict

18. Results Witt standard o Wilk’s λ = 0.96, F(4, 452) = 4.70, p =.001, η 2 = 0.04 o Mean aggravator endorsement F(1, 455) = 4.0, p =.05, η 2 = 0.01 o Mean mitigator endorsement F(1, 455) = 0.02, p =.90, η 2 = 0.0 o Sentencing verdict F(1, 455) = 15.84, p <.001, η 2 = 0.03

19. Results

20. Results

21. Results Witherspoon-Morgan standard o Wilk’s λ = 0.95, F(4, 452) = 5.60, p <.001, η 2 = 0.05 o Mean aggravator endorsement F(1, 455) = 0.96, p =.33, η 2 = 0.002 o Mean mitigator endorsement F(1, 455) = 0.05, p =.82, η 2 = 0.0 o Sentencing verdict F(1, 455) = 18.53, p <.001, η 2 = 0.04

22. Results

23. Discussion The Witt standard and Witherspoon-Morgan standard were both associated with death penalty verdicts o Confirms hypothesis and coalesces with past literature Only the Witt standard was associated with aggravator endorsement o Partially answers research question: Death qualification standard does matter o Did not replicate Butler and Moran (2002): Neither standard was associated with mitigator endorsement o Partially supports opinion in Morgan v. Illinois (1992)

24. Limitations Simulated jury trial o Consequentiality Individual decisions o Deliberation could change results Could not account for process effects (Haney, 2005) o Every participant underwent death qualification effects

25. Legal Implications “’[P]revent or substantially impair’“ and ‘automatically’ -is not impartial language. Juries will achieve real neutrality when the standards for assessing attitudes toward the death penalty are consistent” (Belt, 1994, p. 170) Witt Standard v. Witherspoon-Morgan Standard o Hurst v. Florida (2016) o Morgan v. Illinois (1992)

26. Research Implications What standard should be used? o Future research is needed, but… o What are the goals of the study? o What variables are in the study? o What is the study’s methodology? Clarity is most important o Potentially use death qualification as control o Process effects (Haney, 2005) v. Eligibility effects (this study) Future directions o Non-unanimous decision o Do similar juror selection procedures have similar effects? o Further study of process effects

27. Conclusion Death qualification standard does matter Death qualification increases death penalty verdicts Death penalty researchers should clearly articulate the standard they use and how they apply it

28. Thank you! Matthew P. West matthewwest@unr.edumatthewphilipwest@gmail.com

29. References Belt, J. C. (1994). Morgan v. Illinois: The right to balance capital sentencing juries as to their views on the death sentence is finally granted to defendants. New Mexico Law Review, 24, 145-170. Retrieved from http://lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr/volumes/24/1/08_belt_morgan.pdf Butler, B. M., & Moran, G. (2002). The role of death qualification in venirepersons' evaluations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital trials. Law and Human Behavior, 26(2), 175-184. doi:10.1023/A:1014640025871 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Haney, C. (2005). Death by design: Capital punishment as social psychological system. New York: Oxford University Press. Hurst v. Florida, No. 14-7505 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2016). Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992). North Carolina General Statutes (n.d). Subchapter XV. Capital Punishment. Article 100. http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/enactedlegislation/statutes/html/bysection/chapter_15a/g s_15a-2000.html (accessed 8 March, 2015) Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002). State v. Daniels, 446 S.E.2d 298, 337 N.C. 243 (1994). Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968).