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International Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evidence M. Scott Taylor Department of Economics, University of Calgary & National Bureau of Economic.

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Presentation on theme: "International Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evidence M. Scott Taylor Department of Economics, University of Calgary & National Bureau of Economic."— Presentation transcript:

1 International Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evidence M. Scott Taylor Department of Economics, University of Calgary & National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA.

2 Some Facts Poor Environmental Quality in many less developed countries Continuing deforestation; capture fisheries are in a state of decline if not collapse. Carbon emissions continue to grow at rapid rates

3 The Case Against Free Trade Poor environmental outcomes in many developing countries Weak if any Environmental Regulations. Trend towards specialization in environmentally sensitive or dirty goods Worldwide movement towards liberalized trade

4 The Analysis Step One. Agree that: Regulations are weak or non-existent in developing countries Patterns of specialization moving towards pollution intensive goods There are many serious environmental problems in the world today.

5 Step Two: Introduce a Common Language and way of thinking about trade’s effect Scale, Composition & Technique

6 Trade’s Impact

7 Step Three: Develop Theory What determines the policy response and hence the technique effect? Since trade liberalization affects incomes and income growth affects policy responses, how do this simultaneity problem work out? What determines the pattern of trade and hence the composition effect?

8 Key Issues Identified by Theory Almost all of the important results are determined by just two factors: 1. Speed and strength of the policy response; i.e the strength of the technique effect 2. The pattern of trade; i.e. the direction of the composition effect created by trade liberalization.

9 Debate over the Composition Effect Pollution Haven Hypothesis vs. the Factor Endowments Hypothesis

10 The Pollution Haven Hypothesis Differences in the costs of meeting environmental regulations are the most important motivation for trade in dirty goods. Income levels are key determinants of environmental standards. World income distribution is highly skewed.

11 Modelling Two region model: North versus South Each region: many small identical countries Mechanism: differences in income differences in environmental regulation differences in production costs trade pattern 5.1

12 Dirty Good X Clean Good Y North South p p

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14 Trade’s Impact on the South Dirty industries move and create pollution havens in the South Pollution in Poor countries rises Real income gains may lead to tighter environmental policies. Real income gains from trade may more than compensate for a dirtier environment. Trade may be welfare improving.

15 Rich countries avoid dirty production by importing dirty goods from poor countries Pollution in Rich countries falls, and their real incomes rise. Trade is necessarily welfare improving regardless of the efficacy of policy. Trade’s Impact on the North

16 Trade’s Impact on the World Perhaps a more efficient distribution of production across countries. An increase in global pollution.

17 The Alternative Hypothesis Perhaps Dirty Industries are also capital intensive ones. Rich developed countries are capital abundant relative to Poor undeveloped ones which are labor abundant. If conventional determinants of comparative advantage swamp the cost reducing effects of lax regulation, then the direction of trade may be reversed.

18 Dirty Good X Clean Good Y North South p p p North

19 Implications Liberalized trade could shift pollution intensive production from poor to rich countries This shift would move production to tighter regulation countries Liberalized trade could lower world pollution and improve environmental quality in both poor and rich countries.

20 Debate over the Technique Effect Key issue in the Resource & Trade literature Property rights over many natural resources are hard to define and difficult to enforce. Property rights are often weak in developing countries.

21 Competing Hypotheses The Hardin hypothesis: lack of property rights creates a situation of open access to resources that produces a tragedy of the commons. This situation is permanent. The Stigler Hypothesis: property rights are malleable institutions and their strength is determined by economic forces.

22 If lax regulation implies a comparative advantage in this industry, then liberalized trade will create: 1. Resource depletion, deforestation and overfishing. 2. Welfare losses from trade and large environmental costs as well. If Hardin is right

23 If Stigler is right If trade raises the value of natural resources, it also raises the value to protecting and managing them more carefully. Regulation and enforcement of property rights should improve with trade. But if property rights enforcement is determined by economic forces, trade may also bring other changes that destroy incentive systems and existing regulation.

24 The Empirical Evidence Do pollution regulations affect trade flows? Can other sources of comparative advantage overwhelm regulatory costs. Does environmental and resource policy respond to income gains or price changes brought about by trade.

25 Do regulations matter? Empirical work Pre-1995 Differences in environmental policy have little or no effect on trade patterns, investment flows or firm location No support therefore for pollution haven hypothesis No need to worry about competitiveness consequences

26 Empirical work Post-1995 Account for the endogeneity of regulation. Find significant effects of regulation on trade flows and plant location. Levinson (1999); Levinson and Taylor (2001); Ederington and Minier (2003); Becker and Henderson (2000); Kahn (1997); Greenstone (2002); List et al. (2002); Keller and Levinson (2002); List and Millimet (2004).

27 Could regulatory costs matter most? Pollution Abatement costs have been rising, but as a fraction of US Real Output they are virtually constant. Costs as a fraction of Manufacturing Value- added are small. Pollution abatement costs are a small fraction of output for all OECD countries suggesting that other determinants of location could be important.

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29 Pollution Abatement Costs/GDP Australia0.8Korea1.6 Austria2.2Netherlands1.9 Belgium1.4Norway1.2 Canada1.2Poland1.6 Czech Republic2.0Portugal0.8 Finland1.1Slovak Republic1.5 France1.4Sweden1.0 Germany1.6Switzerland1.6 Hungary0.6Turkey1.1 Ireland0.6United Kingdom0.7 Italy0.8United States1.5 Japan1.3

30 J. Ederington & A. Levinson

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32 Is Free Trade Good for the Environment? Develops a model that nests both the Factor Endowments Hypothesis and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. Develops an empirical method to identify the changes in pollution levels created when trade alters a nation’s composition of output. Also provides estimates of Scale and Technique effects.

33 Composition effect of Trade? Effects of trade on pollution are statistically significant, but rather small Composition effect positive for some countries, negative for others (as theory would predict) Factor endowment effects are stronger than pollution haven motives

34 Trade’s impact on Composition

35 Conclusions on Trade Patterns Pollution Haven Hypothesis is logically tight, but may be empirically irrelevant. Pollution regulations matter to trade flows, but not enough to make LDC’s pollution havens for the developed world. Evidence in fact points in the opposite direction: Free trade is good for the environment.

36 What about Resource Industries Key issue is existence of policy response but there is also a debate over the composition effect. Lax property rights lower costs today, but create less productive resource pools tomorrow and this raises costs.

37 Very little empirical evidence Bohn and Deacon: property rights and resource use. Series of UNEP Studies of trade liberalization in individual countries. Numerous press stories on deforestation, shrimp farming, etc. Existing empirical studies not guided by theory.

38 A. Carlos and F. Lewis on the fur trade. D. Patterson and J. Wilen on the Pacific fur seal. R. Allen and I. Keay on whaling. Taylor on the U.S. Buffalo Slaughter. Case Study Evidence

39 What does History tell us? Market forces can decimate marketable species in a very short period of time. Waiting for economic development to foster better resource management is a risky proposition. Resource losses are often irreversible. There is no reason to think that correlated characteristics will work in our favor this time.

40 Conclusions & Caveats Tests of trade’s impact on the environment are crude and need improvement. Good cross country data on the environment is very rare. Very little if any convincing evidence on resource use and liberalized trade. Several case studies from history suggest caution is in order.

41 Additional Reading Werner Antweiler; Brian R. Copeland; M. Scott Taylor, “Is Free Trade Good for the Environment”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, Sep. 2001, pp. 877-908. Brian Copeland; M. Scott Taylor, “Trade, Growth and the Environment”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 42, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 7-71. Arik Levinson; M. Scott Taylor, “Unmasking the Pollution Haven Hypothesis”, forthcoming in the International Economic Review. Brian Copeland; M. Scott Taylor, “Trade, Tragedy and the Commons”, NBER Working paper No. M. Scott Taylor, “Buffalo Hunt: International Trade and the Virtual Extinction of the North American Bison, NBER working paper No.


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