1. Prospects for Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia By Carl Baker

2. Overview Factors that support institutionalization of security cooperation Factors that support institutionalization of security cooperation Sustaining the momentum Sustaining the momentum Implications for regional security order Implications for regional security order

3. Broadening the Scope of Security Six-Party Talks influential in broadening the scope of security Six-Party Talks influential in broadening the scope of security September 2005 joint statement explicitly links denuclearization with economic cooperation and a peace regime on the peninsula September 2005 joint statement explicitly links denuclearization with economic cooperation and a peace regime on the peninsula Leads to recognizing the legitimacy of other states’ security perceptions Leads to recognizing the legitimacy of other states’ security perceptions Confidence building process mechanisms Confidence building process mechanisms Legitimacy based on sovereignty as defined in UN Charter Legitimacy based on sovereignty as defined in UN Charter Articulation of confidence building through reciprocal action Articulation of confidence building through reciprocal action Other influences can reinforce, enable or hinder the process of broadening Other influences can reinforce, enable or hinder the process of broadening Other multilateral organizations such as East Asia Summit, ASEAN plus 3, ARF, APEC Other multilateral organizations such as East Asia Summit, ASEAN plus 3, ARF, APEC NPT and global nonproliferation regime NPT and global nonproliferation regime US bilateral alliances US bilateral alliances Shanghai Cooperation Organization Shanghai Cooperation Organization

4. The transition to long term cooperation Six Party Talks not based on grand design but reflect underlying strategic choices Six Party Talks not based on grand design but reflect underlying strategic choices Cooperation seen as best alternative for the six parties, but with different goals in mind Cooperation seen as best alternative for the six parties, but with different goals in mind Real challenge is to institutionalize the cooperation beyond the immediate issue Real challenge is to institutionalize the cooperation beyond the immediate issue Goals reflected in characterizations of the process Goals reflected in characterizations of the process US sees the process in terms of denuclearization US sees the process in terms of denuclearization North Korea focus is on US “hostile policy” North Korea focus is on US “hostile policy” China portrays the process a means to achieve regional stability China portrays the process a means to achieve regional stability South Korea emphasis is on reconciliation South Korea emphasis is on reconciliation Russia focus is on involvement in the region Russia focus is on involvement in the region Japan least committed to cooperative approach Japan least committed to cooperative approach

5. Strategic Choices Each country is faced with strategic choice of cooperation in establishing a regional security cooperation mechanism Each country is faced with strategic choice of cooperation in establishing a regional security cooperation mechanism North Korea: Give up nuclear weapons program for economic security North Korea: Give up nuclear weapons program for economic security US: Accept survival of NK for maintenance of global nonproliferation regime US: Accept survival of NK for maintenance of global nonproliferation regime SK: Economic assistance for avoiding costs associated with NK collapse SK: Economic assistance for avoiding costs associated with NK collapse China: Accept continued US presence for regional stability China: Accept continued US presence for regional stability Japan: Provide assistance to NK to avoid isolation Japan: Provide assistance to NK to avoid isolation Russia: Accept a marginal role to avoid exclusion Russia: Accept a marginal role to avoid exclusion

6. Process issues Individual countries at different stages of committing themselves to the choices Individual countries at different stages of committing themselves to the choices Example of South Korea v. Japan Example of South Korea v. Japan Reversibility a key issue Reversibility a key issue Principle of reciprocity reinforces the ability to sustain support for the choice Principle of reciprocity reinforces the ability to sustain support for the choice

7. Why now? Nexus between strategic choice and the Six-Party Talks Nexus between strategic choice and the Six-Party Talks Shift in policy occurs at different times and for different reasons Shift in policy occurs at different times and for different reasons South Korea: Early 1990’s—First nuclear crisis South Korea: Early 1990’s—First nuclear crisis China: Turn of the century—value of multilateral China: Turn of the century—value of multilateral US: Failure of isolation policy and NK nuclear test US: Failure of isolation policy and NK nuclear test NK both initiator and recipient—the threat and object of cooperation NK both initiator and recipient—the threat and object of cooperation Shift represents recognition that security like economy is mutually constituted Shift represents recognition that security like economy is mutually constituted Challenge is to find ways to reinforce the value of the cooperative choice Challenge is to find ways to reinforce the value of the cooperative choice

8. Sustaining the momentum Building trust through interaction Building trust through interaction Empathy for different perspectives Empathy for different perspectives Synchronization of various components Synchronization of various components Ultimately serves as the basis for moving to cooperation in areas beyond the specific issues in Six-Party Talks Ultimately serves as the basis for moving to cooperation in areas beyond the specific issues in Six-Party Talks

9. Empathy for different perspectives Needed prior to assuming compatibility or incompatibility of interests Needed prior to assuming compatibility or incompatibility of interests Principles from September 2005 provide the basis for reciprocity Principles from September 2005 provide the basis for reciprocity Each country must correlate reciprocal action with its own national interest Each country must correlate reciprocal action with its own national interest Requires transparency on issues such as disclosure of nuclear activity and conventional build up Requires transparency on issues such as disclosure of nuclear activity and conventional build up

10. Synchronization of Effort Must have movement in all components Must have movement in all components Needed to reinforce commitment by respective countries to cooperative choice in addressing security concerns Needed to reinforce commitment by respective countries to cooperative choice in addressing security concerns Common principles needed to govern future interaction Common principles needed to govern future interaction Provides linkage between components Provides linkage between components CSCAP initiative to establish principles of interaction for peace and security charter CSCAP initiative to establish principles of interaction for peace and security charter Integration of nonproliferation regime into the regional security context Integration of nonproliferation regime into the regional security context

11. Conclusion Great expectations for Six-Party Talks as a basis for institutionalizing security cooperation in Northeast Asia Great expectations for Six-Party Talks as a basis for institutionalizing security cooperation in Northeast Asia Synchronization of effort Synchronization of effort Correlate components to individual interest Correlate components to individual interest Maintain attractiveness of strategic choices Maintain attractiveness of strategic choices Creating conditions for the transition Creating conditions for the transition Principles create basis for trust Principles create basis for trust Establishes the basis for reciprocity Establishes the basis for reciprocity Recognizing the comprehensive nature of security relationships Recognizing the comprehensive nature of security relationships