1. Mark Stephens The End of Unitary Rental Systems? Revisiting Kemeny’s typology April 2016 Housing Studies Association Conference

2. Background Understanding housing systems – Historically housing treated as an “autonomous welfare area”… “the joker in an otherwise predictable pack” (Kemeny 2001) – Kemeny’s attempt to identify the cause and nature of housing systems, rejecting overly- descriptive methods used by international agencies, etc. – Rejects “structural determinism” (e.g. Harloe) and treats them as a “strategic policy creation,” but are “embedded” in social structures.

3. Kemeny constructed a typology of rental (in effect) housing systems in 1995; extended in 2005. Important because: – Most influential explanatory work in comparative housing research. – Commonly used for country selection in comparative studies – Sometimes used as independent variable in assessing housing outcomes.

4. The problem and the Questions It has become a “mindless classification” After 20 years, it is time to ask: – Is it theoretically robust as an explanatory theory? – Are the country classifications still valid?

5. The theory Causes: – At regime level (my interpretation): Power structures (left-right) Political organisation (corporatist/ non-corporatist) Ideology (ordo-liberalism/ neo-liberalism) – At system level (ditto): “importance of long-term policy in interaction with the economic processes within rental housing stocks…” (my emphasis)

6. Housing Systems Maturation of cost/ NFP sector is key: – In Dualist systems surpluses are extracted via privatisation, cost rental is residualised, people forced (constrained choice) into owner occupation. – In Unitary systems cost rental retains surplus, is able to lower rents and to compete against for-profit rental, and home ownership. – These (2006) become Integrated when rent controls can be removed and cost rental can compete without such assistance.

7. Theoretical Issues Misplaced ideological drivers? – Ordo-liberalism as key driver of post-war German system – Kemeny argues this also informed Sweden (and other countries with unitary rental systems) – There is no evidence for this, and Swedish post-war (micro) economic model (Rehn-Meider) was significantly more egalitarian than the German version. – Swedish macro-economic policy more Keynesian than Germany’s – and helps to explain refusal to join the Euro. – Difference between social and Christian democracy more than “labour-led” and “capital-led” corporatism?

8. Underdeveloped relationship with welfare regime: – “Ultimately, the aim must be to develop explanatory models of how entire national welfare systems operate as interactive wholes.” (1995) – Declining “welfare” support (esp pensions, care for elderly) may lead to growth in demand for owner- occupation (2005 Really Big Trade Off revisited). – But ignores income distribution and inequality – key outcomes in shaping how a housing system operates: argument developed by Stephens from 2002.

9. Empirical issues External to housing system: – Much of post-war Swedish model (inc wage setting) dismantled following crisis in 1990s – Poverty rising – Impact of migration on “communitarian solidarity”? (Cuperus, 2010) – German economic model has been recast with Hartz IV reforms of labour market and social security – “The euro is a ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policy for Germany, on condition that it beggars its own workers first.” (Lapavitsas, et al, 2012)

10. Swedish housing system Superficially, institutions remain intact, though rent control suggests “unitary” rather than “integrated” market. Housing shortage  dualist rental system emerges as regulated tenancies traded on market Growth of mortgaged home/ co-operative ownership Financialisation: Mortgage debt: GDP = 45% (1999); 82% (2010) Segregation = “monstrous hybrid” (Brett, 2013)/ problem of the second best

11. German housing system: – Melting away (and privatisation) of cost-rental system must mean influence on whole market is weak – System of rent regulation is consistent with a more integrated market than Sweden – Ownership has remained subdued, but is it attributable to a “unitary” rental system – Germany has not financialised: Mortgage debt: GDP = 55% (1999); 46% (2010)

12. Conclusion: joining this together Theory needs updating in three vital areas: – Ideological drivers – Relationship with “welfare system” – Housing system