1. ESA International Economics, 2 Lecture 17 Giorgia Giovannetti Professor of Economics, University of Firenze E-mail: giorgia.giovannetti@unifi.itgiorgia.giovannetti@unifi.it

2. Plan of the course/lectures 14/9 Introduction: globalization 15/9 Introduction, 2 21/9 Ricardo: an introduction (Marvasi) 22/9 Measuring Globalization, Indicators 28/9 Measuring globalization and specialization, Indicators 2 29/9 Overview trade models 5/10 Overview trade models (Bernard et al 2007; 2011) 6/10 Overview- end (new new trade) 12/10 Trade models: Ricardo and comparative advantage 13/10 Ricardo and comparative advantage, 2 /H-O, intro 19/10 Trade models: H-O 20/10 Trade models: H-O,2 26/10 H-O end; Trade and Imperfect competition 27/10 Trade and imperfect competition, exercises 2/11 Geography models/gravity 3/11 Hysteresis, Heterogeneous firms 9/11 test 10/11 TTIP 16/11 FDI 17/11 Heterogeneous firms presentation and Migration presentation 23/11 FDI and Multinationals: OLI theory/ Brain drain 2 presentations 24/11 FDI Offshoring/trade in tasks/GVCs presentation 30/11 China and India (BRICS)/ China presentation 1/12 Granularity and aggregate shocks/ other presentations

3. Group 1: Heterogeneous firms presentation November 17th (Baroncelli, Greppi, Gusella, Iannotta, Pietrini) M. Melitz, 2014, Palgrave (in Moodle) Marc J. Melitz and Daniel Trefler Gains from Trade when Firms Matter, Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 26, Number 2—Spring 2012— Pages 91–118 Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding, and Peter K. Schott (2007), “Firms in International Trade”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3): 105–130. Bernard, A.B., Jensen, J.B., (1995), “Exporters, jobs and wages in U.S. manufacturing, 1976-1987”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, pp. 67-118. Helpman, Elhanan (2006),“Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms”, Journal of Economic Literature, 44(3): 589–630. Melitz, M. (2003),“The impact of trade on intraindustry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity”, Econometrica, vol. 71, pp. 1695-725. Theory (should understand equations and replicate them); evidence possibly reported from existing articles; descriptive evidence for Italy can be original

4. Group 2, Migration presentation November 17th (Bova, Coko, Fraczek, Lekovic) Docquier, F, C. Ozden and G. Peri (2010), “The Wage Effect of Emigration and Immigration”, NBER Working Paper n. 16646.. Ottaviano, Peri and Wright (2010), “Immigration, Outsourcing and the America Jobs”, NBER WP OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013 (cap.1 e 2); Sobotka T., Migration continent Europe, Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2009 Ozden, C., Parsons, C. R., Schiff, M., Walmsley, T.L., Where on earth is everybody ? the evolution of global bilateral migration 1960-2000, Policy Research Working Paper 5709 Theory: what models can be used to explain migrations? (not in model we have studied) data: only every 5 years, how can we deal with this? Empirics: description of status quo, construction of database etc

5. Group 3-4, Brain Drain presentations 23/11 (Bianchini, Rastbicher, Tauber, Sculen, Branchle, Brost) Docquier, F. and H. Rapoport (2012), “Globalization, Brain Drain and Development”, IRES-UCL Discussion Paper 2011-9 and Journal of Economic Literature Docquier, F. and H. Rapoport (2007), “Skilled Migration: the Perspective of Developing Countries”, CREAM Working Paper n. 10/07. BRAIN DRAIN, BRAIN EXCHANGE AND BRAIN CIRCULATION. THE CASE OF ITALY VIEWED FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE. Aspen, 2012 (in Moodle) Hussain, 2015, Reversing the Brain Drain: Is it Beneficial? World Economy Clemens, Ozden, Rappoport, Migration and Development Research is Moving Far Beyond Remittances, World Development, 2015 Delacroix, Docquir & Schiff, 2014, Brain Drain and Economic Performance in Small Island Developing States (chapter of book) Agrawal, 2014, Diaspora Networks, Knowledge Flows and Brain Drain Çaglar Özden David Phillips 2015 What really is Brain Drain? Location of Birth, Education, and Migration Dynamics of African Doctors Hatton: 2014, The economics of international migration: A short history of the debate, Labour Economics Data: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTT RADERESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:23074136~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:54 4849,00.html http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTT RADERESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:23074136~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:54 4849,00.html

6. Group 5, GVCs, presentation 24 nov (Mazzoni, Mora) IMF, (2013) IMF Country Report No. 13/263, GERMAN-CENTRAL EUROPEAN SUPPLY CHAIN—CLUSTER REPORT, August Richard Baldwin, Javier Lopez-Gonzalez, 2013 SUPPLY-CHAIN TRADE: A PORTRAIT OF GLOBAL PATTERNS AND SEVERAL TESTABLE HYPOTHESES, Working Paper 18957, http://www.nber.org/papers/w18957 OECD, 2013 Interconnected Economies, Benefiting from Global Value Chains, DOI:10.1787/9789264189560-en10.1787/9789264189560-en Backer, K. D. and S. Miroudot (2013), “Mapping Global Value Chains”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 159, OECD http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3v1trgnbr4-enhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3v1trgnbr4-en Antràs, P., D. Chor, T. Fally and R. Hillberry (2012). “Measuring the Upstreamness of Production and Trade Flows”, American Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 3, pp. 412-16. Gereffi, G. and K. Fernandez-Stark (2011). “Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer”, Center on Globalization, Governance & Competitiveness (CGGC), Duke University, North Carolina, USA. Van Biesebroeck, J. and T. J. Sturgeon (2010), “Effects of the 2008-09 Crisis on the Automotive Industry in Developing Countries: A Global Value Chain Perspective”, in O. Cattaneo, G. Gereffi and C. Staritz (eds.), Global Value Chains in a Postcrisis World, Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 209-244. Theory (little), data: the discussion of trade in Value added, why? Etc; Forward linkages and backward linkages: what does this mean?, descriptive analysis of developed and developing countries

7. Group 6, China presentation 30/11 (Bianchi, Fiumanò, Liu, Shi, Yakovleva) Carlo Altomonte, Marcella Nicolini, Dario Pellegrino. 2013, The impact of Chinese imports on Italian firms’ price-cost margins: An empirical assessment Isabelle Bensidoun, Françoise Lemoine and Deniz Ünal The integration of China and India into the world economy: a comparison The European Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 6, n.1, pp. 131-155 Francoise Lemoine From foreign trade to international investment: a new step in China’s integration with the world economy, Econ Change Restruct (2013) 46:25–43 Landes D, 2006, Why Europe and the West? Why not China? Journal of Economic Perspectives Guonan Ma and Robert N. McCauley, Global and Euro Imbalances: China and Germany, 2014 China and world economy Cui Hu and Yong Tan, 2015, Export Spillover and Export Performance in China, Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67156/ MPRA Paper No. 67156, posted 10. October 2015 13:03 UTC Short theoretical part (description of the existing literature, what you expect) empirical: descriptive evidence on export shares of China versus those of Germany (or a country of your choice) (which indicator you use/ why etc); descriptive evidence of competitiveness of China vs Germany; etc.

8. Group 7, euro dollar, presentation 1 dec Euro dollar 2. ECB, 2014, "The international role of the euro“ http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eu ro-international- role201307en.pdf?f4c76471697141917926e0f 0011372ee http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eu ro-international- role201307en.pdf?f4c76471697141917926e0f 0011372ee

9. Wage gap

10. Now TTIP: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/ Aims of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Why TTIP? And especially why now? EU-US trade and Investments relationships (links) The transatlantic barriers The possible impacts of TTIP on GDP, trade and employment: a focus on the main transmission channels Benefits are likely to be different in different EU countries and US states (economic structure, position in GVC, FDI attraction…)….. and on the outsiders… Conclusion & Policy implications

11. A galaxy of free trade agreements EU trade policy: TTIP is one of the agreement under negotiation….. The most important one…..

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14. A galaxy of free trade agreements EU trade policy: TTIP is one of the agreement under negotiation….. The most important one…..

15. The TTIP aims at the… Elimination or reduction of tariffs (Tariffs are already low: an average of 3%. The sheer size of the transatlantic economy and trade means that removing these barriers would have a positive impact on both jobs and growth). Elimination, reduction or prevention of barriers to trade and Removal of “behind the border” barriers to trade and investment Enhanced compatibility of regulations and standards For EU, the added value of increased ec. cooperation and representation on the world stage. An individual country would never be able to negotiate a deal with the US on the same terms as the EU as a bloc can. From a global perspective, a transatlantic partnership could set standards for future world trade and could be an incentive for (re)emerging or developing countries to open up markets and work towards meeting the new TTIP global standards.

16. The TTIP: main areas Tariff are low: 2.2% US, 3% EU, NTB more important Regulatory cooperation – Financial services, data protection, audio-visual, chemicals already out – End of the precautionary principle? – Approach towards GMOs? – Future joint RIAs? Government procurement (commesse pubbliche) – But problem is mostly at individual state level in the US – Unlikely to remove “buy US steel” and other forms of protectionism Access to energy and raw materials – US has an enormous advantage – Will EU abandon ETS and endorse shale gas? State-owned enterprises 16

17. TTIP Areas that TTIP is set to cover… – market access for agricultural and industrial goods, – government procurement, – investment, – energy and raw materials, – regulatory issues, – sanitary and phytosanitary measures, – services, 17 Most important for EU & US

18. TTIP … and more: – intellectual property rights, – sustainable development, – small- and medium-sized enterprises, – dispute settlement, – competition, – customs/trade facilitation, – state-owned enterprises. 18

19. Overlap of TPP with AFTA and other FTAs TTIP overlap – EU FTAs with EFTA (& European Economic Area on services) FTAs with members of the Barcelona Process (N. Africa & Middle East) Several FTAs with members of CEFTA (Central Europe Free Trade Area) – US NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) FTAs with several (not all) of Barcelona Process 19

20. 20 E = Economic Integration Agreement f = FTA C = Customs Union Figure 4: Existing FTAs & EIAs

21. Overlap of TTIP with other FTAs Messages: – EU and US are already heavily linked to their neighbors by existing FTAs: Most are both FTAs and Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs) on services. Of 26 countries and country groups that I’ve selected as neighbors – EU has FTA or EIA with all but 6 – US has FTA or EIA with 7 21

22. The Message: – TTIP should not be understood in the same way that both the original EU and NAFTA were understood, as arrangements among countries that had no other prior arrangements – TTIP is integration between countries that are already heavily integrated with others 22 Overlap of TTIP with other FTAs

23. The facts: Steps towards TTIP US-EU Summit November 2011 Throughout 2012: important preliminary work undertaken by the US-EU High Level Working Group (HLWG) on Jobs and Growth February 2013: US and EU leaders announced that they would have initiate internal preparation for TTIP negotiations. July 2013, first round of TTIP negotiations. 24 working groups; Important exclusions November 2013, second round: despite tensions (e.g. datagate), on Nov 15 th : EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht“: I am glad to see that we are now fully back on track with the EU-US trade talks. We are making …progress across the broad range of issues we need to tackle to make our transatlantic business environment more efficient and effective whilst preserving the protections and rights already in place for consumers. Let's keep our eye on the prize: more jobs for people in Europe, more growth for the European economy.“

24. Third Round: December 2013 Fourth round: March 2014 Fifth Round: May 2014 Sixth Round: July 2014 Seventh Round: September 2014 Eighth Round: February 2015 Ninth Round: 20-24 April, 2015 Tenth Round, 13-17 July 2015 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and- events/#negotiation-rounds The facts: Steps towards TTIP

25. Most important & more difficult tasks Ranking of Bertesmann, 2013

26. Why TTIP: EU-US relationships Size matters: Europe: 507 million consumers; GDP=12 trillion euro. US: 315 m. consumers; GDP of 11 trillion euro; Exchanges of goods and services across the Atlantic average almost €2 billion per day. Trade in goods: Total €455 billion, positive balance for the EU: €72 billion. US is EU's third largest supplier (11% of total EU imports) and main export market(17% of total EU exports). Trade in services: US is EU's top partner for trade in commercial services (around 29% of total EU imports and 24% of total EU exports). FDI: high and job creating.

27. ….and why now? Limited/zero growth since the start of the financial crises in 2008 Need for growth-stimulating structural reforms (TTIP can contribute to economy recovery), Stalemate of multilateral negotiations within the WTO and limited success of last Doha-round multilateral trade talks, Attempt to maintain the leadership in world trade and gain new competitiveness in face of emerging economies (e.g. China, India... BRIC), Competition among agreements: there is a trend towards forging more important agreements (e.g. RCEP, ASEAN+6) → fear or being crowded out of the export market as a result of trade agreements between partners.

28. 28 EU - U.S. : Main trade facts and figures value of transatlantic trade in goods and services over $600 billion/year; value of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) = UE in the U.S. - $1.7 trillion, U.S. in UE - $1.9 trillion; 3 million employees in EU companies in the U.S., 3 million employees in the U.S. companies in EU.

29. EU- US trade: surplus for EU

30. EU- US trade in goods and services

31. A Dynamic Transatlantic Economy EU and U.S. together account for 40% of total global trade (more than $1.5 billion in transatlantic trade every day). The $3.75 trillion EU-U.S. transatlantic economy employs 14 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic. Since 2001, Europe has accounted for roughly two-thirds of total global investment flows into the U.S. – by far the most significant source of foreign investment in the U.S. economy. EU is the largest source of US Imports and second largest US export market

32. European companies are the leading foreign investors in the U.S. – The UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands – top four sources of jobs created by foreign investment in the United States. American companies invest far more in EU countries than in Asia. – U.S. investment in India is half of American investment in Sweden and roughly the same as in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary – Between 2000 and 2008, US firms invested $26.4 billion in China, less than U.S. investment in Belgium and less than half of American investment in Ireland BMW’s assembly plant is South Carolina’s largest private sector employer. EU is the largest investor in US

35. EU – US exports

36. EU countries Exports Exports to USTop exportsImports from US FDI in from US & employees FDI out to US & employees UK9.9% (21.1 no intra EU) ($46 bill) Heavy machinery, chemical products 14% ($45 bil)$549 bill 1.209.298 $442 bill 909.972 France5% (13.3 no intra EU) Machinery & transport eq, chemicals, agricultural 3.3% (10.% no intra EU) $89.5 bill 510.240 $ 199 bill 489.020 Germany5.6% (15% no intra EU) ($78 bill) Machinery & transport eq, chemicals (3/4 of tot) 3.5% (9.8 %no intra EU) $107 bill 586.040 $ 216 bill 589.536 Netherl.3.9% (17.9 if extra UE excl) Machinery & transp. Eq. Commodities, mineral fuels 5.8% $595.3 bill 215.404 $ 240 bill 350.064 Italy5.9% (13.6 no intra EU) Machinery, transport goods, chemicals 3.1% (7.1% no intra EU) $ 25.3 bill 216.930 $ 23.0 bill 83.123

37. US States exports of services to EU

38. US States exports of goods to EU

40. EU Foreign Direct Outflows, 2012

45. Many recent studies: different models, different assumptions, hence different impact…. CGE models, sectors linked through intermediate inputs coefficients and competition in primary factor markets AMBITIOUS SCENARIO: tariff reduced to zero, NTBs reduced by 25% (difficult to assess), and Public Procurement reduced by 50%. GAINS: for the EU: €119 billion a year; for the US: €95 billion a year, once the agreement is fully implemented. For the rest of the world: €100 billion a year LESS AMBITIOUS: 98% of tariffs reduced to zero, NTBs reduced by 10%, and Public Procurement reduced by 25%. Different views on how the rest of the world will be affected

46. Trade Effects of TTIP Three main effects – Trade creation: Import from partner what was previously produced at home – Trade diversion: Import from partner what was previously imported from 3 rd country – Reversal of trade diversion: Import from new partner what had been diverted to partner in prior FTA (“trade un-diversion”? “trade reversion”? “counter trade diversion”?) 46

47. Trade Effects of FTAs Trade Creation: Import from partner what you previously produced yourself – Beneficial to partner, which exports – Beneficial to importing country as a whole – But harmful to import-competing industry in importing country 47

48. Trade Effects of FTAs Trade Diversion: Import from partner what you previously imported from an outside country – Harmful to outside country – Harmless to import-competing industry in importing country (there is none) – Harmful to importing country as whole, as it pays more for imports – Beneficial to the partner exporting country 48

49. Trade Effects of FTAs Additional effect if a member already has an FTA with an outside country: – Reversal of trade diversion: Imports that were diverted from the new partner by the 1 st FTA revert to the new partner with the 2 nd FTA – This is a form of trade diversion Harmful to the country diverted from (which had benefited from 1 st FTA’s trade diversion) But beneficial to the importing country – it gets back to cheap imports 49

51. Economic gains for Us and EU 51 “Deep liberalization” scenario Some countries face a decrease in real income and employment US +13,4%, EU+ 5%

52. Benefits differ by country (states in US), sector, typologies of workers… Country in EU: UK exports are expected to increase more than average (and than F & G); also Sweden, Ireland and Spain benefit more than average States in US: greatest gains in States particularly well integrated into the supply chains of translatlantic automobile market (Michigan + 95%, South Carolina + 187%, Alabama +138%) Sectors: The biggest relative increase in trade is likely to take place in the motor vehicles sector. But also, metal products (+12%), processed foods (+9%), chemicals (+9%), other manufactured goods (+6 %), and other transport equipment (+6%). Labor market: new job opportunities for high- and low-skilled workers. In US + 740000 new jobs (not including the anticipated growth due to EU investment

53. The mechanisms at work 1.Larger market, higher competition (standard) 2.To the extent that trade is intra industry, there is a dynamic effect from an increase in labour productivity (important) 3.LT consequences of FDI (attraction of new flows, also from countries outside agreement, eg Asian) 4.Increase in home exports imply an increase in outsourcing (offshoring); Home firms can outsource low VA part of GVCs; foreign firms increase role as suppliers 5.Intra company trade becomes more important

54. Heterogeneity of EU countries/US States Significant heterogeneity of EU countries and US states Impact likely to be very different

55. An example, Germany…

56. An example, machinery in Germany…

57. An example: the impact of TTIP on output and labor in selected sectors in Germany…

58. Impact by EU country and US States: some examples UK Germany France The Netherlands Sweden Italy California, Connecticut Selected developing countries Main message: high heterogeneity

59. GDPexportsimports UK0.17-0.271.22-2.211.03-1.87 France0.2- 2.642.62.5 Germany0.4-4.72.12.5 Netherland0.32-0.720.76-1.690.8-1.83 Sweden0.09-0.181.71.5 Impact on GDP and Trade, EU

60. Impact on GDP, selected countries, different hypothesis

61. US States: increase in exports after TTIP

62. Impact on Italy, by sector

63. Job market effects: EU EC Estimates suggest that every billion euros of trade (goods or services) supports around 15 000 jobs in the EU. An ambitious TTIP would mean that more of Europe’s jobs would be in firms capable of exporting successfully, better equipped to deal with competition. This will contribute to a more sustainable employment base TIPP would have a positive impact both on skilled and less skilled workers’ wages, raising each by close to the same amount, roughly 0.5% (CEPR) In the EU, less than 0.7% of the labour force could be expected to move between sectors over ten years. This means that fewer than 7 workers in every 1000 would end up moving to another sector by 2027 due to the TTIP.

64. N. of jobsSkilledunskilledWages increases UK400.0000,21-0,38%0,21-0,35%6.6% France122.0002.3% Germany160.0003%4%1.6% Netherland30.0000,3%0,5%1.8% Italy141.0002,8% EU2043.000 (Oecd) 2.34% Job market effects: EU and selected countries

66. Job market effects in the US, by state

67. Top 10 States by estimated n of TTIP attributable jobs added California75340 Texas67780 NewYork50520 Florida47540 Pennsylvania33960 Illinois30200 Ohio26960 Georgia24660 North Carolina22860 New Jersey21700

68. California

69. Connecticut

70. Impact on outsiders Canada (-9.5) and Mexico (-7.2) are particularly affected; losses also in Asia (Japan -6%) North and West Africa also penalized Little effect on other low income countries (because of Most Favored Nation or similar things) No much import substitution Important to discuss Sanitary and Phytosanitary and Technical Barriers (many LIC can face rejection)

71. 71 Turkey – Turkey is a very special case, as it has a customs union with the EU and therefore, of necessity, shares the EU’s FTAs – With its EU customs union, Turkey shares the EU’s external tariffs, which presumably will include its zero tariffs on imports from the US under TTIP – But Turkey is not, currently, a party to the TTIP negotiations and therefore will not benefit from reduced US tariffs on its exports

72. 72 Turkey – Turkey will Gain from reversal of its own trade diversion favoring the EU Lose from reversal of the EU’s trade diversion favoring Turkey Since its exporters will continue to face US tariffs, it will also lose from new trade diversion, as the US buys from the EU instead of from Turkey – Conclusion: Turkey is most likely to lose from TTIP – It could gain if it were included as part of it.

73. 73 Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia – Egypt (above) is somewhat representative of these 5 countries – They have FTAs with the EU but not with the US – They trade most with the EU, but also significantly with the US – Like others considered above, they stand to lose from TTIP due to trade diversion

74. 74 Israel, Jordan, and Morocco – These are unique among the countries considered so far, in that they have FTAs with both the EU and US – To the extent that their significant exports to both were diverted from direct EU-US trade, this advantage will be lost with TTIP – They stand to lose more than most

75. 75 Canada and Mexico – The only notable difference between these two is the absence of the signature of an FTA between the EU and Canada (done but not implemented yet) – Thus, like Israel, etc. above, these countries have FTAs with both the EU and the US, and they stand to lose when those gain equally preferential access to the other.

76. A Final Word on Rules of Origin FTAs (unlike customs unions) necessarily have rules of origin With a complex web of FTAs, expanding with TTIP, an important issue is “cumulation of ROOs” – Do imported inputs from third countries count as originating within the FTA? 76

77. A Final Word on Rules of Origin The US favors “bilateral cumulation,” under which the answer is NO. – This limits the extent to which the FTA liberalizes trade, since much trade may still be subject to tariffs – Worse, firms may switch to higher cost inputs within the FTA in order to qualify under the ROO – This can mean that a web of FTAs can be worse than none 77

78. A Final Word on Rules of Origin The EU uses “diagonal cumulation” for the countries of the Barcelona Process. – Thus products assembled in, say, Morocco with inputs from, say, Tunisia will still qualify for tariff- free entry into the EU Were this extended to all of the EU and US FTA partners, the effects of TTIP would be better all around. 78

79. Conclusion Trade effects of TTIP on the neighbor economies will be mostly that they lose from either – New trade diversion, or – Reversal of previous trade diversion that was in their favor 79

80. Conclusions: is TTIP worth the effort? Yes, gains are likely for the US and EU The impact could go beyond what can be modelled (with CGE or Partial eq. models) Main expected benefits may result from regulatory convergence and normative influence Most likely result: a less ambitious TTIP – Possible agreement on technical standards – Non-financial reporting and value-based standards? – Future cooperation (e.g. on electric vehicles) – Joint RIAs – Removal of some tariff barriers

81. Thanks

82. UK Sources: (1) Ecorys - Study on "EU-US High Level Working Group“ Final report (2) http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/fdi/foreign-direct-investment/2010-release/foreign-direct- investment-2010.html#tab-Key-findingshttp://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/fdi/foreign-direct-investment/2010-release/foreign-direct- investment-2010.html#tab-Key-findings (3) CEPR LN (4) CEPII (5) IFO X to US: 59.4% (1) (reference year 2008) IM from US: 23.6% (1) (reference year 2008) FDI out to US: 25.9% (2) FDI in from US: 33% (2) Tariffs: 0.5% - 1.5% (3) NTBs: 8.5% (3) Present situation EX: 1.22% - 2.21% (3) IM: 1.03% - 1.87% (3) Tot: 0.09% - 0.18% (3) GDP: 0.14% - 0.27% (3) (£4 billion - £7 billion) ; 9.7% (5) Ind: 0.5% (4) Agr: 3.9% (4) Serv: 4.8% (4) Emplo: 400,000 jobs (5) Unsk: 0.21% - 0.39% (3) Skill: 0.21% - 0.38% (3) Average wage: 6.6% (5) Effects

83. Germany Sources: (1) Ecorys - Study on "EU-US High Level Working Group“ Final report (2) http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER for reference year 2011http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER (3) CEPII (4) IFO X to US: 64.5% (1) (reference year 2008) IM from US: 29.6% (1) (reference year 2008) FDI out to US: 10 221.4 USD (2) FDI in from US: 1 927.6 USD (2) Tariffs: NTBs Present situation EX: 2.1% (3) IM: 2.5 (3) Tot: GDP: 0.4% (3) ; 4.7% (4) Ind: 2% (3) ; 11.10% (4) Agr: -2.6% (3) ; 28.56% (4) Serv: 2.9% (3) ; 3.78% (4) Emplo: 160,000 jobs (4) Unsk: 4% (4) Skill: 3% (4) Average wage: 1.6% (4) Effects

84. Netherland Sources: (1) Ecorys - Study on "EU-US High Level Working Group“ Final report (2) http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER for reference year 2011http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER (3) IFO X to US: 64.4% (1) (reference year 2008) IM from US: 54.1% (1) (reference year 2008) FDI out to US: 2 367.7 USD (2) FDI in from US: -10 330.1 USD (2) Tariffs: NTBs: Present situation EX: 0.76% - 1.69% (1) IM: 0.8% - 1.83% (1) Tot: 0.03% - 0.07% (1) GDP: 0.32% - 0.72% (1) ; 4.43% (3) Ind: Agr: Serv: Emplo: 30,000 jobs (3) Unsk: 0.5% (1) Skill: 0.3% (4) Average wage: Effects

85. France Sources: (1) Ecorys - Study on "EU-US High Level Working Group“ Final report (2) http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER for reference year 2011http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER (3) CEPII (4) IFO X to US: 55.9% (1) (reference year 2008) IM from US: 27.7% (1) (reference year 2008) FDI out to US : 9 688.0 USD (2) FDI in from US : 4 176.9 USD (2) Tariffs: NTBs: Present situation EX: 2.6% (3) IM: 2.5% (3) Tot: 0.03% - 0.07% (1) GDP: 0.2% (3) ; 2.64% (4) Ind: 2.6 (3) Agr: -0.3% (3) Serv: 3.1% (3) Emplo: 122,000 jobs (4) Unsk: Skill: Average wage: Effects

86. Sweden Sources: (1) (2) http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER for reference year 2011http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER (3) National Board of Trade (Sweden) X to US: IM from US: FDI out to US :2 956.2 USD (2) FDI in from US : 3 152.3 USD (2) Tariffs: NTBs: Present situation EX: 17% (3) IM: 15% (3) Tot: GDP: 0.09 % 0.18% (3) Ind: Agr: Serv: Emplo: Unsk: Skill: Average wage: Effects