1. USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France Valery Ray vray@partbeamsystech.com PBS&T FREUD Methods FIB Invasive Attacks and Countermeasures

2. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 2 F R E U D ® Functional Reverse Engineering of Undocumented Devices ® Extraction of functionality and data without full reverse-engineering of manufacturing process

3. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 3 Outline  Targeted Devices and Applications  Workflow of FIB process  Signal extraction and injection, RC issues  Limitations of existing FIB technology  Countermeasures to FIB methods

4. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 4 Workflow of “FIB invasion”  Layout capture and location of nodes  Navigation and positioning  Bypassing protective shields, if needed  Making contacts, injecting and extracting data

5. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 5 Layout Capture and Node Location Alignment Reference Data Nodes TargetedNode

6. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 6 FIB Navigation to Nodes  Must be done by coordinates – lines are small and shield prevents direct navigation with optics;  Have to use sacrificial device for locating nodes, two devices for small-linewidth shielded ICs;  Two steps of localization – coarse and precise;

7. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 7 Coarse Navigation on Sacrificial Device (s)  Scan tiles, stitch bitmap, locate nodes  Establish coordinate conversion by references  Convert bitmap coordinates to FIB stage position  Do laser mark under OM and locate the mark in FIB – obtain FIB coordinates

8. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 8 References and Nodes in FIB Use alignment references for navigation and deprocess nodes to capture position

9. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 9 Navigation with Local Alignment  Accuracy of FIB stage is limited – how to navigate on small-linewidth devices?  Shield is preventing optical navigation  Use reference points for coordinate navigation  Use protective shield as your local reference!

10. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 10 Electrically Bypassing Shield  Bypass protective shield locally » Works on analog and digital shields » One or two lines may need bypassing per contact » Takes 30 to 120 min. of FIB time per contact  Bypass entire shield » Best for analog shields » Takes 30 to 120 min. of FIB time per device » Requires follow up by non-FIB techniques

11. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 11 Shield Disabling  Disable shield control circuitry » Requires detailed analysis of layout » Simulate “OK” shield on input of circuitry » Simulate “OK” output (no interrupts, alarms, etc…)  Disable “NOK” actions » Requires detailed analysis of layout » Cut output of charge pump – disable flash erase! » Cut “security interrupt” nodes

12. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 12 Making Contacts and Pads Create HAR vias to connect to the nodes and deposit contact pads for probing Clean overspray of metal depo

13. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 13 Data Extraction  Connect contact pads to data acquisition equipment by microprobing  Ensure proper buffering of the connection lines – internal nodes can’t drive 100pF cable  Use ultra-low capacitance buffers for glitch recovery

14. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 14 Signal injection  Injection of impulses into data bus can alter execution of embedded code  Basic application: disrupt end of loop command during ATR – data memory could be extracted  Suitable injection buffers are not available from OEMs of pattern generators – design and build your own!

15. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 15 Limitations of existing FIB technology  Accuracy of navigation » Targeting multiple nodes on <150nm devices by coordinates is unreliable – use local reference.  Aspect ratio of contacts » Detection of endpoint on contacts deeper then 20:1 depth/width requires “aftermarket tune-up”  Linewidth (technology node) limitations » Making deep contacts smaller then 150 nm is a high art

16. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 16 Countermeasures against FIB  FIB attacks are high-cost effort and can be made uneconomical for commercial hacking: » Planarize devices and use small linewidth » Thick copper metal shields difficult to cut » Use Liquid Crystal Polymer passivation » Use leakage-sensitive analog shields and double shield layers » Introduce “jitter” to shield position – prevent local referencing for navigation (easy with analog shields)

17. 6/13/2016 USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France 17 Summary  FREUD by FIB methods can’t be prevented, but can be made uneconomical (>>100K/device)  Basic countermeasures are relatively inexpensive in manufacturing – planarize devices, use thick copper plate in addition to active shield  Advanced countermeasures become viable as cost of IC manufacturing is reduced: active double-shielding, LCP (Liquid Crystal Polymer) passivation

18. USE-IT 2007, Toulouse France www.partbeamsystech.com