1. Republican Strategic Policy 1969-1976 Détente and Nuclear Anxieties

2. Sufficiency  Nuclear Options Needed  Old Thinking  Counterforce and CEP  Counter limited strikes in kind  Damage Limitation (hard target kill)  Seemed more feasible because weapons accuracy was improving… or was it?  Nuclear Options Needed  Old Thinking  Counterforce and CEP  Counter limited strikes in kind  Damage Limitation (hard target kill)  Seemed more feasible because weapons accuracy was improving… or was it?

3. Sufficiency  RAND’s James Schlesinger was skeptical of accuracy claims and what was necessary for surgical counterforce strikes  Measures of warhead accuracy misleading  CEP measures more reliability than accuracy (radius within which a missile will land 50% of the time)  CEP more a description of clustering and reliability than accuracy  Accuracy affected by wind patterns, gravity, etc. that can only be revealed through testing  RAND’s James Schlesinger was skeptical of accuracy claims and what was necessary for surgical counterforce strikes  Measures of warhead accuracy misleading  CEP measures more reliability than accuracy (radius within which a missile will land 50% of the time)  CEP more a description of clustering and reliability than accuracy  Accuracy affected by wind patterns, gravity, etc. that can only be revealed through testing

4. Sufficiency  U.S. tests missiles out of Vandenberg AFB in California to the Kwajalein Islands in the South Pacific  No a true measure given different elements, trajectory, gravitational pull, etc. on route toward USSR  U.S. tests missiles out of Vandenberg AFB in California to the Kwajalein Islands in the South Pacific  No a true measure given different elements, trajectory, gravitational pull, etc. on route toward USSR

5. Schlesinger as SecDef  James Schlesinger suggests “shot across the bow”  Very limited nuclear use… demonstration shots  Compellent threat accompanied by action demonstrating resolve  Interesting idea but with considerable problems  James Schlesinger suggests “shot across the bow”  Very limited nuclear use… demonstration shots  Compellent threat accompanied by action demonstrating resolve  Interesting idea but with considerable problems

6. Schlesinger as SecDef  Problems with “shot across the bow”  How do you do it? What targets should you select?  If target is too safe and attack too small, the adversary might think you’re chicken  How might Soviets respond?  Respond in kind  Hit back harder  Do nothing, simply ignore  Problems with “shot across the bow”  How do you do it? What targets should you select?  If target is too safe and attack too small, the adversary might think you’re chicken  How might Soviets respond?  Respond in kind  Hit back harder  Do nothing, simply ignore

7. Consequences of Sufficiency  SIOP suggests need for more and wider variety of weapons to accomplish all sorts of missions from the smallest to massive retaliation  Debate over sufficiency:  Set stage for change in nuclear debate to one of renewed anxiety about adequacy of nuclear forces  Critics argued US was dangerously vulnerable to increasingly powerful Soviets  Late 1970s criticisms echo those of the late 1950s  SIOP suggests need for more and wider variety of weapons to accomplish all sorts of missions from the smallest to massive retaliation  Debate over sufficiency:  Set stage for change in nuclear debate to one of renewed anxiety about adequacy of nuclear forces  Critics argued US was dangerously vulnerable to increasingly powerful Soviets  Late 1970s criticisms echo those of the late 1950s

8. Renewed Concerns about US Inferiority  Soviet First Strike Incentives  Soviets continue buildup even after early 1970s parity  More accurate Soviet MIRVs threaten US nuclear arsenal  One Soviet missile could now carry multiple warheads and take out several US missiles  Each US missile (also MIRV’d) knocked out would neutralize several US warheads  In a crisis, a first strike would be tempting  Nitze’s Committee on the Present Danger  Nitze had quit arms control delegation because he thought treaties being negotiated were militarily unwise and only done for political reasons.  Soviet First Strike Incentives  Soviets continue buildup even after early 1970s parity  More accurate Soviet MIRVs threaten US nuclear arsenal  One Soviet missile could now carry multiple warheads and take out several US missiles  Each US missile (also MIRV’d) knocked out would neutralize several US warheads  In a crisis, a first strike would be tempting  Nitze’s Committee on the Present Danger  Nitze had quit arms control delegation because he thought treaties being negotiated were militarily unwise and only done for political reasons.

9. Nitze’s Nightmare  U.S. will be self-deterred  Soviets evacuate cities  Use part of MIRV’d ICBMs to attack US land-based missiles, bombers, and missile submarines in port  US left with SLBMs that could only hit cities  Soviet cities only have 3-4% of population left in them  US won’t retaliate because USSR still has massive countervalue forces at the ready  President fears destruction of US cities  After absorbing Soviet first-strike, USSR numerical advantage has been further increased  U.S. will be self-deterred  Soviets evacuate cities  Use part of MIRV’d ICBMs to attack US land-based missiles, bombers, and missile submarines in port  US left with SLBMs that could only hit cities  Soviet cities only have 3-4% of population left in them  US won’t retaliate because USSR still has massive countervalue forces at the ready  President fears destruction of US cities  After absorbing Soviet first-strike, USSR numerical advantage has been further increased

10. Nitze’s Nightmare  Arguments against Nitze  Technically doubtful… plenty of US forces would be likely to survive for retaliation  Ignores risks Soviets would have to heed before launching  What if US launches on warning?  Counterforce attack would still kill 10-20 million Americans. Could USSR count on US to be rational and show restraint or would it lash out and kill 10-20 million Soviet citizens?  Arguments against Nitze  Technically doubtful… plenty of US forces would be likely to survive for retaliation  Ignores risks Soviets would have to heed before launching  What if US launches on warning?  Counterforce attack would still kill 10-20 million Americans. Could USSR count on US to be rational and show restraint or would it lash out and kill 10-20 million Soviet citizens?

11. Assured Destruction Not Good Enough  Colin S. Gray says Soviets will not be deterred by threats of assured destruction  USSR leaders not deterred because they don’t value the society threatened  Must threaten the regime and the survival of the Soviet state  Threaten regime-change like Japan and Germany in WWII  Nuclear weapons should not be countervalue or counterforce, but “counter- state”  Colin S. Gray says Soviets will not be deterred by threats of assured destruction  USSR leaders not deterred because they don’t value the society threatened  Must threaten the regime and the survival of the Soviet state  Threaten regime-change like Japan and Germany in WWII  Nuclear weapons should not be countervalue or counterforce, but “counter- state”

12. Assured Destruction Not Enough  Response to Gray’s argument  What evidence do you have that Soviet leadership doesn’t value society? (WWII not a good illustration)  Soviets would know that any nuclear war would threaten the existence of the state  Assumes that only acceptable resolution of conflict is unconditional surrender  Such an all-or-nothing prospect could prevent US from settling for less to avoid nuclear annihilation  Imminent political demise of the USSR might be one situation that would provoke desperation and elicit an irrational massive retaliation from Soviets  Response to Gray’s argument  What evidence do you have that Soviet leadership doesn’t value society? (WWII not a good illustration)  Soviets would know that any nuclear war would threaten the existence of the state  Assumes that only acceptable resolution of conflict is unconditional surrender  Such an all-or-nothing prospect could prevent US from settling for less to avoid nuclear annihilation  Imminent political demise of the USSR might be one situation that would provoke desperation and elicit an irrational massive retaliation from Soviets

13. 1970s Concerns Pertinent Today  What to do if deterrence fails?  How likely is it that deterrence will fail?  If you’re nervous about the second question, you’d better think a lot about the first question  Ever-increasing Soviet capabilities  More assertive Soviet behavior throughout the world  What to do if deterrence fails?  How likely is it that deterrence will fail?  If you’re nervous about the second question, you’d better think a lot about the first question  Ever-increasing Soviet capabilities  More assertive Soviet behavior throughout the world