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Chapter 12 Uncertainty 1
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Uncertainty is Pervasive What is uncertainty in economic systems? tomorrow’s prices future wealth future availability of commodities present and future actions of other people. 2
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Uncertainty is Pervasive What are rational responses to uncertainty? A portfolio of contingent consumption goods. E.g., buying insurance (health, life, auto) 3
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12.1 Contingent consumption 或有消費 states of nature: different outcomes of a random event “car accident” (a) “no car accident” (na). Accident occurs with probability a, does not with probability na ; a + na = 1. Accident causes a loss of $L. 4
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Contingencies A state-contingent consumption plan is a specification of what will be consumed in different sates of nature. E.g. the insurer pays only if there is an accident. 5
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12.2 State-Contingent Budget Constraints Each $1 of accident insurance costs . Consumer has $m of wealth. C na is consumption value in the no-accident state. C a is consumption value in the accident state. 6
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa 7
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa 20 17 A state-contingent consumption with $17 consumption value in the accident state and $20 consumption value in the no-accident state. 8
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints Without insurance, C a = m - L C na = m. 9
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m The endowment bundle. 10
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints Buy $K of accident insurance. C na = m - K. C a = m - L - K + K = m - L + (1- )K. K = (C a - m + L)/(1- ) C na = m - (C a - m + L)/(1- ) 11
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m The endowment bundle. 12
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m The endowment bundle. 13
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m The endowment bundle. Where is the most preferred state-contingent consumption plan? 14
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12.3 Preferences Under Uncertainty Think of a lottery. Win $400 with probability 1/2 and $0 with probability 1/2. Will you prefer participating the lottery or getting $200 for sure? 15
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Think of a lottery. Win $90 with probability 1/2 and win $0 with probability 1/2. U($90) = 12, U($0) = 2. Expected utility 預期效用 16
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Think of a lottery. Win $90 with probability 1/2 and win $0 with probability 1/2. Expected money value of the lottery is 17
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Preferences Under Uncertainty EU = 7 and EM = $45. U($45) > 7 $45 for sure is preferred to the lottery risk-aversion. 風險驅避 U($45) < 7 the lottery is preferred to $45 for sure risk-loving. 風險愛好 U($45) = 7 the lottery is preferred equally to $45 for sure risk-neutrality. 風險中立 18
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth$0$90 2 12 $45 EU=7 19
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth$0$90 12 U($45) U($45) > EU risk-aversion. 2 EU=7 $45 20
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth$0$90 12 U($45) U($45) > EU risk-aversion. 2 EU=7 $45 MU declines as wealth rises. 21
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth$0$90 12 2 EU=7 $45 22
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth$0$90 12 U($45) < EU risk-loving. 2 EU=7 $45 U($45) 23
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth$0$90 12 U($45) < EU risk-loving. 2 EU=7 $45 MU rises as wealth rises. U($45) 24
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth$0$90 12 2 EU=7 $45 25
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth$0$90 12 U($45) = EU risk-neutrality. 2 U($45)= EU=7 $45 26
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Preferences Under Uncertainty Wealth$0$90 12 U($45) = EU risk-neutrality. 2 $45 MU constant as wealth rises. U($45)= EU=7 27
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Preferences Under Uncertainty State-contingent consumption plans that give equal expected utility are equally preferred. 28
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Preferences Under Uncertainty C na CaCa EU 1 EU 2 EU 3 Indifference curves EU 1 < EU 2 < EU 3 29
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Preferences Under Uncertainty What is the MRS of an indifference curve? Get consumption c 1 with prob. 1 and c 2 with prob. 2 ( 1 + 2 = 1). EU = 1 U(c 1 ) + 2 U(c 2 ). For constant EU, dEU = 0. 30
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Preferences Under Uncertainty 31
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Preferences Under Uncertainty C na CaCa EU 1 EU 2 EU 3 Indifference curves EU 1 < EU 2 < EU 3 32
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Choice Under Uncertainty Q: How is a rational choice made under uncertainty? A: Choose the most preferred affordable state-contingent consumption plan. 33
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m The endowment bundle. Where is the most preferred state-contingent consumption plan? 34
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m The endowment bundle. Where is the most preferred state-contingent consumption plan? Affordable plans 35
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m Where is the most preferred state-contingent consumption plan? More preferred 36
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m Most preferred affordable plan 37
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m Most preferred affordable plan 38
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m Most preferred affordable plan MRS = slope of budget constraint 39
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State-Contingent Budget Constraints C na CaCa m Most preferred affordable plan MRS = slope of budget constraint; i.e. 40
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12.4 Insurance Suppose entry to the insurance industry is free. Expected economic profit = 0. I.e. K - a K - (1 - a )0 = ( - a )K = 0. I.e. free entry = a. If price of $1 insurance = accident probability, then insurance is fair. 41
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Competitive Insurance When insurance is fair, rational insurance choices satisfy 42
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Competitive Insurance When insurance is fair, rational insurance choices satisfy I.e. 43
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Competitive Insurance When insurance is fair, rational insurance choices satisfy I.e. Marginal utility of income must be the same in both states. 44
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Competitive Insurance How much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy? 45
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Competitive Insurance How much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy? Risk-aversion MU(c) as c . Hence 46
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Competitive Insurance How much fair insurance does a risk-averse consumer buy? Risk-aversion MU(c) as c . Hence full-insurance, K=L 47
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“Unfair” Insurance Suppose insurers make positive expected economic profit. I.e. K - a K - (1 - a )0 = ( - a )K > 0. 48
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“Unfair” Insurance Suppose insurers make positive expected economic profit. I.e. K - a K - (1 - a )0 = ( - a )K > 0. Then > a 49
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“Unfair” Insurance Rational choice requires 50
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“Unfair” Insurance Rational choice requires Since Hence for a risk-averter. 51
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“Unfair” Insurance Rational choice requires Since Hence for a risk-averter, K<L. A risk-averter buys less than full “unfair” insurance. 52
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12.5 Diversification Two firms, A and B. Shares cost $10. With prob. 1/2 A’s profit is $100 and B’s profit is $20. With prob. 1/2 A’s profit is $20 and B’s profit is $100. You have $100 to invest. How? 53
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Diversification Buy only firm A’s stock? $100/10 = 10 shares. You earn $1000 with prob. 1/2 and $200 with prob. 1/2. Expected earning: $500 + $100 = $600 54
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Diversification Buy only firm B’s stock? $100/10 = 10 shares. You earn $1000 with prob. 1/2 and $200 with prob. 1/2. Expected earning: $500 + $100 = $600 55
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Diversification Buy 5 shares in each firm? You earn $600 for sure. Diversification has maintained expected earning and lowered risk. 56
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Diversification Buy 5 shares in each firm? You earn $600 for sure. Diversification has maintained expected earning and lowered risk. Typically, diversification lowers expected earnings in exchange for lowered risk. 57
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