1. Subway Chemical Detection: A Proposed System Process for a Detect-to-Warn Capability to Save Lives CAPT Joselito Ignacio, MA, MPH, CIH, CSP, REHS Acting Director, Chemical Defense Program Office of Health Affairs Department of Homeland Security

2. Subway System Challenge Chemical Incidents Pose Significant Challenges to Subway System Responses  2008: 3.5 million passengers use mass transit rail in U.S.  Represents 33% of total number of passenger trips using all forms of public transportation (Dickens & Neff, 2010)  Lack of Strict Passenger and Baggage Screening Requirements Terrorist Interest  1995 Aum Shinrikyo Sarin Attack;  2001 thru 2005, plots foiled to attack mass transit rail in NY, Singapore, Paris and London (Hinds, 2005);

3. Can Chemical Detection Reduce The Challenges? Create a system that responds with speed, skill and effectiveness using technology as a tool for effective response ACTIONS Proposed Solution: Create a system that responds with speed, skill and effectiveness using technology as a tool for effective response ACTIONS Problem: A single component (technology) is perceived as the sole solution to chemical defense

4. 5 Chemical Response Requires Rapid Actions [Validated in Demonstration Projects] Create a system that responds with speed, skill and effectiveness using technology as a tool for effective response ACTIONS Proposed Solution: Create a system that responds with speed, skill and effectiveness using technology as a tool for effective response ACTIONS Problem: A single component (technology) is perceived as the sole solution to chemical defense

5. Location-Independent System Process In order to design Chemical Detection Systems for placement in U.S. Subway Mass Transit Risk Assessment of Chemical Threats in Subway Performance Specifications For Chemical Detectors Chemical Detection Technologies Concept of Operations Plan (CONOP) Chemical Detector Placement Simulating Chemical Dispersion in Subway Training and Exercise Program for Chemical Event

6. Risk Assessment Methodology Network Analysis  Multiple Stations (Nodes) and Rail (Links)  Model-Based Risk Assessment  Identify Highest Risk Nodes and Links Threat and Vulnerability Assessments  Intelligence Sources  DHS Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessments  Nearby Chemical Manufacturing Distribution and Storage Consequence Analysis  Scenario Driven  Scenarios Provide Specific Conditions  Specific Parameters (Release Mechanism, Quantities, Duration, Environmental Conditions, Operating Conditions, and Exposure Threshold)

7. Chemical Detector Performance Specifications  Risk Assessment Based  Define Need for a Stationary and Autonomous Detection System  Specify Targeted Chemical Agents  Specify Operating Conditions  Specify Data Integration Requirements  Specify Common Interfering Agents TICCAS No. IDLHAEGL-2/30 min mg/m 3 (Calculated) ~ppmmg/m 3 (Calculated) ~ppm Ammonia (NH 3 )7664-41-7208.96300153.24220 Hydrogen Cyanide (AC)74-90-8565011.0510 Phosgene (CG)75-44-5822.430.60 Sarin (GB)107-44-80.10.020.0500.0085

8. Technology Review Criteria  Reference Risk Assessment  Detection Performance Specifications  Costs (Capital and Sustainment Costs, Warranties  Vendor Workshop  Third-party Independent Test and Evaluation Review  Develop and issue a Comprehensive Request for Proposal Response Operating Curve (ROC) characterizes a detector’s ability to detect and quantify agent concentration s (Carrano, J. L. et al. Chemical and biological sensor standards study. March 29, 2011)

9. Detector Placement Analysis  Addresses System Adequacy  Based on Modeling and Risk Illustrations of Evenly Distributed and a Centrally Distributed Detector Placement (with Manifold Sampling Lines) (Becknell, A. F. (2011). Evaluation of facility monitors. Unpublished manuscript)  Identifies Proper Placement  Identifies Appropriate Quantity

10. Concept of Operations Drives Response Actions to a Chemical Release Must Include:  Detection Method (Detector, Visual Cues, and/or Post- exposure Involving Delayed Onset  Warning mechanism to Alert Staff, Patrons, EMS/Police/Fire/Public Health, and/or Communities  Mitigation Process for False Alarms  Response Process (e.g., Evacuation, Mass Human Decontamination)

11. Training and Exercise Training and Exercises Creates Operator and Response Proficiency Training Should Encompass  Detectors and Data integration  CONOP for Detect, Warning, Mitigation, and Response Exercises Should Encompass  Seminar to Familiarize and Revise the CONOP  Tabletop Exercise  Games to Simulate Chemical Release  Drills to Exercise Specific Tasks within CONOP

12. Lessons Learned Need a Detailed and Deliberate Process for the Design, Integration and Implementation of a Chemical Detect-to-Warn Capability  Risk-based;  Curtail costs;  Not detector-centric; Applicable to Venues other than Subway Systems