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2. Linac4 Timescale 2  Technical design report issued December 2006  Project approved by CERN Council June 2007  Official start of project January 2008  Groundbreaking ceremony October 2008  Building and tunnel delivered November 2010  End of infrastructure installation summer 2012  Beam commissioning 3 MeV summer 2013  Scheduled end of beam commissioning summer 2014

3. Linac4 budgets 2007-2012 3 2006 2008 2010 2012 Preliminary budget (mostly top down) Execution budget (bottom up) Revised execution budget Note that in 2004/2007 was active a (small) R&D budget for Linac4, which allowed a smooth transition between R&D and construction (exemples: the MEBT was paid with the R&D budget, but part of the DTL R&D was paid with the construction budget).

4. Linac4 Execution Budget – 2008 All costs in CHF (1€=1.5CHF in 2008, 1.2 CHF now )

5. 5 Linac4 original budget breakup NOTES: R&D program 2006/07 covered MEBT construction, RFQ design, structures R&D Not included 13 klystrons recuperated from LEP + circulators and some waveguides.

6. Linac4 budget - 2008 6 Procedure: 1. Identify Workpackages (and responsible!), Workunits and Deliverables; 2. Negotiate the budget with WP holders; define together the general approach (for example, share outsourcing/in-house/in-kind); 3. In particular, agree that contingencies have to be centralized at project level. But CERN accounting “tradition” does not allow to have an explicit contingency. Therefore: 1.15% contingency added only to Civil Engineering (as “finishing works”); 2.small additional reserve at project management level (0.5%), some margin (another 0.5%) in some WPs “under construction”; 3.5% contingency provided at the CERN planning level (not included in project budget) → the project was starting with an overall contingency of some 9%. Note that CERN costs do not include manpower, but: - include temporary labor – at different levels - include subcontractors when relevant - include visitors and some additional personnel (some “fellows”=2.5 years post-docs) in a special budget under “project management” of 2.3 MCHF – 2.3%.

7. Insourcing or Outsourcing ? 7  CERN has some production capabilities, which are extremely good but overloaded and expensive (internal billing on hourly basis) - but they do not charge overheads!  Chosen Strategy: mix of insourcing/outsourcing, build in industry all what could be built there at a reasonable price, keep in house productions that are not interesting/possible in industry. In all cases, maintain in house the overall control of the productions (reduces considerably the costs, but increases the level of risk).  In kind contributions are welcome, but filtered (approved) by the project and proven (after prototyping). They are included in the budget with their real or equivalent cost.  Result of these construction choices: lower costs but higher risks, in particular for WPs with more insourcing (accelerating structures, beam instrumentation, LLRF, etc.).

8. Earned Value Management 8 EVM Methodology developed in ’60s by US DoD – enormous amount of experience in the US, is a PMBOK standard (finding: cost performance stabilizes when project is >20% complete…) Applied for LHC at CERN after the financial crisis of 2001; improved version (following LHC experience) implemented for Linac4 in 2009 Allows comparing expected financial evolution (Planned Value) with actual evolution (Earned Value) and real costs (Actual Cost). Workpackages Workunits Deliverables Original budget and planning → Planned Value Regular (monthly) reporting → Earned Value Budget follow-up → Actual Cost

9. Linac4 and EVM 9  Linac4 went into EVM from a very early stage (consequence: different level of refinement for different WPs);  The EVM tool for Linac4 was an improved version of the LHC tool, modified, simplified and adapted to a project of Linac4 size. It was integrated into the general CERN Planning Tool.  It was decided (after long discussions) to separate Personnel from Material: the WUs under EVM concern only material (and the follow up is done on the material expenditures) whereas separate WUs contain the personnel part, which are in the Planning Tool but not under EVM.

10. Workplan and budget into EVM 10 Long and tedious process, needs to be explained to and accepted from the WP holders

11. Example of Workunit 11 Manufacturing of DTL drift tubes: includes an in-kind contribution (charged to a special budget code) and a CERN part. Divided into 9 deliverables.

12. Project cost by year 12 up-to-date budget tables can be generated in a few clicks

13. Project execution Workunit Holders asked for Progress Reporting: Earned Value (EV)

14. PV/EV table 14 expenditures can be easily tracked and compared to planned ones

15. Four years later… 15

16. Situation in 2012 16  2012: 4 years after start of project.  Projects evolve: schedule was « stretched » several times, the PS Booster part went into a separate project, new problems appeared → need to frequently update the EVM baseline, so far every year. May 2012: frozen Baseline4, should be the last one!  At May 2012, 51% of budget spent, 20% engaged, in-kind contributions defined → more than half-way through, only some 25% of budget remains to be engaged.  and our contingency is gone!  special contingency (5%) absorbed by the variation in the exchange rate: we profit of the better exchange rate for all purchases in Euros, but CERN material budgets are indexed accordingly to a weighted exchange rate and should have been reduced → decided to compensate the negative material index with the financial contingency → practically, the contingency has been distributed to the WPs (but those who pay more in EUR have a higher advantage!)  civil engineering went well, without overcosts thanks to the careful follow-up → the 15% contingency on civil engineering was made available to the project at end 2010  but at the same time problems with the ion source forced to start a new (and expensive) in-house source development → the costs of the new ion source have completely absorbed the CE contingency.

17. The 2012 budget 17

18. Budget breakdown (linac only!) 18

19. 2 nd level for RF and acc. structures 19 w/o LEP klystrons, HPRF would need 8 additional 2.8 MW klystrons with circulators ≈ 5.2 MCHF

20. Budget evolution 20

21. What does EVM tell about the project? 21 Linac4 (global) on 23.5.12 delay of 5 months EV agrees well with AC

22. EVM report - 2 22 CE and infrastructureLinac systems

23. EVM report - 3 23 LINAC4 2.4 – Accelerating Structures LINAC4 2.6 – Radio Frequency Systems

24. EVM report - 3 24 LINAC4 2.7 – Beam Instrumentation LINAC4 2.10 – Power Converters

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26. Earned Value Management 26 The EVM tool has been: - an essential ingredient for a correct definition of the required budget and the associated schedule - an extremely useful management tool for the follow-up of the project - an invaluable help in the relations with the stakeholders (top management, finance, auditors): the fact that all data are available and (freely) accessible enormously contributes to the reputation of the project. However, the present implementation still presents some problems when used for the preparation of the yearly budgets. EVM data tend to be overoptimistic. The cost performance so far is not too bad (overall CPI = EV/AC = 1.02) Dr. Christensen & associates’ findings: CPI stabilizes when project is 20% complete |CPI(final) – CPI(20%)| ≤ 0.10

27. Conclusion: The 6 Linac4 Theorems 27 1)Problems always appear where you don’t expect them (example: ion source) 2)Problems do not appear where you expect them (Corollary of the previous theorem, example: civil engineering) 3)Most of problems appear at the interfaces between WPs (went well for Linac4: we were expecting problems there -Theorem 2- and we had in place a strong structure to follow the interfaces) 4)The size of a problem is inversely proportional to the size of the equipment that is causing it (small details stop big machines…) 5)The overcosts in the production of an equipment are directly proportional to its technological content. In Linac4, conventional systems costed less than foreseen, but all high-tech systems costed more than foreseen. This looks like a general rule. 6)Every activity takes 50% more time than what allocated, independently from the amount of time originally allocated.