1. Lt Col Nicolas Henry (FRA) Deputy Director, NATO ENSEC COE
Hybrid threats: overcoming ambiguity, building resilience
Vilnius, 11 SEPT.2015
Best practices and lessons Learnt in Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection
Some NATO Examples
Lt Col Nicolas Henry (FRA)
Deputy Director, NATO ENSEC COE

2. NATO NATO pipelines System; (slide 2) CEPS case study; (slide 3 to 12)
NATO Operations; (slide 13)

3. NPS presentation
The NPS was set up during the Cold War to supply NATO forces with fuel and it continues to satisfy fuel requirements with the flexibility that today’s security environment requires. The NATO Pipeline System (NPS) consists of ten distinct storage and distribution systems for fuels and lubricants. In total, it is approximately 12,000 kilometres long, runs through 13 NATO countries and has a storage capacity of 5.5 million cubic metres.

4. THE CEPS Connected to main arbors and refineries:
5 599 km pipelines; Total Transport: 12.3 Mm3
82 pump stations;
33 bulk fuel tank farms ; Storage: m3
member Nations of the CEPS Program
HN : Belgium
FRANCE
Germany
LUXEMBOURG
Netherland
User Nat.: United States
MILITARY MISSION
Storage and refreshment of strategic stocks belonging to the military clients
Day-to-day transport and delivery of on-specification jet fuel (F-34)
Non-MILITARY use
Authorized by the North Atlantic Council already in 1959
Subject to a mandatory MILITARY PRIORITY CLAUSE

5. CEPS : an essential military capability
Jet Fuel availability is warranted by strategic storages and by the priority always given to military transport => Permanente availability of jet fuel
CEPS is the only system of transportation able to answer to drastically increase demand in short notice (Gulf wars, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, …)
CEPS is essential for fuels support of NATO and NATO Nations airbases connected
Daily supply of military airbases connected to CEPS
0.9 million de m3 in 2012 (equivalent of ≈ trucks)

6. CEPS : an essential military capability
Utility of non-military traffic
Reduction of military activity – industrial tool usable for industry – strategic for Jet-fuel in Europe
Operational justification:
Train personnel daily
Rotation of stocks in storage (jet fuel)
Rapid response during situations of high demand
Additional benefit:
- Reduce costs for the CEPS community :

7. resilience Redundancy of HPPS Multiples tanks farms in the all system
Multi-directions
Knots with Tank farms and multi pipes (3 x 4 pipes)
Multiple exit solutions:
trucks
Rails
Airbases (mili-civilian)
Arbors
Emergency take off points …
The protection of the CEPS
A Military asset built in the 50’s, Based on resilience;
Integral part of the system from the construction;
Network approach on the design of the system;
Physical protection of each element;
Civil traffic to support military needs
War-damage capability

8. The physical protection
Pump stations
manifolds
valves pits
Pipelines underground (100%)
A Military asset built in the 50’s;
Integral part of the system from the construction;
Physical protection of each element;
Network approach on the design of the system;
Based on resilience;
Civil traffic to support military needs
War-damage capability

9. Underground storage tanks
Dispatching
Remote controlled operations
Security and safety of the network
Emergency dispatching shared with other private system.
Underground storage tanks
Ground
Concrete + Steel + Epoxy
Dissemination (no domino effect)
A war Damage system was developed to support the system (field equipment HPPS, LPPS, field tank farm,…) able to replace any part damaged of the system.
A extended repair capability (internal and external).
By its one teams and specific equipments;
By contracted Companies, known, trained, …
Security and safety survey
Regular air survey;
Ground patrols by operators and police forces;
Strong integration with local population (passive survey);
Anti-intrusion alarm system in all non manned installations;
Short notice intervention by trained security personnel.

10. Terrorist attack in 1984
"CCC", les Cellules Communistes combattantes (communist Fighting Cells);
11th Dec 1984 in SIX different places (Ittre, Ensival, Glons 1, Glons 2, Gastuche, Gages (Gibecq));
Bomb attacks on 6 isolated valves pits;

11. Terrorist attack in 1984

12. Terrorist attack in 1984 Practical's results:
Successful attacks (6 destruction for 6 attacks):
No operational impact:
Operation stopped locally only during a short time;
No operational disruption on fuel supply (Web network + tank farms).
Media impact : very limited (cold war).
Lessons learn from attacks:
System well designed for protection (confirmation with a real case);
Withdraw of non necessary valves pits, and better protection of the other. (Emergency take off points).
Results :
No wounded or killed;
6 VPs destroyed, lost of product and limited fire in some places.
Fuel lost : 433m³
Operation disruption: some days;
Military impact: close to zero;
Media impact : limited (cold war).
Conclusions
CEPS is a military network, built for Cold-War, still strategic for the Alliance (supply of the new Eastern NATO countries) and for Civil Jet Fuel supply in Europe.
The system was design taking in account the protection in the 50’s, the approach is still valid (resilience, recovery capacity, integration in the civil society, …).

13. Interconnection Energy Security and Maritime Security
NATO Maritime Operations
Operation Active Endeavour
(Mediterranean Sea )
NATO Maritime Operations can prevent or deter hostile actions that could affect energy security. Currently there are two ongoing NATO maritime operations: Operation Active Endeavour in Mediterranean Sea against terrorism and Operation Ocean Shield in Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean against piracy and armed robbery.
Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are systematically carrying out preparatory route surveys in “choke” points as well as in important passages and harbors throughout the Mediterranean. 65 per cent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe pass through the Mediterranean each year.
NATO is currently leading Operation Ocean Shield, which helps to deter and disrupt pirate attacks while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region. It is also an indirect contribution to energy security.
Operation Ocean Shield
(Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean)

14. NATO ENSEC COE Studies and Lesson Learned for real cases;
Petroleum committee (RAP support capability); (slide)
Ukraine case study; (slide)
Enhancing sharing of experience and best practices among the alliance and with partners ;
Participation and organization of WS and conferences; (Workshop in Georgia on CEIP - southern corridor , conference in Baku in 2013, Turkey in 2015, …);
WS Klaipeda LNG terminal (slide)
Participation and organization of specific training or exercises (for military and or civilian)
Education (slide);
Exercises, ei TTX on CEIP (slide);
For this NATO ENSEC is not working alone but as a hub of knowledge
Cooperation, sharing experience, partnership, cross dimensional …(slide)

15. Study for NATO PC
Problem: closures of European refineries could threaten the production of specific military fuels (Aviation Turbine Fuel F-34 (Jet A1), Aviation Turbine Fuel, High Flash type F-44 and Naval Distillate Fuel F-76)  
A special focus on supply chain and storage capacities for Baltic countries connected to RAP,
Tasks: to identify
from which European refineries specific military fuels come from, economic condition of these facilities
storage capacities for specific military fuels
Additional proposal : Follow-up: Conclusions of this study will be used to update the Bulk fuel strategy of NATO and serve as a basis for further research in this area

16. Hybrid Conflict and Critical Energy Infrastructure: the Case of Ukraine
Based on Ukrainian experience, to deliver an analytical study for NATO and partner countries to build resilience in energy sector; ( )
Study is on military/terrorist threat (& hybrid warfare) on energy infrastructure;
Work out a conceptual approach how to build resilience in energy sector.
Propose practical measures for countries to resist these threats, to build resilience.

17. NATO ENSEC COE
Experience and best practices sharing Klaipeda (LTU) LNG Terminal Security Roundtable (12 December, 2014)
Aim: discuss the potential means of ensuring the safety and protection of energy infrastructure related to the LNG terminal.
Organizers:
the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence
the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania
together with Joint Stock company ‘Klaipėdos nafta’ (operator)
Security proposals for LTU LNG terminal were based on good practices:
at the Gate Terminal at Gasunie (Rotterdam) and
future LNG terminal in Swinoujscie (Poland)
Taking into account the importance of critical energy protection, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania together with Joint Stock company ‘Klaipėdos nafta’ and the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence would gladly invite interested Lithuanian institutions to participate and to discuss the potential means of ensuring the safety and protection of energy infrastructure related to the LNG terminal, which will be held on the 12th of December in the Klaipėdos Oldport Hotel conference hall.
During the course of this workshop, potential physical, cyber and informational risks and threats will be discussed in relation to LNG terminals and tankers. Also, during this event, lessons learned from the LNG infrastructure protection in Lithuania and other places will be shared. The roundtable discussion, which will be moderated by a representative of NATO  ENSEC COE will also be joined by foreign experts who will share insights and experiences of how to analyse the potential threats to LNG terminals, not only in the present, but also in the future.

18. Education and Training Efforts (Individual )
ADL Energy Security Awareness Course ( DoK 100/200)
(to be available on line in NATO e-portal in 2015)
Energy Security Pilot Course ( DoK 300)
(Done between May 2015 in NATO ENSEC COE )
Energy Security Strategic Awareness course (DoK 400/500)
(NATO School, Oberammergau, 28 Sep Oct 15)
In order to fulfil the needs of education and training on energy security NATO ENSEC COE offers and compiles education and training activities in different level
Individual education and training:
ADL Energy Security Awareness Course ( DoK 200) will be available on line in NATO e-learning portal by the end of September 2015
Energy Security Pilot Course (( DoK 300) has been executed in Vilnius between May 2015 in cooperation with Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence.
Energy Security Strategic Awareness Course (DoK 400/500) will be offered by the NATO School, Oberammergau between 28 september-02 October 2015 in cooperation with Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the United States Partnership for Peace Education and Training Center (US PTEC), and NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence

19. Education and Training Efforts (Collective)
NATO-ICI Table Top Exercise on the Protection of
Critical Energy Infrastructure (20-23 October 2014)
Terrorist Attack based scenario
Cyber Attack based scenario
STRATCOM Based scenario
New CEIP TTX for NATO
2016
Additionally, NATO-ICI Table Top Exercise on the Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure has been conducted on October 2014 in Vilnius, Lithuania with 35 participants from 9 nations including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
The purpose of the table top exercise was to collect and share information and experience from senior civil emergency planners and crisis management officers from NATO member countries and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners on protection of critical energy infrastructure and present an overview of the existing challenges.
The exercise based on three scenarios, which included Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) shipment incidents, terrorist and cyber risks to energy-related port infrastructure, as well as strategic com
munications challenges, all affecting the transportation of energy resources
CEIP-TTX General Outcomes
Cooperation between NATO and partner nations and stakeholders on protection of critical energy infrastructure,
Operational (military and security), commercial and legal dimensions of CEIP must be taken into account when considering measures,
Supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure through the sharing of information, intelligence and best practice,
In the light of threat analyze, risk and vulnerability assessment, security and emergency response plans should include physical and informational aspects of protection,
Continue conducting exercises on CEIP, focusing on specific infrastructure objects (harbors, terminals, pipelines, power stations, etc.)

20. NATO ENSECCOE Outreach
Cooperation with :
other COEs (24)
NATO / National military organizations
Partnership Sectors:
Military – Civilian
Public – Private
The Golden Triangle: Military, Academia and Industry
Outsourcing the competence on Eneregy Security.
Cooperation with Partners has been a promoting activity for the NATO ENSEC COE. Each partner has brought new perspectives for the wider research and development possibilities including new insights.
With the Letter of Intent signed the institutions agreed to exercise their best efforts to develop the following forms of cooperation in the common areas of competence with particular focus on energy security: to share good practice in the areas concerned, to exchange experts, researchers within the joint projects, to conduct planning and coordination of joint projects, to organise joint seminars, workshops and trainings, to facilitate students’ engagement in internships, to exchange unclassified results and outcomes of conducted researches, unclassified information of planned and ongoing events and invite to workshops, seminars and conferences.

21. ...Thank you! Lt Col Nicolas Henry Deputy Director
NATO ENSEC COE
Šilo str. 5a,
Vilnius
Lithuania