1. ฮ๊อตสปอรต์กับ กึ๋นอาเซียน กวี จงกิจถาวร บรรยายพิเศษ สมาคมนักข่าวและหนังสือพิมพ์แห่ง ประเทศไทย 8 มิถุนายน 2012

2. อาเซียนสามารแก้ไข ปัญหาทะเลจีนใต้หรือข้อ พิพาทปราสาทเขาพระ วิหารได้หรือไม่ ?

3. Asean role in conflict resolutions: Early years Asean role of ASEAN in the Cambodia conflict of 1978 and again in 1997 Peacekeeping in East Timor and Aceh post-Nargis Burma in 2008 Can Asean settle South China Sea or Thai- Cambodia conflict (Khao Praviharn Temple) Non use of high council, TAC (why?) Informal diplomacy helps to prevent and defuse conflicts.

4. Asean’s quiet diplomacy Informal, loose discussion Leadership rapports and liked minds Informal negotiations Asean deals better with interstate, not internal conflicts When does domestic affairs end and international conflict starts..very confuse What is a dispute, and what is conflict..

5. Asean and conflict resolution 1995 concept paper, Asean Regional Forum Asean Political-Security Blueprint Asean Charter: Article 22, 24 and 25 calls for the setting up of dispute settlement mechanisms Article 23 states that: “Member states which are parties to a dispute may at any time agree to resort to good offices, conciliation or mediation in order to resolve the dispute within an agreed time limit.” and that: “Parties to the dispute may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary-General of ASEAN, acting in an ex- officio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation.” Enhance the conflict management role of Asean SG.

6. Problems faced Asean Lacking capacity building Lacking capable staffs Need early warning knowledge and analysis Need better Political and Security Directorate Need talent pool of experts on security and regional conflicts

7. comfidential

8. Setting up AIPR Asean decided to set up Asean Institute of Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) Asean leaders will endorse the terms of reference in November 2012 in Phnom Penh Will AIPR become an independent organization or come under Asean?

9. Future roles of AIPR Compiling Asean best practices on peace and conflict management and resolutions Identifying research projects Enhancing cooperation among Asean think tanks Holding workshops on peace, conflict management and resolutions with UN/int’l organization Promoting gender mainstream in peace building, keeping process

10. Six Issues in the South China Sea (SCS) Bilateral Disputes Multilateral Disputes The 2002 DOC Proposed Code of Conduct (COC) in the SCS Overlapping Claims of Continental Shelves and EEZs Maritime Security

11. Different Concerned Parties Bilateral Disputes The Paracels : China vs Viet Nam; Scarborough Shoals, Reed Bank : China vs the Philippines; Tungsha : China vs Taiwan Multilateral Disputes The Spratlys : China, Taiwan, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam The 2002 DOC 10 ASEAN Member States and China Proposed Code of Conduct (COC) in the SCS 10 ASEAN Member States and China Overlapping Continental Shelves and EEZs Coastal States that have ratified UNCLOS [not including Taiwan], and the UN’s CLCS Maritime Security All countries with interest in freedom and safety of navigation and aviation in and above the SCS, including participants in the ARF, in the ADMM Plus, the International Maritime Organization, etc.

12. ASEAN Position : Bilateral Disputes + ASEAN common position on these bilateral disputes are based on the following : The SCS should be recognized and treated as an opportunity for cooperation for common benefit, rather than as a source of conflicts. Bilateral territorial disputes in the SCS should be resolved peacefully among the two parties concerned in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. Pending peaceful resolution of these bilateral disputes, the parties concerned should avoid disrupting or undermining peace, security, freedom and safety of navigation in the SCS. ASEAN believes, and China seems to agree, that disputes in the SCS that concern ASEAN Member States and China shall not be allowed to obstruct ASEAN-China cooperation, which has now developed to the stage of “strategic dialogue partnership”, in which both sides are now celebrating their 20 years of cooperation.

13. Asean Position : The Spratlys ASEAN as a group does not and cannot take sides in favour of any of the four ASEAN claimant states’ claims over the Spratlys. (And quite prudently, none of the four has ever requested ASEAN to support any of its own national claims either.) ASEAN position on the Spratlys was first pronounced in the ASEAN Declaration on South China Sea, done by the six ASEAN Foreign Ministers (of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in Manila on 22 July 1992. The Ministers emphasized “the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force;” and urged “all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes.” They also called for the use of the principles in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as the basis for formulating an “international code of conduct over the South China Sea”. And they invited all concerned parties to support this Declaration. Another key element of ASEAN’s common position on the Spratlys is that as far as ASEAN is concerned, the 1997 ASEAN-China summit commitment on non-use of force in the SCS disputes remains valid.

14. Asean Position : The Spratlys Moreover, ASEAN believes that China is also legally obliged under the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), to which China acceded on 9 October 2003, to settle differences or disputes among TAC High Contracting Parties by peaceful means, and to refrain from the use or the threat to use force in inter-state disputes in Southeast Asia. Recent “incidents” involving alleged Chinese “aggression” were within the EEZ claimed by Viet Nam and within the EEZ claimed by the Philippines, far away from the disputed areas in the Spratlys. It is conceivable that one or more of the ASEAN claimant States might call for assistance from the TAC’s High Council, on the ground that Chinese aggressiveness in asserting its claims in the SCS is disturbing peace in the SCS and regional harmony. China, of course, can refuse to go the TAC’s High Council. But the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute may offer “all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance (Article 16 of the TAC).

15. Asean Position: The DOC The DOC has always been a framework for cooperation between ASEAN and China on confidence building in the SCS. The DOC clearly stated in its introductory paragraph that this is an agreement between “The Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,”. While ASEAN is not a party to the Spratlys dispute, it is indisputable that the DOC concerns all 10 ASEAN Member States collectively and ASEAN as an organization in working with China to build mutual confidence through practical functional cooperation in the SCS. ASEAN Leaders “stressed that continuing the positive engagement of ASEAN-China is essential in moving forward the DOC issue.” They also “stressed the need to further intensify the efforts of both ASEAN and China to ensure the effective and full implementation of the DOC and move forward the eventual conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct (COC).” ASEAN Leaders “welcomed the convening of the 6 th ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the DOC on 18-20 April 2011 in Medan, Indonesia. In this connection, we encouraged the continued constructive consultation between ASEAN and China, including the early convening of the ASEAN-China SOM on the DOC.”

16. Asean Position : The DOC ASEAN Leaders reaffirmed “the principle of ASEAN, on the basis of unity and solidarity, to coordinate and to endeavour to develop common positions in its dialogues with its Dialogue Partners.” This is consistent with Article 41, Paragraph 4 of the ASEAN Charter, which states : “In the conduct of external relations of ASEAN, Member States shall, on the basis of unity and solidarity, coordinate and endeavour to develop common positions and pursue joint actions.” ASEAN Leaders “resolved to take advantage of the momentum of the anniversary of the 20years of ASEAN-China relations in 2011 and 10 years of the adoption of the DOC in 2012 to finalize the Guidelines on the Implementation of the DOC and initiate discussions on a regional COC.” ASEAN has also reaffirmed its support for Viet Nam, being the Country Coordinator in the ASEAN-China Dialogue Partnership, to continue to coordinate the DOC matter with China. ASEAN believes the draft Guidelines must be finalized and adopted first, before any joint projects could be undertaken under the DOC. (Six joint projects were already agreed upon at the Second Joint Working Group in Sanya, China, in February 2006).

17. Asean Position : The COC In the beginning, the COC was the goal; it was supposed to be a political document with no legal binding effect. Yet, ASEAN Member States and China couldn’t agree on the scope of coverage of the COC. And finally, they went for the second-best outcome in the DOC, with a promise stated in the DOC, that “The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region, and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.” ASEAN believes that the COC remains a desirable goal for both ASEAN and China to reach through their implementation of the DOC. ASEAN plans to start discussing soon, at least on the ASEAN side, possible elements that could go into the COC. The ASEAN side also in general agreement that the COC should enjoy a higher status than the DOC. But how?

18. Asean Position: UNCLOS/ EEZ ASEAN has taken no common position on this issue, because it is not a party to UNCLOS. Although ASEAN has frequently invoked UNCLOS in its official pronouncements and legal instruments, actually two of its Member States -- Cambodia and Thailand-- like the U.S., have not yet ratified UNCLOS.

19. ASEAN Position : Maritime Security In its ASEAN+1 Dialogue Partnership, ASEAN would be extra careful not to create any misunderstanding that some in ASEAN are trying to “internationalize” the SCS disputes by soliciting support from some powerful Dialogue Partner countries. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ADMM-Plus are existing multilateral processes that can address various aspects of maritime security for common benefit. But they need not focus on any specific area – certainly not to zero in on only the SCS-- because they all operate on the basis of consultation and consensus. ASEAN Leaders want the EAS to continue to be a Leaders-led “forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.” In addition, ASEAN Leaders have agreed at the 18 th ASEAN Summit, among other things, “to set in motion EAS deliberations and cooperation on a set of traditional and non- traditional security issues, based on the existing ASEAN body of work;”.

20. ASEAN Position : Maritime Security The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) is an ASEAN initiative for its Defence Ministers to engage in policy dialogue and practical cooperation with a group of select counterparts from ASEAN’s Dialogue Partner countries. At the inaugural ADMM- Plus in Ha Noi on 12 October 2010, Defence Ministers of eight countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, RoK, New Zealand, Russia, and the US) attended. One of the five practical cooperation areas is maritime security, which will be led by Malaysia and Australia at the expert working group level; the four other areas are : humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, led by Viet Nam and China; peacekeeping operations, by the Philippines and New Zealand; counter-terrorism by Indonesia and the US, and military medicine by Singapore and Japan.

21. Conclusion ASEAN has clear and consistent stand on each of the six specific SCS issues. ASEAN and its Member States are doing what they can in promoting cooperation with China to maintain peace and security in the SCS, and to create an atmosphere of growing mutual trust and understanding to pave the way for the formulation and adoption of a COC in the SCS. Existing mechanisms involving specific concerned parties are in place and are being used to address particular issues to achieve desirable outcomes. Each of the six SCS issues has its own dynamics and specific concerned parties that should not be mixed up. Outsiders wishing to bring up the SCS, either in the ARF, the EAS, or the ADMM Plus, would need to be precise about which particular SCS issue they want to raise, and in what context. Clearly, the most agreeable SCS issue for discussion in a multilateral forum is the one concerning maritime security in the context of promoting international cooperation for common benefit.