1. Credible Threat? DPRK (North Korea) missile programs Technical Analysis and Global Implications Tal Inbar Head, Space Research Center The Fisher Institute for Air & Space Strategic Studies, Israel April 20, 2016 © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

2. Disclaimer The presentation is based exclusively on unclassified open source information The views represents the author and are NOT necessarily represent an official Israeli governmental position; © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

3. Content of the presentation Introduction to North Korean re-entry vehicles for ballistic missiles Description of the Nuclear equipped warhead of HS-13 Description of the re-entry simulation conducted for the nose tip of the HS- 13 (mod. 2) Technological assessments Prospect for the future Preliminary conclusions © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

4. North Korean ballistic missiles The NK arsenal of ballistic missiles consist of former Soviet Union technologies and origin: Scud, SS-21(KN-02) and BM-25 (aka Musudan, BK-1) Original design: Nodong, HS-13 – two versions Soviet Origin Original NK design © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

5. HS-13 (KN 08) missile The missile was first shown on a military parade on April 15, 2012. Photographic materials indicated that the missile was under development or production in Kim Jong Il time. It is described by North Korea as ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile). On October 2015, a second version of the missile was shown. No test flight was conducted for either type. © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED HS-13 HS-13 mod. 2

6. HS-13 (KN 08) missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED 1 st stage 2 nd stage 3 rd stage Re-entry vehicle

7. HS-13 (KN 08) missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

8. Nuclear equipped warhead (RV) of the HS-13 missile On March 9, 2016, DPRK displayed, for the first time, a nuclear equipped warhead for its HS-13 (KN-08) long range ballistic missile. HS-13 (KN-08) RV on its cradle © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Triconic RV configuration Blunt Nose-Tip Low ballistic coefficient (b)

9. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead Electronic package for the nuclear bomb or ballast weight Nuclear explosive device © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Aft Skirt (for stabilization) Nose Tip

10. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Electronic package for the nuclear bomb or ballast weight Nuclear explosive device Aft Skirt (for stabilization) Nose Tip

11. Cut out of HS-13(KN 08) RV armed with Nuclear Warhead © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

12. Nuclear equipped warhead of the HS-13 missile DPRK leader Kim Jong Un was shown the nuclear bomb that was designed to fit inside the re-entry vehicle of the HS-13 missile. Note the missile in the background. © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

13. Nuclear equipped warhead of the HS-13 missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED HS-13 missile first stage HS-13 missile second stage Place for the nuclear explosion device

14. Nuclear Bomb for HS-13 © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Explosive Lens

15. Nuclear Bomb for HS-13 Electrical cords for explosive lens activation © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

16. Geometry of the nuclear explosive device Nuclear bomb with some pentagons and hexagons superimposed Probable geometry of the nuclear device (minus external features) © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

17. Nuclear equipped warhead of the HS-13 missile Inside view of the re- entry vehicle of the HS- 13 ballistic missile Electronic package for the nuclear bomb OR ballast © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Aft Squirt Mounting point Location of the Nuclear payload

18. The strategic significance It is a devastating combination of long range ballistic missile AND a nuclear warhead. North Korea never tested a missile to a range exciding 1100 km – the HS-13 family is a quantum leap in it’s capabilities. The unveiling of the miniaturized nuclear bomb is a direct response to the west’s claims that NK lack the capability to produce them. © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

19. Re-entry simulation for the nose tip of the HS-13 (mod. 2) missile On March 15, 2016, NK published detailed view of a ground test of the nose tip of the HS-13 mod. 2 ballistic missile. The simulated atmospheric re-entry was conducted by using a static test stand and exposure of the nose tip to the exhaust gases of a Scud missile. Front page of the Rodong Sinmun revealing the test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED The test aim was to evaluate and prove of the nose tip in heat loads and heat fluxes typical to the critical phase of atmospheric reentry.

20. Erosion and Ablation test of the Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2 Nose tip – probably made of ceramics Ablative material Electrical connectors Attachment Bolts (to the missile) © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Note the cover up design

21. Erosion and Ablation test of the Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2 Nose tip poised for test Scud engine Exhaust from the scud engine Nose tip © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Scud engine

22. Schematic drawing of the nose tip © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Gauge to measure the curve of the nose tip: note that very little material has been ablated Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2

23. Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2 © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Electronic package used for the nuclear explosive device OR ballast Electrical connectors

24. Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2 Charred nose tip Thermal blankets (possible use of Asbestos Phenolic ) Ablative material. Note that MOST of the material withstand the heat during the test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

25. Electronic equipment – probably related to the nuclear bomb. Some may be avionics. Antenna Bolts unaffected by the heat © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Post test Nose tip for HS-13 mod. 2

26. HS-13 missile First stage Cables duct Second stage First stage main engine © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

27. HS-13 mod. 2 Nose tip (as was tested on March 15, 2016) Large compartment for nuclear bomb (Larger than the one shown on march 9, hence larger yield possible) © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

28. Technological assessments The HS-13 missile shown with the nuclear warhead looks authentic. The 6 HS-13 (mod. 2) missiles shown looks authentic. The design of the nuclear bomb looks authentic. The nose tip used for simulated re-entry is authentic in every aspect. © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

29. Solid propelled rocket motor On March 2016, DPRK performed a static test of a new, large diameter (probably 1.25 meters) solid rocket motor. DPRK leader Ki Jong Un attended the test. © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

30. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Rails Engine’s exhaust Jet vane mount

31. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Electrical Connector Nozzle Jet Vane

32. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

33. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

34. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

35. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

36. Solid fuel engine test © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Welding Jet vane mount

37. Static test fire of HS-13 engines On April 2016, DPRK performed a static test of the engines which are installed in the HS-13 missile. Kim Jong Un attended the test. © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

38. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

39. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

40. Static test of a cluster of engines for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

41. Static test of dual-combustion chamber rocket engine for HS-13 ballistic missile © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED Flame from engine 2 Flame from engine 1 Truss – connecting the engines to the missile Cables for measurements during the test Probable location of turbo- pumps assembly

42. Preliminary conclusions DPRK has finished the design of two versions of the HS-13 ballistic missile. DPRK has succeeded to built a miniaturized nuclear bomb to fit its large ballistic missiles. DPRK has the technology to design, manufacture and test of re-entry vehicles for ballistic missiles. Transfer of DPRK missile technologies is conformed in regard to Iran and Pakistan, among other countries. © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

43. Future prospects Static tests of both versions of the HS-13 must be conducted (including separation tests – for stages of the missiles, AND the re-entry vehicles must be conducted). NOTE – This might have been partially achieved through launches of the UNHA satellite launch vehicle. Nuclear test with the miniaturized bomb must be conducted (this MAY HAVE been done already, with reduced yield). Dynamic tests (launches) of both versions of the HS-13 missile must be conducted to test the design and build reliability. © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

44. Future prospects NK might develop even smaller nuclear warheads, to fit its arsenal of Nodong missiles. it will have a profound influence on all assessments regarding Iran If they will, it will have a profound influence on all assessments regarding Iran – since Iranian Shahab 3, Gader 110 are Nodong derivatives. © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

45. talinbar@fisherinstitute.org.il Contact Information

46. Back up slides © 2016 by Tal Inbar, FOUO, UNCLASSIFIED

47. Note the same support structure for the missile Kim Jong Un, March 2016 Kim Jong Il, Date UNKNOWN When was the HS-13 built?

48. The RAND report on NK missile Threat - 1/4 RAND (of Santa Monica) Issued a technical report on NK missile threat The report was written by the German missile expert Marcus Shiller The report’s conclusions are:

49. The RAND report on NK missile Threat – 2/4 North Korea Is Not Behaving Like a Developer and Producer of Large Numbers of Relatively Sophisticated Missile Systems North Korea has conducted very few missile test launches, but the missiles used in these few launches have shown a high level of reliability. Launches take place only at politically significant dates and are therefore not dictated by engineering development or training needs. Soviet Scud missiles and the North Korean Scud missiles that have been observed look exactly the same, up to the smallest details. North Korea apparently limits its reverse engineering and production capabilities to missiles and a few other defense products. For example, it possesses almost no automotive or aerospace industry.

50. The RAND report on NK missile Threat – 3/4 The North Korean Missile Threat Is Largely a Bluff North Korea has likely launched Soviet/Russian-made missiles (that are old but proven designs) to maximize the appearance of performance. North Korea may never have tested missiles from its own production, and any such indigenous missiles cannot have noteworthy reliability or accuracy. It cannot be ruled out that North Korea has nuclear warhead designs for its missiles, but without actual testing, the reliability of these warheads has to be assumed to be low. The main purpose of the program seems to be political — to create the impression of a serious missile threat and thereby gain strategic leverage, fortify the North Korean regime's domestic power, and deter other countries, particularly the Republic of Korea and the United States, from military action.

51. The RAND report on NK missile Threat – 4/4 North Korea should be considered to possess no real long-range missile threat, but steps should be taken to defend against a conventional short-range threat. Concerns about North Korea's missile launches are overblown: Every launch further depletes the limited North Korean arsenals, and North Korea gains no real experience from these events. Since the purpose of the launches seems to be political, the United States and other nations should downplay or even ignore them. A variety of avenues of investigation should be pursued to gain more information about the North Korean missile program.

52. What the US SEDEF said on NK Missiles “I think that North Korea will have developed an intercontinental ballistic missile within that time frame. I believe they will have a very limited capability” 11.1.2010 “With the continued development of long-range missiles and potentially a road mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, and their continued development of nuclear weapons, North Korea is in the process of becoming a direct threat to the United States” 4.6.2011 “North Korea now constitutes a direct threat to the United States. The president told [China’s] President Hu that last year. They are developing a road-mobile ICBM. I never would have dreamed they would go to a road-mobile before testing a static ICBM” 21.6.2011 Robert Gates, former US SECDEF

53. US SECDEF Leon Panetta on Iran’s missiles ““Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems by improving accuracy and developing new submunition payloads” that extend the destructive power over a wider area than a solid warhead, according to the June 29 (2012) report signed by U.S. Defense Secretary Panetta. “The report seemed pretty sober and respectful of Iran’s capabilities, crediting Iran with improving survivability,” (Congressional Research Service Iran analyst Kenneth Katzman ) Leon Panetta, US SECDEF

54. Pentagon’s urgent assessment of North Korean mobile ICBM threat The Pentagon’s Joint Staff is conducting an urgent threat assessment of North Korea’s new road-mobile missile and the danger it poses to the United States. The classified assessment is being done for Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on an expedited basis, said defense officials familiar with the effort. “This is an expedited examination of the North Korean ICBM threat specifically for the chairman,” one official said. A Joint Staff spokesman declined to comment on the North Korean ICBM assessment. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Published on February 12.2013

55. Pentagon’s urgent assessment of North Korean mobile ICBM threat The Joint Staff assessment was ordered following recent intelligence reports indicating development work on the North Korean KN-08 mobile ICBM is nearing completion. Several KN-08s were spotted moving around North Korea in January. The assessment is also expected to address whether North Korea will share the mobile ICBM technology with Iran. The KN-08 ICBM was first disclosed in April 2012 during a military parade. Officials said it represents a new level of threat to the United States because although it has yet to be flight-tested, U.S. intelligence agencies believe it will be able to range Alaska, Hawaii, and the western United States. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Published on February 12.2013