1. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE Some topics and historical issues of the 20 th century

2. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY VS. THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE The philosophy of language is concerned with certain philosophical questions concerning language. Linguistic philosophy is a movement in philosophy that attempts to solve or dissolve certain philosophical problems by analyzing language in various ways.

3. CENTRAL QUESTIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE What is the nature of meaning? In virtue of what does language relate to the world? What is the relation between truth, language, and the world? What are the atomic units of meaning, and how do they relate to form compound units of meaning?

4. FREGE’S PUZZLE The meaning of ‘a’ and ‘b’ is exhausted by what they refer to. ‘a = b’ is true. ‘a = a’ is knowable a priori. ‘a = b’ is not knowable a priori. How can all of the claims above be true?

5. FREGE’S THEORY OF SENSE AND REFERENCE All terms have two components of meaning. The sense of an expression is its mode of presentation. The referent of an expression is what it refers to in the world. While ‘The morning star’ and ‘The evening star’ differ in their mode of presentation, they refer to the same thing in the world.

6. THE PROBLEM OF BELIEF CONTEXTS Lois believes that Clark Kent cannot fly. If a = b, then ‘a’ is substitutable for ‘b’ in a context C, without changing the truth-value of the sentence S in which C occurs. Clark Kent = Superman. So, Lois believes that Superman cannot fly. Question: How can we explain the invalidity of the inference?

7. FREGE’S ACCOUNT OF INDIRECT CONTEXTS I Direct context: sentence is not embedded in a propositional attitude. Superman can fly. Indirect context: sentence is embedded in a propositional attitude. Lois believes that Superman can fly.

8. FREGE’S ACCOUNT OF INDIRECT CONTEXTS II: DIRECT CONTEXT SubjectPredicateSentence Supermancan flySuperman can fly Sense ReferencePersonExtension of Predicate Truth-Value

9. FREGE’S ACCOUNT OF INDIRECT CONTEXTS II: INDIRECT CONTEXT SubjectPredicateObject LoisBelievesSuperman can fly Sense Sense 2 ReferenceLoisbelief relationSense 1

10. COMPOSITIONALITY Compositionality of Sense: The sense of a sentence is determined by the sense of its parts and their mode of combination. Sense of ‘Superman can fly’ is the combination of the sense of ‘Superman’ and ‘can fly’. The referent of a compound is determined by the relation of combination of their referents. The referent of ‘Superman can fly’ is determined by whether the object picked out by ‘Superman’ is a member of the set of objects picked out by the predicate ‘can fly’.

11. THE DEBATE BETWEEN FREGE AND MILL Frege maintains that the proper names, such as ‘James Bond’ have both a sense and a reference. Mill maintains that proper names, such as ‘James Bond’ have only a referent. Frege holds that proper names have a mode of presentation of their objects. Mill denies that proper names have any meaning directly associated with them.

12. KRIPKE ON AGAINST FREGE Suppose that the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ is given by some description associated with the name, such as the most famous student of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the great. Kripke argues as follows: ‘Aristotle is the most famous student of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the great’ is analytic. If the sentence is analytic, it is necessary. However, it is possible that Aristotle never studied philosophy, and never taught Alexander the great. So, the sentence is not necessary, and thus not analytic.

13. KRIPKE’S ARGUMENT AGAINST FREGE Kripke is trying to establish that the Fregean theory of meaning is false for proper names. He is attempting to do so by showing that for any proper name where we find a meaning we want to attach to it we can construct a modal argument to show that the sentence is not necessary, and thus not analytic. His argument has been taken to be a partial defense of the Millian theory of proper names.

14. CONCEPTUAL ROLE SEMANTICS The meaning of a symbol or expression is given by the role it plays in the cognition. The meaning is ‘red’ is given by the inferences we would make to and from sentences involving the ‘red’. Other terms used to identify it: Inferential or Functional Role Semantics Meaning is given by how one uses words – the inferences they make from their uses of words.

15. RUSSELL ON LOGICAL ANALYSIS I Standard Model of Truth: A sentence of the form S is P is true just in case the entity picked out by the subject of the sentence is a member of the set of entities picked out by the predicate of the sentence. Example: “John is tall.” just in case the entity picked out by ‘John’ is a member of the set of things picked out by the predicate ‘is tall’.

16. RUSSELL ON LOGICAL ANALYSIS II Consider the following two sentences: John is tall. Someone is tall. If we use the standard model of truth, which we applied to the first sentence, for the second sentence, then we would have to say the following: ‘Someone is tall’ just in case the entity picked out by ‘someone’ is in the set of things that are tall.

17. RUSSELL ON LOGICAL ANALYSIS III Analysis of “someone is tall.” Grammatical subject ‘Someone’ is actually the logical predicate. Grammatical predicate ‘is tall’ is actually the logical subject. Outcome: The predicate ‘is tall’ is true sometimes.

18. RUSSELL ON LOGICAL ANALYSIS IV The present king of France is bald. On the standard model of truth the sentence is true just in case: The entity picked out by the subject of the sentence ‘The present king of France’ is in the set of things that are bald. Given that there is no present king of France, we have an open question as to what the truth-value of the sentence is. This potentially could lead to a violation of the law of excluded middle: every sentence is either true or false.

19. RUSSELL ON LOGICAL ANALYSIS V Russell argues that phrases involving definite descriptions, such as ‘the….’, can be analyzed as follows: The present king of France is bald. There exists one and only one king of France. it has the property of being bald. Given the analysis, the sentence is false because the existence claim is false.

20. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY: THE CASE OF SKEPTICISM I The Cartesian Skeptic can be taken to offer the following kind of argument: 1. S knows that P only if S can rule out SK. 2. S cannot rule out that SK. 3. So, S does not know that P. External world skepticism is generated by letting SK stand for a hypothesis equal in strength to the evil-demon scenario.

21. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY: THE CASE OF SKEPTICISM II Norman Malcolm, an ordinary language philosopher of the 20 th century attempted to give a refutation of the skeptical argument. Malcolm’s refutation is motivated by consideration of how ordinary language works. His argument is an extension of an argument given by G.E. Moore, and discussed at length by Wittgenstein in his work On Certainty.

22. LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY: THE CASE OF SKEPTICISM III 1. In order for a person to learn how to correctly use the word ‘know’, in terms of making 1 st person and 3 rd person attributions, such as ‘I know that P’ or ‘He knows that P’, the person must have learned the word ‘know’ from some correct cases of use. 2. According to the skeptic there are no correct cases in which ‘know’ is applied to the external world, since we cannot know anything about the external world. 3. So, the skeptic’s position is inconsistent with what it would take for us to learn the word ‘know’. 4. We do correctly use the word ‘know’ on some occasions. 5. So, skepticism about the external world is false.