Reminder: Definition of Computation Symbol system Symbol shapes arbitrary Symbol manipulations (algorithms) all syntactic (based on shape, not meaning) Implementation-independent Semantically interpretable (meaningful)
“Strong AI” (“Computationalism” or “Cognitivism” “Mind is a computer program” (I.e., cognition is computation) “Brain is Irrelevant” (I.e., computation is implementation-independent) Turing Test is Decisive (I.e., the T2-passing symbol system has a mind)
Chinese Room Argument Suppose SS is the T2-passing symbol system (passes in Chinese, so has a mind, understands Chinese) Because computation is implementation-independent, every implementation of SS understands Chinese Searle implements SS -- but fails to understand Chinese
What went wrong? System Reply: “Searle doesn’t understand, the system does” (but Searle is the system!) Turing Test is at fault (T2 perhaps, but T3?) Symbol Grounding Problem (symbols and T2 are not enough: symbol meanings must be grounded via T3
The Symbol Grounding Problem Chinese/Chinese Dictionary-Go-Round Grounding symbols in T3 (robotic) capacity Neural nets and other nonsymbolic (analog, dynamic) functions Hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic systems Categorical Perception (sensorimotor “toil” Dictionary Grounding (symbolic “theft”)
Dennett on Robotics and Reverse-Engineering Dennett is a behaviourist/instrumentalist For him, mental capacities are just behavioural capacities Hence TT capacity = mind Reverse-engineering the mind is reverse-engineering its behavioural capacities Robotics is the way to design and test theories of mind
Critiques of connectionism Cognition may not be just computation, but is it just connectionism either? Pinker/Prince’s critique of Perceptron past-tense learning Pylyshyn/Fodor’s critique of “systematicity”
Chalmers on Computation What is computation for Chalmers? “Reconfiguring hardware” via software What can be reconfigured into what, via software? Can a computer be reconfigured into a plane? Why should thinking (cognition) differ from flying?