Alberto Pasquini – Deep Blue Safety Assessment in MFF ASAS TN2 3-5 April 2006, Rome MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/2006 1/19

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/2006 2/19  Content of the presentation  Safety objective in MFF  Process adopted (SAM and ED78A)  Main results  Benefits and problems experienced

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/2006 3/19 Safety Analysis Show evidence of Safety Provide early feed- back to project Provide reusable results  Safety Objective – Overall Approach

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/2006 4/19  Safety Objective – Evidence of Safety  In line with EATMP Safety Policy and ATM Strategy  Guarantee that the adoption of MFF procedures do not increase and, where possible, decrease the number of ATM induced accidents  Reference figures for ATM induced accidents available only for most severe events

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/2006 5/19  Safety Objective – Early Feedback  Three releases of the Safety Case  Three releases of the validation document with synthesis of the results  Share of safety investigation phases with other project working areas  Joint workshops with other project working areas

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/2006 6/19  Safety Objective – Reusable results  Adoption of Standard Methodologies  Definition of templates  Clear specification of the assumptions

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/2006 7/19  Process Adopted – The references  Safety Policy and Plan designed to satisfy the ESARR4 requirements  Methodology mainly based on the application of the EUROCAE ED78A guidelines and on the Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) of Eurocontrol  Safety Assessment submitted to the Safety Regulation Commission

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/2006 8/19 Hazard ConsequenceLikelihood Risk  Process Adopted – Risk Based Approach

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/2006 9/19  Process Adopted – Acceptability of Risk

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19 Identification of the Operational Scenarios for the application of the MFF procedures (OSED) Identification of potential hazards and of the severity of their consequences (OHA) Evaluation of acceptability (with reference to frequency), and safety requirements for limitation of non acceptable hazards or mitigation of their consequences (ASOR) Assessment of the achievement of the Safety Requirements (SSA) MFF Scope  Process Adopted – Scope of Safety Assessment in MFF

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19 OHA Past Projects Meetings with operational experts Expert opinions  Process Adopted – OHA

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  Process Adopted – Role of Operational Experience  Mainly speculative work to be completed with empirical evidence  Need for additional information concerning aspects such as: detectability, mitigation ability, consequences, credibility, related hazards  Use of the RTS to reproduce and study some potential hazards (specific “traffic sample” and cooperation of pseudopilots)

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  Process Adopted – ASOR - I Hazards with associated consequences (from OHA) What likelihood of this event can be accepted ? Is risk acceptable or is mitigation needed ?

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  Process Adopted – ASOR - II Hazards requiring mitigation Identification of basic events leading to the hazards Safety Requirements preventing or reducing likelihood of basic events

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  Process Adopted – Role of Operational Experience  Validation workshops with operational experts (controllers and pilots)  Selection of experts who experienced potential problems when using the MFF procedures during simulation  Hazards and safety requirements clustered and analysed using examples and visual support

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  Process Adopted – The results  ASAS Spacing is a consolidated concept for which feasible safety requirements have been identified  Main hazards associated with the use of a wrong target and delegation  Crossing and passing not acceptable as part of the ASAS spacing application because of major difficult to afford safety problems  ASAS Separation less consolidated and less validated concept for which only major safety requirements have been identified

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  Benefits and problems - I  State of the art approach incorporating SRC feedback and compliant with existing standard references  Interactions between project working areas and between participants  Deep and progressive involvement of operational experts (beneficial for both)

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  Benefits and problems - II  Lack of quantitative references for Safety Assessment (but for most severe events)  Lack of statistic significance of the information elicited from operational experts  Uncertainty in the quantification of basic events (especially human errors)  Cost of the approach (justifiable in a context facilitating re-use)

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  Questions ? Alberto Pasquini Deep Blue

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  An Example - I Target 1 Delegated 1 Target 2 Delegated 2 8 Nm Wrong target in ASAS Spacing

MFF | SAFETY in MFF MENU: COVER | SUMMARY | OVERVIEW | TASKS | ALLOCATIONSCOVER SUMMARY OVERVIEWTASKSALLOCATIONS ROME 3-5/4/ /19  An Example - II  Does the controller “feel” responsible for the separation even if the action of maintaining the distance has been delegated ?  Does he assign correct priority to related actions ?  Are the related tools offering adequate support for the activity ?  Is ASAS interfering with the possible emergency manoeuvre ?