Overcoming the Resource Curse in African States: Examining the Effectiveness of the Developmental State Framework on Economic Development in Resource-Rich.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Research Proposal PIDE and Iran. Prudent economic management is essential for putting the economies on the path of sustainable economic growth. Over the.
Advertisements

GAMBIA COMPETITION COMMISSION GAMBIA COMPETITION COMMISSION Levelling the Field for Development BY : EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 5 TH JUNE 2013.
Do Institutions Cause Growth?
Government’s Role in Economy
Two theories: Government ownership of banks (GOB) should be more prevalent in poorer countries, with less developed financial markets, with less well-
Analysis of Governance in Agriculture – A conceptual Framework and Applications Suresh Babu International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC.
What Role for Entrepreneurship in Economic Development? Peter J. Boettke 2004 Hayek Fellow, LSE Oxford University October 12, 2004.
Development Economics ECON 4915 Lecture 6 Andreas Kotsadam.
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL OIL Trade Structure and Growth SAMUEL A SARKODIE In Daniel Lederman and William F. Maloney’s Natural Resources:
Quality of government and the returns of European regional policies Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, LSE with Jose Enrique Garcilazo, OECD Università di Bologna.
Assessing Law and Order The Lesson from the Global Competitiveness Index and the Growth Competitiveness Index  Irene Mia  Senior Economist  Global Competitiveness.
Openness, Economic Growth, and Human Development: Evidence from South Asian countries from Middlesex University Department of Economics and.
Inequality and Economic Growth: Do Natural Resources Matter?
DECENTRALIZATION AND RURAL SERVICES : MESSAGES FROM RECENT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE Graham B. Kerr Community Based Rural Development Advisor The World Bank.
By Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, 2001
Political institutions. I. Unbundling institutions, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) Two theories of the state 1. Contract theory: the state provides the legal.
Prepared by Arabella Volkov University of Southern Queensland.
Globalization, Veto Players and Welfare Spending Written by Eunyoung Ha Comparative Politics Pietro Besozzi.
Financial Development and International Agricultural Trade D. Susanto and C. P. Rosson Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University College.
Policy Issues of EDRC Models Ex-ante Poverty Impact Assessment of Macroeconomic Policies International Workshop Washington, D.C. October 14-15, 2003 Aghasi.
Health spending, utilization and governance in decentralized Indonesia Robert Sparrow and Menno Pradhan.
Bureaucratic Structure and Performance: New Evidence from Africa The United Nations University Julius Court, Office of the Rector.
Investment Climate & Foreign Direct Investment in Africa
Institute for Economics and Peace
Measuring & Monitoring Governance in Developing Countries Stephen Knack The World Bank 2 nd International Roundtable Marrakesh, Feb
Corruption: Definition, Quantification and Measurement Shrabani Saha Lecturer Department of Economics and Finance Massey University.
The Natural Resource Curse Methods II Data Presentation September 21, 2007 Tom Dugan.
Economic and Social equality: oil and gas TACOSODE Theofrida Kapinga and Theophilus Mlaki.
Labour Market Inequality in India and Brazil: Comparing Labour Market Institutions in India and Brazil Taniya Chakrabarty 18th December 2014.
Determinants of Fiscal Capacity: history, geography or politics? Antonio Savoia, with R. Ricciuti and Kunal sen Effective States and Inclusive Development.
Resource Curse and Policy Innovation at the Local Level: Evidence from Shanxi Province in China Ping Zhang, Fudan University Yaozu Xue, Shanxi University.
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. Why a Rule of Law Coalition for Business?
NS4053 Winter Term 2014 Country/Region Indices. Country Indices/Rankings I There are a number of organizations that provide rankings of countries based.
Growth, Initial Conditions, Law and Speed of Privatization in Transition Countries: 11 Years Later presented at Conference “Comparative Transitions: A.
An Introduction to Good Governance The concept of good governance in the modern world is not even 25 years old. However, in India, this concept is as old.
Regime Type and Economic Development By James Mazol.
GOVERNANCE & ANTICORRUPTION An Introductory Course.
COUNTRY RISK ANALYSIS The concept evolved in 1960s and 1970s in response to the banking sector's efforts to define and measure its loss exposure in cross-border.
Deepening Integration in SADC - Macroeconomic Policies and Their Impact South African Country Study 3rd – 6th April 2006 Zambezi Sun Hotel, Livingstone,
Political economy of tax regimes in South Asia: The Context By G. Shabbir Cheema Director Asia-Pacific Governance and Democracy Initiative East-West Center.
Comments: “Inflation Targeting Framework for Jamaica: An Empirical Exploration” Myriam Quispe-Agnoli Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Conference on Inflation.
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation A presentation in the context of institutions and coordination failure.
Addressing the resource curse? NS4053 Week 7.2.
Governance Indicators at AfDB Stephen Bahemuka May, 2012 African Development Bank.
Aid, Policies and Growth Craig Burnside and David Dollar The American Economic Review September, 2000 AZIRIA Lemya & EL MALLAKH Nelly.
NS4540 Winter Term 2015 Country Indices. Country Indices/Rankings I There are a number of organizations that provide rankings of countries based on factors.
An Empirical Test of “Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions”: Evidence from land reforms around the world, Pablo Jimenez-Ayora; Prasad.
Governance in Central and Eastern Europe Cheryl W. Gray Europe and Central Asia Region World Bank.
PHYSICAL INVESTMENT, HEALTH INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS IN AFRICA By Abiodun O. Folawewo and Adeniyi Jimmy Adedokun Department of Economics,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS: Firm Level Evidence from Chilean industrial sector. Leopoldo LabordaDaniel Sotelsek University of.
ITCILO/ACTRAV COURSE A Capacity Building for Members of Youth Committees on the Youth Employment Crisis in Africa 26 to 30 August 2013 Macro Economic.
AN ANALYIS OF THE GROWTH-HEALTH RELATIONSHIP IN NIGERIA By M. Adetunji BABATUNDE Department of Economics, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
Noncompetitive division charts and policy questions The following pages provide a range of indicators (listed in alphabetical order) that you can use to.
Indonesia in Perspective’s Study Case Corruption in IndonesiaCauses of CorruptionLesson Learned.
Institutional-Anomie, Political Corruption, and Homicide Rates Jerry K. DadayWestern Kentucky University Lisa M. Broidy University of New Mexico Dale Willits.
Competition Policy and Economic Growth: Evidence from Latin America Esteban Greco Diego Petrecolla Carlos A. Romero.
Dictatorship, Patronage and Public Good Provision
Adnan MS Fakir Azraf Uddin Ahmad K M Masnun Hosain
Namibia: DORMANT POTENTIAL
Suriname: What Policy Reforms Work Best for Diversification
Development and Growth in Mineral-Rich Countries
FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND POVERTY: ARE WE GETTING IT RIGHT?
Inequality and Economic Growth: Do Natural Resources Matter?
Government’s Role in Economy
Structural Change: Pace, Patterns and Determinants
GOVERNANCE & ANTICORRUPTION
Performance of Fiscal Rules
Addressing the resource curse?
Model and Hypothesis Table Explanation of Variables
Presentation transcript:

Overcoming the Resource Curse in African States: Examining the Effectiveness of the Developmental State Framework on Economic Development in Resource-Rich African Countries Jody-Ann Jones

Outline of Presentation Introduction Context Research Problem ▫ Botswana: An African Developmental State Research Question Research Argument Research Design Core Elements of the Developmental State (Leftwich) Core Elements of the Botswana Developmental State (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson) Operationalizing the Core Elements of the Developmental State Measurement Issues Model One’s Hypotheses Model Two’s Hypotheses Methodology Model One’s Findings Model Two’s Findings Implications of the Study Conclusion

Introduction: Resource Abundance in Africa Source: U.S. Geological Survey, "2009 Minerals Yearbook: Africa," U.S. Department of the Interior (September 2011).

Context The Resource Curse thesis (Sachs and Warner, 1999; Ross, 1999; Auty, 2001; Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007): ▫ The abundance in natural resources is inversely correlated with economic development because of several factors:  Dutch Disease  Vulnerability to Market Price Volatility  Rent-Seeking

Research Problem

Botswana: A Developmental State What is a developmental state? ▫ Adrian Leftwich describes the developmental state as “those states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy, capacity and legitimacy at the center to shape, pursue, and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives” (Leftwich, 2000).

Research Question To what extent does the developmental state framework mitigate the resource curse, and hence improve economic development in resource-rich African states?

Research Argument I argue that it is not the abundance of natural resources that causes low development, but rather it is the absence of key aspects of the developmental state model. Conversely, the presence of elements of the developmental state model in resource-rich African countries should be associated with higher levels of economic development as illustrated in Botswana.

Research Design In order to assess the efficacy of the developmental state framework, I empirically test the effects of the operationalized concepts from the developmental state literature on economic development (measured by GDP per capita) In terms of African developmental states, two seminal texts are Adrian Leftwich’s States of Development and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s article “An African Success Story: Botswana.”

The Developmental State (Leftwich) Developmental Elite Relative State Autonomy Bureaucratic Power Weak Civil Society Strong Capacity in Managing State’s Economic Interests Weak Human Rights Legitimacy i.e. Widespread Support for the Regime in Power Core Elements of

Core Elements of the Botswana Developmental State (Acemoglu et. al) Basic system of law and contract Limitation of state and private predation Relatively noncorrupt bureaucracy Government investment in infrastructure and public goods Prudent fiscal policy Strong private property institutions

Operationalizing the Core Elements of “The Developmental State” Model One (Leftwich)Model Two (Acemoglu et. al) Developmental Elite  Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index Law and Contract  African Development Indicators 'Time Required to Enforce a Contract Relative State Autonomy  Polity IV’s Polity Limitation of State Predation  Polity IV’s Executive Constraint Bureaucratic Power  African Development Indicators’ Government Effectiveness Relatively Noncorrupt Bureaucracy  Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index Influence and Capacity to Manage Economic Interests  World Bank’s Doing Business Index Investment in Public Goods  African Development Indicators’ Education Spending as a percentage of Government Expenditure and Health Spending as a percentage of Government Expenditure Weak Human Rights  African Development Indicators’ Participation and Human Rights Prudent Fiscal Policy  African Development Indicators’ Fiscal Balance State Legitimacy  Polity IV’s Durable Strong Private Property Institutions  African Development Indicators’ Time Required to Register Private Property

Measurement Issues In order to measure the strength of the civil society, I use the GINI Index of Inequality. However, because of the lack of sufficient data coverage for this variable, it was omitted from the data analysis.

Model One’s Hypotheses H 1: States that score higher on the corruption perception index should be associated with higher levels of development. I predict a positive relationship between CPI and GDP per capita. H 2: States that exercise greater autonomy from interest groups should be associated with a higher level of development. I predict a negative relationship between POLITY and GDP per capita. H 3: States that exercise greater bureaucratic power, should be associated with a higher level of development. I predict a positive relationship between government effectiveness and GDP per capita. H 4: States that exercise a greater capacity to manage their economic interests should be associated with a higher level of development. I predict a negative relationship between the doing business index and GDP per capita. H 5: States that score lower on the participation and human rights index should be associated with a higher level of development. I predict a negative relationship between participation and human rights and GDP per capita. H 6: States with longer regime durability should be associated with a higher level of development. I predict a positive relationship between regime durability and GDP per capita.

Model Two’s Hypotheses H 1: States that require less time (or less calendar days) to enforce contractual obligations should be associated with a higher level of development. I predict a negative relationship between the time required to enforce a contract and economic GDP per capita. H 2: States with a higher degree of executive constraint should be associated with a higher level of development. I predict that there is a positive relationship between executive constraint and GDP per capita. H 3: States that score higher on the corruption perception index should be associated with higher levels of development. I predict a positive relationship between CPI and GDP per capita. H 4a: States that spend more on education as a percentage of their government expenditure should be associated with a higher level of economic development. ▫ H 4b : States that spend more on health as a percentage of their government expenditure should be associated with a higher level of economic development. I expect a positive relationship between the public goods variables and GDP per capita. H 5: States that maintain a higher fiscal balance should be associated with a higher level of economic development. I predict a positive relationship between fiscal balance and GDP per capita. H 6: States that require less time to register private property should be associated with a higher level of development. Thus, I predict a negative relationship between the time required to register private property and GDP per capita.

Methodology In order to test these hypotheses, I analyze two time-series cross-sectional multiple regression models for the period based on data collected from the World Bank’s African Development Indicators, Doing Business Index, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, and the Polity IV Project.

Model One’s Findings Table 1: Model One's Coefficients Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients tSig. BStd. ErrorBeta 1 (Constant) Resource Abundant Dummy Corruption Perceptions Index (score) Revised Combined Polity Score Government Effectiveness (estimate) Ease of doing business index (1=most business- friendly regulations) Participation and Human Rights Regime Durability a. Dependent Variable: GDP per capita (current US$)

Model Two’s Findings Table 2: Model Two’s Coefficients Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients tSig. BStd. ErrorBeta 2 (Constant) Resource Abundant Dummy Time required to enforce a contract (days) Executive Constraints Corruption Perceptions Index (score) Public spending on education, total (% of government expenditure) Health expenditure, public (% of government expenditure) Fiscal balance, cash surplus/deficit (current US$) Time required to register property (days) a. Dependent Variable: GDP per capita (current US$)

Implications of the Study In order to better understand the economic dynamics of resource-rich African countries, we need to look at three important dimensions: ▫ Corruption ▫ Regime Legitimacy and Stability ▫ Private Property Institutions

Conclusion This study’s empirical evidence supports its research argument that not all African countries encounter the resource curse. The resource curse thesis states that countries which are highly endowed with natural resources tend to experience lower economic growth and subsequently lower economic development. However, the statistical results from the models tell us that the resource-rich African countries that experience relatively higher levels of development incorporate elements of the developmental state framework to some extent. Botswana has utilized this framework to some degree and has had remarkable economic success. Possibly, a solution to the resource curse in other resource-rich African states is to adopt the key elements of the developmental state framework based on this study’s findings: 1) decrease the incidents of public sector corruption, 2) improve the legitimacy and stability of their regimes, and 3) enhance their private property institutions.