Low Power and Shutdown PSA IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country.

Slides:

Advertisements

Similar presentations

Operation & Maintenance Engineering Detailed activity description

Advertisements

Risk Management Introduction Risk Management Fundamentals

WGOE Meeting – 29/31 May 2006 Sub-directorate for power reactors DGSNR – SD2 - 1 Organisation of the operating experience and incident.

PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT

International Energy Agency Hydrogen Implementing Agreement Proposed Task on Hydrogen Safety.

RISK INFORMED APPROACHES FOR PLANT LIFE MANAGEMENT: REGULATORY AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES Björn Wahlström.

NFPA-805 Duke Power Transition – Lessons Learned

MODULE “PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL” EMERGENCY PLANNING SAFE DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Project BG/04/B/F/PP , Programme “Leonardo.

Lindy Hughes Fleet Fire Protection Program Engineer Southern Nuclear Operating Company June 4, 2013 Fire Protection.

Framatome ANP IP-EUROTRANS Meeting WP 1.5 Progress in safety approach development TEE, March Sophie EHSTER.

PSAEA – CNRA Conference on OEF (Köln, 29-31/05/2006) The relationship between risk analysis and event analysis – PSA based Event Analysis P. De Gelder.

AREVA NP EUROTRANS WP1.5 Technical Meeting Task – ETD Safety approach Safety approach for EFIT: Deliverable 1.21 Stockholm, May Sophie.

Title slide PIPELINE QRA SEMINAR. PIPELINE RISK ASSESSMENT INTRODUCTION TO HAZID 2.

Event Trees Quantitative Risk Analysis. Event Trees - Overview Definitions Steps Occurrence frequency Mean Time between Shutdown Mean Time Between Runaway.

Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 112 Communicating Internal Control Related Matters Identified in an Audit.

SISIFO-GAS A COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM TO SUPPORT SEVERE ACCIDENTS TRAINING AND MANAGEMENT WGRisk Workshop March 29-31, 2004 Köln, Germany César Serrano.

Fukushima Incident Preliminary Analysis, Consequences and Safety Status of Indian NPPs Part-1 Dr. S.K.Jain Chairman & Managing Director NPCIL & BHAVINI.

Risk Management - the process of identifying and controlling hazards to protect the force.  It’s five steps represent a logical thought process from.

IRSN STRATEGY TO ASSESS A NEW MAINTENANCE POLICY / Nesebar, Bulgaria Presented by Naoëlle MATAHRI, IRSN.

(Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, March 2004 ) 1 International Workshop On Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management Hosted by:

Margin Management. PAGE 2 Margin Management Plant Shutdowns 1.Late 1990’s – numerous “surprise” long-term plant shutdowns 2.Shutdowns resulted when a.

Risk Management 3-1 Chapter 3. Learning Objectives Define risk. Define risk management. Discuss the meaning of and the process for risk identification.

9 th Workshop on European Collaboration for Higher Education and Research in Nuclear Engineering & Radiological Protection Salamanca, Spain 5-7 June 2013.

Programme Performance Criteria. Regulatory Authority Objectives To identify criteria against which the status of each element of the regulatory programme.

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Event Summary and FPL/DAEC Actions.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUES.

TACIS Project: R8.01/98 – TRANSLATION, EDITING AND DIFFUSION OF DOCUMENTS (Result Dissemination) Probabilistic Safety Analysis Technology (PSA) TACIS R3.1/91.

System Monitoring at the DAEC SysMon SMART Teaming up to get the most out of System Monitoring!

ASPEC Damaging Energies New Staff Induction What is this course about? This course is designed to talk through the major damaging energies on site. It.

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency INTRODUCTION Module 2.

2011 PLANT OPERATIONS MODULE 8 Maintain Bulk Plant Systems and Equipment.

Diablo Canyon NPP Risk-Informed In-service Inspection

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making System Analysis Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country XX - XX Month,

Risk-informed On-Line Maintenance at Cofrentes NPP IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA.

Human Reliability HUMAN RELIABILITY HUMAN ERROR

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop Defence in Depth Safety Culture Lecturer.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Common Cause Failure Analysis Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Temelin NPP Risk Panel A PSA and Safety Monitor Application Workshop Information.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Diablo Canyon NPP Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program Workshop Information.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Overview of Risk Informed Inspection Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City,

Safety Assessment of General Design Aspects of NPPs (Part 2) IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Diablo Canyon NPP Proposed Fire Risk Meter Workshop Information IAEA Workshop.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making PSA Quantification. Analysis of Results Workshop Information IAEA Workshop.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop Safety Assessment Process. Plant Modification.

Initiating Event Analysis IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country.

RISK MANAGEMENT FOR COMMUNITY EVENTS. Today’s Session Risk Management – why is it important? Risk Management and Risk Assessment concepts Steps in the.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Diablo Canyon NPP Maintenance Rule Program Workshop Information IAEA Workshop.

Workshop on Risk informed decision making on nuclear power plant safety January 2011 SNRC, Kyiv, Ukraine Practical examples of RIDM application.

Stoimen Stoimenov QA Engineer SitefinityLeads,SitefinityTeam6 Telerik QA Academy Telerik QA Academy.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making “Overview of Level 2 PSA” Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country.

Workshop on Risk informed decision making on nuclear power plant safety January 2011 SNRC, Kyiv, Ukraine Benefits and limitations of RIDM by Géza.

Use and Conduct of Safety Analysis IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decission Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop Lecturer.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Risk Monitoring tools: Requirements of Risk Monitors, relation with the Living.

Version 1.0, May 2015 SHORT COURSE BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module V Safety classification of structures, systems and components This material.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop Licensing Renewal of Operating License Periodic.

Version 1.0, July 2015 BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module VII Probabilistic Safety Assessment Case Studies This material was prepared by the IAEA.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making PSA Fundamentals and Overview Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country.

Version 1.0, May 2015 BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module XX Regulatory control Case Study This material was prepared by the IAEA and co-funded by.

BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module XI Operational limits and conditions Case studies Version 1.0, May 2015 This material was prepared.

BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module V Safety classification of structures, systems and components Case Studies Version 1.0, May 2015.

Diversity analysis for advanced reactor design

Quantitative Risk Assessment

Internal Flooding PRA For APR 1400

BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module III Basic principles of nuclear safety Case Studies Version 1.0, May 2015 This material was prepared.

BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module VII Probabilistic Safety Assessment Case Studies Version 1.0, July 2015 This material was prepared.

BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module VII Probabilistic safety assessment Version 1.0, May 2015 This material was prepared by the IAEA and.

Version 1.0, May 2015 SHORT COURSE

Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Bunker

BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module XX Regulatory control Case Study Version 1.0, May 2015 This material was prepared by the IAEA and.

Presentation transcript:

Low Power and Shutdown PSA IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country XX - XX Month, Year Lecturer Lesson IV 3_10 Lecturer Lesson IV 3_10

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 1  Need to select those that pose the most significant risk. Plant Operating States  Low power and shutdown include many different plant conditions.  A Plant Operating State (POS) is a determined plant condition that can be unmistakably distinguished in respect of its characteristics as far as carrying out a PSA is concerned.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 2 Characteristics to define plant operating states and to select those that represent a greater potential risk of fuel damage: Plant Operating States Definition  Success criteria to assure safety functions.  Similarity of initiating events within the same operating state.  Level of existing residual heat.  Water inventory.  Reactor vessel head and vent status.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 3 Selection of Initiating Events  Analysis of specific initiating events in low power and shutdown modes.  Analysis of initiating events of the full power PSA. Analysis of events which have occurred in similar reactors. Analysis of the actual plant operating experience. Qualitative analysis of possible initiating events at the plant.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 4 Grouping of Initiating Events  The accident sequences they generate are the same.  The consequences they generate are the same.  The requirements and availability of systems are the same.  The success criteria of the safety functions are similar.  The responses of the operating groups are identical.  The state of the containment is the same. Criteria for grouping Initiating Events

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 5 Scenario Definition Scenario  Group of initiating events that could arise in a given POS. Selection Criteria: Availability of systems in each POS. Permanence time in each POS. Level of residual heat in each POS. Consequences which can be extrapolated from the full power PSA.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 6 Accident Sequences and Success Criteria  Similar methodology than in a full power PSA to delineate Accident Sequences.  Success Criteria : Use of success criteria from the full power PSA when applicable. Performance of simple calculation for scenarios with reactor vessel head off.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 7 System Modelling  Consistent methodology with that used in the full power PSA.  Use as much as possible models developed for the full power PSA.  New models for systems not analysed in the full power PSA.  Some systems could be operating with different alignment than in the full power PSA.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 8 Data Analysis  Permanence time in each Plant Operating State (POS)  Use of component reliability data and common cause failure obtained in the full power PSA.  Use of plant-specific data whenever available.  Component unavailability data based on schedules established for plant shutdown.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 9 Human Reliability Analysis (1/3) Differences with respect to HRA in full power operation: Need to actuate equipment manually. Low availability of procedures. Lack of training or experience. Instrumentation and indications not available.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 10 Human Reliability Analysis (2/3)  Type 1 actions: In general full power PSA analysis remains valid. Identification of basic events whose HPE can be affected by the scenario, a new basic events not modelled at full power.  Type 2 actions: Full power PSA: integrated in frequency of the initiating events.. SPSA: two categories:  IEs with dependencies in subsequent actions.  IEs that not present dependencies with subsequent actions.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 11 Human Reliability Analysis (3/3)  Type 3 actions: Evaluations of the impact of the scenario on the way the task are carried out.  Type 4 actions: In full power PSAs normally are not modelled. In SPSA generation of a confusion matrix in accordance with NSAC 60 or expert judgement.  Type 5 actions: Evaluations of the impact of the scenario on the way the tasks are carried out.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 12 Area Initiating Events Internal Fires  Increased human presence: Increased fire frequency. Greater detection and suppression capacity.  Greater number of activities with fire risk.  Presence of larger amounts of transient fuel.  Possible opening of fire barriers.  Possible shutoff of automatic detection and suppression systems.

IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making 13 Area Initiating Events Internal Flooding  Activities involving the transfer of liquids.  Greater number of maintenance activities.  Possible opening of barriers delimiting flood zones.  Possible activation of automatic fire extinguishing systems.