DIPLOMACY Henry Kissinger Chapter 28 Foreign Policy as Geopolitics: Nixon’s Triangular Diplomacy

1. (704) Why did the U.S. need a major reassessment of foreign policy after the Vietnam War? When should such ‘reassessments’ occur?

2. (704) What were the “cracks in the communist monolith” that Kissinger mentioned?

3. (704) What kind of person does Kissinger portray as Nixon being?

4. (705) How did Nixon’s and Wilson’s views of the world differ? What are the implications of each view for a sitting president? Where does our current president fall in this juxtaposition?

5. (705) Was Nixon right in his historical analysis of the conditions for international peace?

6. (706) Do politicians still like to use Wilsonian language?

Wilsonianism idealism Realpolitik pragmatism

7. (707) Explain what Kissinger meant by “putting the Vietnam experience into some perspective.”

8. (707) How did Nixon use strategy and an adept understanding of the press to time the release of the Nixon Doctrine?

9. (708) Should presidents revive Nixon’s annual foreign policy report? If so, when should it be given in relation to the State of the Union address? If no, why?

10. (708) What was the Nixon Doctrine?

11. (708) Why was the Nixon Doctrine’s claim to “keep its treaty commitments” a dubious one?

12. (708) What were the two ambiguities of the ‘shield’ plank of the Nixon Doctrine?

13. (709) Kissinger contends that the Nixon Doctrine was applicable to what part of the world?

Theologists v Psychiatrists “Fathers of Containment” Dulles, Acheson, Ike, McNamara (‘60) Soviet desire for world domination seen as inherent nature (congenital) US must use force (or threat of force) to counter that threat Negotiations are useless (or amoral) until USSR’s intent is changed. In other words, the US most ‘convert’ the enemy Walter Lippman and other critics of containment Lippman, McNamara (’95) and the ‘intellectuals’ Saw Soviet leaders as no different than Americans in their intents and outlooks Sought to connect the ‘doves’ in each government

NIXON TheologistsPsychiatrists American ExceptionalismRealpolitik New Radicals Communism did not need to be defeated. It needed to be survived. Expansion equaled destruction; for if we were truly exceptional, history would prove us correct.

14. (710) Assess the validity of Norman Mailer’s quote on this page?

15. (711) What did John Kenneth Galbraith’s convergence theory state?

16. (711) Is our media still driven by events and not ideas? Give evidence to support your answer.

17. (711) Was Kissinger fair in placing blame on the media for Nixon’s new foreign policy not grabbing the public’s attention?

18. (712) Revaluation of U.S. history: What have been some of America’s ‘specific crusades’ and ‘permanent engagements’?

19. (712) How did Nixon propose to measure success in dealing with the Soviets? According to him, what was needed before any progress would be made? How different is the tone of Nixon’s quote on this page previous administrations? President Nixon escorts Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko into the White House during an official visit. Despite the enormous challenges his administration was facing in Vietnam and Cambodia, Nixon still gave top priority to relations with the communist government of the Soviet Union.

20. (713) What belief of Nixon/Kissinger concerning US-USSR relations had some similarity with the new radicals of US foreign policy? Richard M. Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev meeting during the Soviet Premier's 1973 visit to the U.S., 06/19/1973

21. (713/4) What were the factors that brought both the US and USSR to a point of mutually desired reduced tension?

22. (714) What was Nixon’s perception of linkage and détente?

23. (714) What was the Wohlstetter Paper? Why was it considered ‘one of the truly original articles of the Cold War?” What effect did it have on arms control negotiations?

24. (715) Is preemption a justifiable reason for war? Do you feel Kissinger finds it so?

25. (715) Why did the idea nuclear war cause anxiety on so many levels?

26. (716) How did arms control serve as a dominant topic of debate within the government in the 1970s?

27. (716) What does Kissinger mean when he writes that arms control “made containment more permanent?” Explain the following equation: containment + arms control = stalemate (peace)

28. (717) “The Cold War was an adversarial relationship between the two superpowers.” What (if anything) did Nixon miss in this description?

29. (717/8) How was Nixon’s idea of linkage received? What was his justification for this policy?

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Strategic = First Strike Capability

30. (719) What event opened the way for triangular diplomacy? US Interests Chinese Interests Soviet Interests US Interests Communist Interests

31. (719) How important is symbolic gestures such as refusing to shake hands? Can you provide any analogous examples?

32. (720) Why should it not be surprising that two European leaders saw the opportunities in a Sino-Soviet split? Charles de Gaulle Konrad Adenauer

33. (720) What were the reactions to early attempts to improve Sino-American relations? How did Nixon answer them?

34. (721) Explain the difference between the zero-sum game approach of traditional cold warriors and Nixon/Kissinger’s options-equal- dominance approach to relations with China.

35. (721/2) Why did the 1969 border clashes between the USSR and the PRC raise US suspicions?

36. (722) What were some ‘clues’ that the Soviets were the aggressors in the border clashes with the PRC?

37. (722) Why would a Sino-Soviet war be a disaster for the U.S.?

OUTCOMES OF A SINO-SOVIET WAR USSR WIN: PRC subservient to USSR Population subservient to nuclear power Unified Communist Monolith PRC WIN:Mao with nuclear weapons?!? More radical regime

38. (723) What were Nixon’s first steps in showing a changing policy towards the PRC?

39. (723) What was Nixon’s ‘bold move’ in 1969 concerning Sino-Soviet-American relations?

40. (724) What was unique about Nixon’s promise of assistance to the PRC in the event of a Sino-Soviet war?

41. (725/6) Give some examples of the subtlety of Chinese diplomacy. What was the PRC trying to convey to the U.S. in 1970? Edgar Snow

42. (716) What is the meaning of Mao’s remark to Nixon, “The small issue is Taiwan; the big issue is the world.”

“…occasionally murderous revolutionary…”

43. (727) According to Kissinger how did negotiation styles of Soviet and Chinese leaders differ? Zhou EnlaiBrezhnev and Nixon on White House balcony in 1973 Chairman Mao

45. (729) Where did the Nixon Administration believe the safest place in a the Sino-Soviet split?

44. (728) What did the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué state as shared US-PRC objectives?

46. (731) Did the opening of US-PRC relations sour US-Soviet relations?

47. (732) Why did Nixon’s approach to foreign policy end with Nixon?