WLAN Security1 Security of 802.11 WLAN Máté Szalay

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Presentation transcript:

WLAN Security1 Security of WLAN Máté Szalay

WLAN Security2 Contents Introduction WEP Intercepting Traffic Keystream Reuse Key Management Message Authentication User Authentication Message Confidentiality

WLAN Security3 Contents Introduction WEP Intercepting Traffic Keystream Reuse Key Management Message Authentication User Authentication Message Confidentiality

WLAN Security4 Introduction Wireless LAN IEEE a (5 GHz, 54Mbps) b (2.4 GHz, 11 Mbps) g (2.4 GHz, 6-54 Mbps) PDA, Notebook

WLAN Security5 Contents Introduction WEP Intercepting Traffic Keystream Reuse Key Management Message Authentication User Authentication Message Confidentiality

WLAN Security6 WEP 1 Wired Equivalent Privacy Radio Interface Goals: Privacy/Confidentiality User authentication Message authentication

WLAN Security7 WEP 2 RC4 Checksum Message IV (24) k (40) Keystream

WLAN Security8 WEP 3 – RC4 RC4 Stream cipher 10 times faster than DES Ron Rivest, 1987 (Ron’s Code) Details available since 1994 Variable key size

WLAN Security9 WEP 4 M: message c(M): integrity checksum Key independent! v: IV (Initialization Vector) k: Secret Key P: plaintext P= C: ciphertext C=PRC4(v,k)

WLAN Security10 WEP 5 AB: v,C C=PRC4(v,k) = RC4(v,k)

WLAN Security11 Contents Introduction WEP Intercepting Traffic Keystream Reuse Key Management Message Authentication User Authentication Message Confidentiality

WLAN Security12 Intercepting Traffic Open Radio Waves 2.4 GHz Significant time and equipment costs Modifying WLAN hardware Firmware upgrade

WLAN Security13 Contents Introduction WEP Intercepting Traffic Keystream Reuse Key Management Message Authentication User Authentication Message Confidentiality

WLAN Security14 Keystream reuse 1 Same keystream portion is used to encrypt C 1 and C 2 C 1 C 2 =P 1 P 2 Partial knowledge of some plaintexts Known headers Languages

WLAN Security15 Keystream reuse 2 k is rarely changed WLAN uses per packet IV IV reuse means keystream reuse IV reuse is easy to detect PCMCIA cards set IV to 0 on reset and increment after each packet

WLAN Security16 Keystream reuse 3 24-bit IV Random IV Birthday paradox Per packet IV is recommended by standard 5Mbps, 24-bit IV space is exhausted in less than half a day

WLAN Security17 Exploiting keystream reuse Known headers Plaintext can be “chosen” Building up TCP connection from a known IP address Sending , and waiting for the user to check it over WLAN

WLAN Security18 Decryption Dictionaries IV reuse Plaintexts are learned Keystream segment is also learned Full table: 1500 bytes for 2^24 IVs 24 GB Starting from low IVs Fast and easy decryption

WLAN Security19 Contents Introduction WEP Intercepting Traffic Keystream Reuse Key Management Message Authentication User Authentication Message Confidentiality

WLAN Security20 Key Management Not specified by standard Globally shared array of 4 keys Message contains key ID Practice: one key is used in the entire network Same IV from different users

WLAN Security21 Contents Introduction WEP Intercepting Traffic Keystream Reuse Key Management Message Authentication User Authentication Message Confidentiality

WLAN Security22 Message Authentication - 1 Checksum is linear! C= RC4(v,k) M’=MD C’=C = RC4(v,k) = RC4(v,k)

WLAN Security23 Message Authentication - 2 Injection Checksum is unkeyed! Attacker learns M, C Recovers keystream Can inject any M using the same IV Receiver must accept IV reuse to be compliant

WLAN Security24 Contents Introduction WEP Intercepting Traffic Keystream Reuse Key Management Message Authentication User Authentication Message Confidentiality

WLAN Security25 User Authentication Shared key authentication 128 bit random challenge Must be returned WEP encrypted Intercepting valid authentication Plaintext ciphertext pair is learned Attacker can authenticate without key!

WLAN Security26 Contents Introduction WEP Intercepting Traffic Keystream Reuse Key Management Message Authentication User Authentication Message Confidentiality

WLAN Security27 Message confidentiality AP can decrypt for us Clone packets in WLAN network with different destination IP address IP checksum: problem

WLAN Security28 Conclusions Consider WLAN network “untrusted” Outside the firewall VPN (dialup) Improved key management MCL WLAN solution

WLAN Security29 Thank you for your attention!