Identity-Based Signatures for MANET Routing Protocols draft-dearlove-manet-ibs-00 Christopher Dearlove Presented by Ulrich Herberg.

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Presentation transcript:

Identity-Based Signatures for MANET Routing Protocols draft-dearlove-manet-ibs-00 Christopher Dearlove Presented by Ulrich Herberg

Status Personal draft, intended for WG adoption, Standards Track. Updates RFC 7182 that: Defined an ICV TLV for RFC 5444 packets/messages. Included crypto function and hash function codepoints. Used shared secret key in most specified cases. Is partially mandated for implementation using OLSRv2/NHDP (by RFC 7183). Draft defines two related new crypto function codepoints.

Identity-based signature Defines an identity-based signature (IBS). All routers individually keyed. o Potentially less harm when router compromised. o Possible revocation, information in identity (beyond scope). Routers independently keyed by trusted authority (KMS). o No need to know any other router’s identity in advance. o Additional routers can be added in future, no changes needed. Trusted authority not needed during network operation. o Authority can be kept “out of harm’s way”. Good fit to characteristics of many ad hoc networks.

Drawbacks Trusted authority has to be completely trusted: It can sign anything as anybody. o Possible to destroy it if no new keys will be needed. Implementations based on elliptic curve mathematics: Need suitable mathematical library. Signatures computationally relatively expensive. Signatures larger at same strength than shared key. More that one possible implementation, tradeoff.

Selection RFC 6507: Elliptic Curve-Based Certificateless Signatures for Identity-Based Encryption (ECCSI) Accepted informational RFC. Draft repeats RFC 6507 elliptic curve recommendation. o Also needs hash function, SHA-256 recommended. Does not use “pairings” (bilinear function from elliptic curve to another group) unlike some other IBS cases. o Pairings are expensive, this is faster than cases using them. Larger signature than some IBS cases. o With recommended elliptic curve, signature length is 129 octets (to be compatible with RFC 6507, allows code reuse). o Cannot truncate, need whole signature to verify. o Security level 128 bits (similar to HMAC-SHA-256, 32 octets).

Identity Identity can be anything tied to router. Natural choice is IP address. o Originator address for messages, IP source address for packets. o These may not be suitable (originator address may not be present, source address may not be unique on router). o Also need an option not based on address. Also may want to add to address, e.g. added validity. Can use from RFC Two options: just, address +. o These are the two crypto functions: ECCSI and ECCSI-ADDR. o Like HMAC, these define how to use hash, not just composed. o Verify function, rather than re-sign (impossible) and compare.