CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 20 Jonathan Katz.

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Presentation transcript:

CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 20 Jonathan Katz

Administrative items  Midterm next week –Based on everything from last midterm through today

Zero knowledge (ZK)  ZK proofs can offer deniability and secrecy  A zero-knowledge protocol for graph 3- colorability  Warning: the aim here is simplicity, and many subtleties and details are purposely being ignored

Applications of zero-knowledge  (Deniable) authentication –Generalization of the protocol we saw last time –Again, many subtleties and details omitted!  Anonymous credentials  Group signatures/trusted computing

Anonymity vs. pseudonymity  Anonymity –No one can identify the source of any messages –Unlinkability – cannot even tell that messages originated from the same person  Pseudonymity –No one can identify the source of a set of messages… –…but they can tell that they all came from the same person, with a known pseudonym  There is a broad scale of achievable anonymity… –Best you can hope for is limited by the network size!

Traffic analysis  May be possible to learn who is communicating with whom using traffic analysis  Typically, even if communication is encrypted the headers are not –Need unencrypted headers for routing  How is it possible to communicate anonymously?

Anonymous communication  You are sitting around a table with n people  How do you send an anonymous message to another person?  How do you broadcast a message to everyone without revealing your identity? –Linear-round protocol? –Constant-round protocol (DC-nets)  Is this secure only for “honest-but-curious” behavior, or also for malicious behavior?

Anonymizers  Single anonymizer proxy…  How to achieve bidirectional communication –Note: one side need not know the other  Anonymizers already exist! – –http

Anonymizers  Issues/drawbacks? –Robustness –Useful for hiding the source from the destination; less useful for preventing full-fledged traffic analysis… Unless encryption is used, which it typically would not be  Possible attacks –Latency vs. timing correlation 0-latency solution using spurious messages? –One user sending multiple messages to the same server –Message sizes –Replay attacks