Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 6 The Organization of the Firm.

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Presentation transcript:

Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 6 The Organization of the Firm

Putting forth best effort How do you compensate so workers and managers put forth greatest effort? Keep in mind there are different ways to compensate workers: n hourly n Straight salary n Piece-rate n Commission n Stock options, etc.

The Principal-Agent Problem Occurs when the principal cannot observe the effort of the agent n Example: Shareholders (principal) cannot observe the effort of the manager (agent) n Example: Manager (principal) cannot observe the effort of workers (agents) The Problem: Principal cannot determine whether a bad outcome was the result of the agent’s low effort or due to bad luck

Solving the Problem Between Owners and Managers Internal incentives n Incentive contracts n Stock options, year-end bonuses External incentives n Personal reputation n Potential for takeover

Solving the Problem Between Managers and Workers Profit sharing Revenue sharing Piece rates Time clocks and spot checks