Three Minimal Market Institutions: Theory and Experimental Evidence Martin Shubik, Yale Shyam.

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Three Minimal Market Institutions: Theory and Experimental Evidence Martin Shubik, Yale Shyam Sunder, Yale Jürgen Huber, University of

Outline Presentation of three basic market designs Experimental implementation Results compared to three benchmarks: –General equilibrium –Non-cooperative equilibrium with 10 traders –Zero-intelligence traders (simulation) Concluding remarks and research plans

Market setup (in all three settings) Two goods (A and B) traded for money Each trader endowed with either A or B and money Multiplicative earnings function: Earnings = squareroot(A x B) + net money Money carried over from period to period (not in double auction)

Three Minimal Market Institutions 1.The sell-all model (strategy set dimension 1) 2.The buy-sell model (strategy set dimension 2) 3.The simultaneous double auction model (strategy set dimension 4)

Endowments (Good A/Good B/Money) 200/0/6000 or 0/200/6000 in sell-all 200/0/4000 or 0/200/4000 in buy-sell 20/0/4000 or 0/20/4000 in double-auction 10 traders in each market (5+5)

InitialGENCEPrice ABABABA=B Sell All Buy Sell Double Auction General and Non-cooperative equilibria

Efficiency Buy-sell Sell-all Double auction

Comparison of markets I

Comparison of markets II

Symmetry Buy-sell Sell-all Double auction

Comparison of markets III

Avg. Prices Buy-sell Sell-all Double auction

Trading vol. Buy-sell Sell-all Double auction

Conclusions The non-cooperative and general competitive equilibrium models provide a reasonable anchor to locate the observed outcomes of the three market mechanisms Unlike well known results from many partial equilibrium double auctions, prices and allocations in our double auctions reveal significant and persistent deviations from CGE predictions The market form has a significant influence on allocative efficiency and the return distribution: the outcome paths from the three market mechanisms exhibit significant differences among them.