Miracles: Hume and Howard-Snyder

* For purposes of initial clarity, let's define a miracle as a worldly event that is not explicable by natural causes alone (including human causation). * What sort of events does this definition of miracles preclude? * What examples of events could we cite that would fit the definition?

* We've run into Hume before. * It's important to remember that Hume is an empiricist, "…experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact…" (389c1). * Part of Hume's empiricism is a healthy, active recognition of the limits of cognition from experience. * Experience may tell us that March is a cool month, but we may experience unseasonable warmth or cold. * Of course, sufficient attention to the evidence gives us a ready explanation of such variability.

* Implication of this empiricist point of view? * "A wise man…proportions his belief to the evidence" (389c1). * What sorts of proportions seem appropriate? * For some claims, experience is a reliable guide, sufficient for (basically) absolute claims (the sun will rise tomorrow). * For many other claims, experience provides insufficient or contrary evidence, making assertions a matter of probability (the preponderance of the evidence suggests that tomorrow will be warmer than today).

* Hume explores the implications of this discussion by means of the concept of testimony. * As Hume notes, testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. Much of the world is beyond our ken at any given moment. Our knowledge of this broader context is dependent on testimony. * Given this importance, what epistemological conditions does it seem reasonable to impose on testimony?

* Hume insists that our evaluation of testimony is importantly conditioned by past experience (in general, and in particular). * In general, our evaluation of the reports of others is conditioned by our past experience of the world and of the entities inhabiting it (including human beings). * In particular, our evaluation of the reports of others is conditioned by our experience of the reporters and of the particular circumstances/individuals about whom they report.

* This discussion of the epistemological constraints appropriate to the evaluation of testimony is an opening to a discussion of miracles, because generally miracles are presented to us via testimony. * Hume defines miracles as, "…violation[s] of the laws of nature…" and thus that by definition, "There must…be a uniform experience against every miraculous event…" (390c2-391c1).

* In the context of his analysis of wisely proportioning beliefs, this definition of miracles as contrary to the preponderance of experience locates consideration of miracles in the probabilistic range. * The issue is then to measure or balance the testimony or experience against all of the contrary or competing evidence. * Only if, on balance, it is more likely true than not that a miracle occurred should we accept claims about miracles. * Cr. 391c1-2.

* Hume then considers whether the testimony we have about miracles satisfies the sort of epistemological constraints we would typically consider appropriate. * He first notes that no recorded testimony of miracles is of the sort that we would consider unimpeachable. * He also observes that the context in which miracles are often claimed to have occurred are highly charged and emotional, situations which generally make people credulous, and thus unreliable testifiers. * He makes the common observation that miracles always seem to happen somewhere else. * The miracles of different religions contradict each other, invalidating each others miraculous claims and thus ultimately their own.

* 393c1. * This also means that a common method of "proving" the truth of religion by pointing to miracles is clearly faulty. * That's all right by Hume, because it is faith, not reason, that is the basis of religion. Indeed, for Hume, faith is itself a kind of miracle, coming as it does at the denial of the vast uniformity of our experience (394c2).

* H-S sets himself the task of evaluating Hume's conclusions about miracles. * He chooses as his paradigmatic example the resurrection. * As the argument would conclude about any purported miracle, Hume's position would be that the claim that Jesus was resurrected falls afoul of the epistemological constraints governing testimony and thus that it is most likely that there was no resurrection. * H-S identifies two possible arguments justifying this conclusion, and argues that neither of them work.

* One argument, which H-S agrees is not really Hume's, is that miracles are strictly speaking not just improbable, but impossible. * As H-S reconstructs it, this argument is best formalized as follows: 1.By definition, miracles are violations of the laws of nature. 2.By definition, laws of nature cannot be violated. 3.Consider the possibility that a miracle occurs. 4.If 3, then a law of nature was violated. 5.But, 2, so 3 must be false. * The argument is formally valid, so if there's a problem it's with the premises. 1 and 2 are the questionable ones.

* Premise 2 asserts that laws of nature cannot be violated, but it is important to consider what sort of 'laws' we are talking about here. * H-S draws a distinction between laws as descriptions and laws as prescriptions. * Though there is clearly a case to be made for a prescriptive account of human laws, he discusses the more controversial claim that natural laws are prescriptive. * Without committing himself to this account, he notes that its possibility opens the possibility that natural laws could be 'violated' by a new prescription.

* H-S then turns to the question of the appropriateness of Hume's definition of miracles, relying on a descriptive theory of laws. * As H-S notes, as typically understood, laws are not exceptionless claims, but rather well-grounded generalizations which always include the possibility of counter instances. * So, in this sense, P1 must be false. * So, this Humean argument fails.

* In order to assess the argument that Hume actually seems to make, we have to understand what type of argument it is. * As H-S reminds us, Hume makes a distinction between demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. What Hume is offering here is a proof: a nonstatistical induction from known premises. * When we are evaluating proofs of this kind we should recognize how common and powerful they are, that they produce probabilistic conclusions, and that sample size and representativeness are decisive.

* What we have in the case of miracles is really competing proofs: the proof offered by testimony (or particular experience) and the proof offered by the uniformity of experience. * Hume insists that no matter how strong the first, the second always cancels it out, so no one should believe any particular miraculous claim. * H-S explores the reasoning with a "Salmon Derby Reductio" which suggests that Hume's position leads to an unsupportable conclusion (that no claim that violates expectations can ever be accepted) and begs the question against possible disconfirming testimony.