Joe Mahoney University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

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Joe Mahoney University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Economics, Organization and Management Chapter 7: Risk Sharing and Incentive Contracts Joe Mahoney University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management To provide incentives, it is desirable to hold employees responsible for their performance; this means that employees compensation or future promotions should depend on how well they perform their assigned tasks. However, holding employees responsible typically will involve subjecting them to risk in their current or future incomes. Because most people dislike bearing such risks and are often less well equipped to do so than are their employers, there is a cost of providing incentives. Efficient contracts balance the costs of risk bearing against the incentive gains that result.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management In most real situations, however, attempts to impose responsibility on employees for their performance expose them to risk because perfect measures of behavior are rarely available. Even though the quality of effort or the accuracy of information cannot itself be observed, something about it can frequently be inferred from observed results, and compensation based on results can be an effective way to provide incentives. Piece rates are a prime example: Rather than trying to monitor directly the effort that the employee provides the employer simply pays for the output.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management However, results are frequently affected by things that are outside the employee’s control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in outcomes induces randomness in the employee’s income. A second source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, but the performance evaluation measures include random or subjective elements. A third source of randomness comes from the possibility that outside events beyond the control of the employee may affect the ability to perform as contracted. Health problems may reduce the employee’s strength and ability to work, concerns about family finances may make it impossible to concentrate effectively and so forth. Consequently, making employees responsible for performance subjects them to risk.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management Balancing Risks and Incentives. It might be possible to insulate employees from these risks by making their compensation absolutely risk free and unrelated to performance or outcomes. In that case, however, the employees would have little direct incentive to perform to more than the most perfunctory fashion, because there are no rewards for good behavior or punishments for poor behavior. Effective contracts balance the gains from providing incentives against the costs of forcing employees to bear risk.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management The general problem of motivating one person or organization to act on behalf of another is known as the principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem encompasses not only the design of incentive pay but also issues in job design and the design of institutions to gather information, protect investments, allocate decision and ownership rights, and so on. Here we focus on the case where the employer is the principal and the employee is the agent.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management The optimal intensity of incentives depends on four factors: The incremental profits created by additional effort; The agent’s risk tolerance; The precision with which the desired activities are assessed; and The agent’s responsiveness to incentives.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management #1: The incremental profits created by additional effort There is no point incurring the costs of eliciting extra effort unless the results are profitable. For example, it is counterproductive to use economic incentives to encourage production workers to work faster when they are already producing so much that the next stage in the value chain cannot use their output.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management #2: The agent’s risk tolerance The less risk averse the agent, the lower the cost he or she incurs from bearing the risks that attend intense incentives. According to the incentive intensity principle, more risk averse agents ought to be provided with less intense incentives.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management #3: The precision with which the desired activities are assessed Low precision means that only weak incentives should be used. It is futile to use wage incentives when performance measurement is highly imprecise, but strong incentives are likely to be optimal when good performance is easy to identify.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management #4: The agent’s responsiveness to incentives Incentives should be most intense when agents are most able to respond to them. Generally, this happens when they have discretion about more aspects of their work, including the pace of work, the tools and methods they use, and so on. An employee with wide discretion facing strong wage incentives may find innovative ways to increase his or her performance, resulting in significant increases in profits.

Milgrom and Roberts (1992): Chapter 7 Economics, Organization & Management The Monitoring Intensity Principle When the plan is to make the agent’s pay very sensitive to performance, it will pay to measure that performance carefully. Which causes which? Do intense incentives lead firms to careful measurement, or does careful measurement provide the justification for intense incentives? The answer is that, in an optimally designed incentive system, the amount of measurement and the intensity of incentives are chosen together. Neither causes the other. However, setting intense incentives and measuring performance carefully are complementary activities. Undertaking either activity makes the other more profitable.