Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
East Carolina University Compressed Gas Safety Training Program
Advertisements

APOLLO 13 Safety Message Bob Sieck Odyssey Spacecraft NASA Project Engineer April 1970.
GRPE ISO GROUP MEETING, MUNICH, JANUARY 22th, 2003 GAS CYLINDERS USE OF PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES Hervé BARTHELEMY AIR LIQUIDE PARIS.
ADX 150 – Engine Repair ADX 170 – Climate Controls
Refrigerators.
Tulane University - Office of Environmental Health & Safety (OEHS) GAS CYLINDERS FOR TULANE LABORATORY OR FACILITY EMPLOYEES WHO USE OR WORK AROUND GAS.
Copyright  Progressive Business Publications Blue Ridge Safety Association Safety Presentations Compressed Gasses.
Phil MottAMS-02 GSR Phase II1 AMS-02 Vacuum Case Overview Ground Safety Review – Phase II September 8-10, 2008 Phil Mott.
Compressed Gases.
EPA Pesticide Container and Repackaging Regulations, Flow Chart 2: Can I fill this large portable refillable container (greater than 119 gallons)? (end.
Improved anchoring of SSS with vacuum barrier to avoid displacement Ofelia Capatina (speaker), Katy Foraz (coordinates all the activities), Antonio Foreste,
What we do and why we do it. Know how to inspect an SCBA bottle for damage prior to fill Know how to use the compressor Know how to document problems.
2.3.9 Student Book © 2004 Propane Education & Research CouncilPage Identifying Procedures for Purging Containers & Injecting Methanol Prior to.
Crane Operations Objective
Review of Helium Venting Analyses
AMS-02 Cryosystem Phase III Flight Safety Review January 12, 2010 Phil Mott.
Gas Transmission Pipelines
1 GLAST LAT ProjectMechanical Systems Mechanical Systems Mechanical / Thermal Hardware July 2005 Status Marc Campell, Subsystem Manager.
MICE Hydrogen System Implementation Tom Bradshaw Elwyn Baynham Iouri Ivaniouchenkov Jim Rochford.
Craig S. ClarkAMS-02 Phase II Safety Review1 AMS-02 Thermal Control System (TCS)
NTOF11 Collaboration Meeting Non-Design Issues for the Mercury Jet Target P.T. Spampinato V.B. Graves T.A. Gabriel Princeton University April 29-30, 2005.
Fcal upgrade for sLHC: Cryogenics modifications – TE-CRG/ C.Fabre 1 ATLAS FCal Upgrade for sLHC: Modifications to the Calorimeter Cryogenic.
Safety Unit II.
C osmic R Ay T elescope for the E ffects of R adiation CRaTER Pre-Ship Review (I-PSR) R. Foster January 3-4, 2008.
Current Safety Status Phase III Flight Safety Review 12 Jan 2009.
5-1 Constellation Space Suit System Government Capabilities and Facilities Crew and Thermal Systems Division.
Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase III Safety Review1 Safety Summary of Significant Changes Since Phase II.
Other Flight Pressure Systems Phase III Flight Safety Review 12 Jan 2009.
We’re proposing to modernize our Rodeo Refinery to recover propane from our refining process, and better recover butane — to cut sulfur dioxide emissions.
NSF International Drinking Water Product Standards.
Overview of AMS-02 Changes due the addition of the Permanent Magnet
1 Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer – 02 Phase III Flight Safety UPS Overview Jan John A. Heilig ESCG/Jacobs.
Hydrogen system R&D. R&D programme – general points Hydrogen absorber system incorporates 2 novel aspects Hydrogen storage using a hydride bed Hydrogen.
DEVELOPING FIRE TESTS FOR FCV AND HYDROGEN VEHICLES Glenn Scheffler Consultant for the US Department of Energy August 2010 DEVELOPING FIRE TESTS FOR FCV.
OSHA’s Most Frequently Cited Violations Hazard Communication 29 CFR (f)(5)(ii) states that all chemical containers must be labeled.
J. Pedersen EN DSO Performance Scientific performance Measurable, reproducible, controllable: Documented presence! Technical performance Measurable,
Exhaust to atmosphere G1 V1 V2 V3 LN2 Storage Vessel 150 l Dewar Cryostat Exhaust to atmosphere Nitrogen or helium gas bottle LN2 Circuit for MIT Test,
How Old is too Old? Who Makes that Decision? Alan Mayberry New Orleans, Louisiana Pipeline Safety Trust Annual Conference
Payload Safety Review Plan and Issues Leland D. Hill.
MNM Fatal /14 Fall of Material Accident Fall of Material Accident August 12, 2010 (Nevada) August 12, 2010 (Nevada) Underground Gold Mine Underground.
Art Nelson, Jr.AMS-02 Technical Interchange Meeting - JSC - January Ground Safety Status.
ESCG\L. D. Hill AMS-02 Permanent Magnet Safety Impact 1 AMS-02-PM Design Review - May 4-5, 2010.
Security in Air Transportation
Chris TuttAMS-02 Phase II Safety Review1 Tracker Alignment System Chris Tutt AMS-02 Project Manager.
The cryogenic system of the HIE-ISOLDE project and its related hazards for persons N. Delruelle on behalf of the TE/CRG group HIE-ISOLDE Safety Review.
Permanent Magnet Impacts to STS/ISS/MOD Chris Tutt 5 May 2010.
Cryogenic scheme, pipes and valves dimensions U.Wagner CERN TE-CRG.
Atmospheric Pressure Science 10. Why Does Atmospheric Pressure Exist?  Because the air in the atmosphere is pulled toward the Earth by Gravity  Currently.
Welding, Cutting, and Brazing
Lowell Randel Vice President, Government and Legal Affairs Global Cold Chain Alliance.
Food Safety T-1150 This work has been produced by DGL (Aust) Pty Ltd This induction package has been designed for usage on DGL’s intranet.
Workshop on Appraisal of Disassembled Magnets: Lessons learned March 17 th, 2005 Boundary Conditions-Technical Specification Jos Vlogaert.
Cost Efficient Off-Board Tank Storage for Compressed Hydrogen Gas Kevin L. Klug (CTC) Michael Olson (HyPerComp Engineering, Inc.) NHA Annual Hydrogen.
Welding, Cutting and Brazing
Absorber progress MICE-ISIS review of the liquid hydrogen system will be held in early January; guidance from Nominated Engineers on the imported absorber.
Proximity Cryogenics P&IDs meeting
- How to place an order for standard products -
THUM Adapter Impact on Hazardous Area Classification
NSF International Drinking Water Product Standards
LN2 Circuit for MIT Test, September 2005
Compressed Gases.
East Carolina University Compressed Gas Safety Training Program
California Space Heaters
TRENTON Casing Filler Presentation
ESS elliptical cryomodule
Food Safety T-1150 This work has been produced by DGL (Aust) Pty Ltd
Shipping and Receiving Hazardous Materials
Presentation transcript:

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels Chris Tutt AMS-02 Project Manager Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review Review of Hazard Hazard to be controlled is structural failure of Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs). Structural failure from overpressurization. Structural failure from damage to overwrap. AMS-02 has three COPVs Xenon Tank and Carbon Dioxide Tanks for the TRD Gas Supply. Warm Helium Tank for the Cryomagnet. Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review Review of Tank Design All tanks designed and manufactured by Arde’. Each is a duplicate of an existing tank with previous space flight history. Xe tank previously used in Plasma Contactor Unit currently on ISS. CO2 tank previously used on X-33. Warm Helium Tank previous used on Pegasus ELV. Tank manufacturing done per AIAA-S-081 requirements. Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review TRD Gas Supply Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

TRD Heaters and Thermostats Heaters and thermostats were added to the outside surface of the TRD tanks. Procedure reviewed by MIT and Arde’. Work done by MIT technician with Arde’ QA present. Tank reinspected and proof pressure test redone after installation. Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review Warm Helium Tank Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

COPV Structural Analysis and Testing Tanks have all been verified against AIAA-S-081 design requirements. Required burst factor of 1.5 x MDP Xenon tank: 3.1 x MDP CO2 tank: 2.0 x MDP Helium tank: 2.5 x MDP Required proof test to 1.5 x MOP Xenon tank: 1.8 x MOP CO2 tank: 3.3 x MOP Helium tank: 2.5 x MOP Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

Proof Test Requirements KNPR 8715.3 para 13.18.1c and d require an inspection and proof pressure test prior to first pressurization at KSC. All COPVs will arrive at KSC filled. No top-offs of these vessels are currently planned. COPVs will have already demonstrated structural integrity for KSC environment. All vessels will have already held pressure for months. Thermal environment from thermal/vac testing will envelope anything seen at KSC. All vessels will have seen vibration environment from multiple plane and truck transports. Tanks will not be emptied and refilled. Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

Special Ground Handling Requirements KNPR 8715.3 paras 13.8.1e, f, and g have special handling requirements if tanks are pressurized above 1/3 design burst pressure. None of the AMS-02 tanks will pass this limit: Xenon Tank: Burst pressure 9300 psid, MOP 2500 psid (26.9%) CO2 Tank: Burst pressure 6400 psid, MOP 1440 psid (22.5%) Warm Helium Tank: Burst pressure 8845 psid, MOP 2900 psid (32.8%) Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

Warm Helium Tank Damage Protection Warm Helium Tank was inspected at Arde’ prior to shipment and found to be free of defects. Upon delivery to SM, tank has been stored in its shipping crate physically separate from main work area. Tank will be installed on Vacuum Case concurrently with its rigid MMOD shield, which will protect the tank from incidental contact. Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

Warm Helium Tank Debris Shield Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

TRD Tanks Damage Protection TRD tanks inspected by Arde’ after manufacturing and found to be free of defects. Fiberglass covers installed to protect tank surface during ground handling and installation. Removed on three occasions. Allow installation of the tank heaters. Allow installation of the tank thermostats. Allow installation of the tank MLI. Covers will remain on until flight MMOD shields installed, which will protect tanks from incidental contact. Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

TRD Gas Supply Debris Shield Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review

Proposed Safety Controls AMS-02 COPVs are low risk for sudden failure. Tanks have been fully certified to all design and analysis requirements in KNPR 8715.3 and AIAA-S-081. Tanks will be filled prior to arrival and will have held pressure for months. Tanks will be protected by MMOD shields during all KSC operations. Tanks will never be loaded above 1/3 of burst pressure. No additional controls apart from standard pressure vessel regulations should be required. Chris Tutt AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review