Mar. 19 Agency Theory as an Analytical Perspective—research on shirking, “cheating,” and strategic positioning [Note: This chapter is taken from a newly-published book written by award-winning scholars on public bureaucracy. The chapter reports on Meier and O’Toole’s empirical study on the behavior of educational agencies in Texas in implementing federal education policy—as such, it takes a form similar to much research in journals. Graduate students need to gain competence in reading and understanding of such research literature. This reading serves well both as a straight-forward, well-written research piece (to help you understand the format of empirical analysis) and a a strong application of Agency Theory as a perspective for understanding how agencies “behave” (act, respond, cope with) in particular situations.] Understanding research format: The left column represents usual components of empirical research write-ups, and the right shows the corresponding sections of the Meier and O’Toole (M&O) chapter: Introduction (often no subheading) that explains See second paragraph of M&O chapter pp the question to be researched or the purpose of the research. Existing studies and research that affect how M&O’s “The Literature” (pp ) the authors understand the problem Explanation of key concepts tested in research: “Cheating as Shirking”—the dv to be explained (pp ); That which is to be explained—the dependent performance gaps, prior efforts, resources, task demands, variable (dv)—and those that cause or affect professional norms—possible ivs (that may or may not explain it—independent variables (ivs). the dv). Method used to test whether possible ivs affect dv. M&O’s “Data and Methods” (pp ). Report on the outcome of testing—usually which M&O’s “Findings” (pp ) ivs affect the dv; if the author’s expectations (or hypotheses) are supported Discussion about the broad implications of the M&O’s “Conclusion” (pp ), particularly about agent research; conclusion (may be a separate section). strategy

Mar. 19 Shirking, “cheating,” and strategic positioning—what can be learned? [Note: The first set of questions below pertains to your understanding of the reading. The second raises broader issues for you to consider.] To what extent and how does the logic of Meier and O’Toole’s research correspond to the issues Gormley and Balla raise in Ch. 3 “The Bureaucracy’s Bosses?” Be specific. Explain the significance of the best case (“…ideal situation for political control…” p.93) in M&O’s research strategy (hint: what would be a “worst case,” and why would it be weak as a basis for their research?) How many principal-agent dyads (or pairs) can you identify in the M&O chapter? How does M&O’s use of the agency theory perspective help them “coax out” their findings and enhance understanding of public agency behavior in their research (or does it)? Could the same findings/conclusions have emerged without using it? Or did using it distort the findings/conclusions? Do you fault the education agencies for “cheating?” Should agent compliance to the principal be “the way it ought to be?” Does “cheating” or shirking have any relevance to the issues Gormley and Balla raise in Ch. 2? Explain. How might economists (presumably looking from the p/a perspective) differ from sociologists (from an institutional perspective) in interpreting the implications of M&O’s research? Are local school administrators forced to cheat or is it a rational, independent choice? (How do the issues of embeddedness and enactment fit in here?) What (if anything) can a public manager learn from the Meier&O’Toole chapter? How does Wilson’s discussion of “circumstances” and (specific) tasks (rather than general) goals relate to M&O’s study of Texas school districts: Ever hear of “situation ethics…?” Is “cheating” here an example? …Those who would view this Texas as as scandalous might have expected people at some level (operator, management, or executive) “to take a higher road.” What in Wilson Ch. 3 accounts for everybody “buying off” on the strategy?