Phil 3318: Philosophy of Science Kuhn-ian Revolutions

‘Real’ Revolutions as metaphor. Scientific Revolutions are those ‘non- cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible one’ (92)

Analogical points: 1.Revolutions are inaugurated by a ‘growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions have ceased to adequately meet the problems posed by an environment that they have in part created’ (92)

2.(although Kuhn doesn’t number it): Revolutions often seem revolutionary only to those whose paradigms are affected to them.

3. (numbered 2) Success of a revolution necessitates, in part, the ‘relinquishment of one set of institutions in favor of another, an in the interim, society is not governed by institutions at all.’

Conclusion: Well, that seems to be point (3). : –During revolutions, society is divided into competing camps or parties – one seeking to defend the old, others seeking to replace it with new. –(There may be competing new camps as well) –Once that kind of polarization occurs, political recourse fails.

The parties are fighting over the legitimacy of institutions by which political decisions can be made – for that very reason, there is no political mechanism for adjudicating between the parties. So, the parties must ‘take to the streets’ – appeal to something other than political will (such as God, history, etc) or resort to force.

The success of the winner is determined not by political institutions, but by extrapolitical institutions – by the very fact that they replace those institutions by which they legitimize themselves.

Therefore, by analogy… Scientific revolutions gain legitimacy not by factors internal to science, but by extra-scientific methods, such as social factors. And this is precisely because the issue at stake is the legitimacy of factors internal to science.

Revolutions as Gestalt-switch Kuhn argues from history (Discovery of Uranus, electrostatic repulsion, Laviosier’s O2 v. Priestley’s dephlogisticated air, etc…) that scientific revolutions shift perception much like the shift in perception of anomalous playing cards, the duck-rabbit or the Necker cube. Well, let’s look at the Examples…Examples

How revolutions morph into normal science Authority! –As a paradigmatic case is accepted, it is taught to future scientists as if it had always been the case. There is little or no acknowledgement of the previously existing paradigm, or the crisis that sparked the paradigm shift in the first place. –Anyone taught about pre-plate tectonic geology lately?

Plate tectonics was proposed by Alfred Wegener in 1912.Plate tectonics –Evidence: ‘Fit’ of the E coastline of S. America with W. coastline of Africa. Similar plant & animal fossils found on these two coasts Other ‘unusual’ geological structures found in both places. –Mechanism: tidal pressure, centrifugal force.

Why not? 1.Forces too weak 2.Forces would destroy, not maintain, coastline shapes via erosion 3.Ocean floor would rip apart continents. (Harold Jeffereys)

Evidence in support 1947: sediment on the Atlantic floor was less than predicted if floor was 4 bill years old (no continental movement). 1950’s: magnetic ‘striping’ of rocks in middle of Atlantic crest. (suggested movement, but also expansion of globe) 1960’s: Evidence from earthquake analysis of the Pacific that earth was ‘being sucked down’, at the same rate as it was ‘bubbling up’ in the Atlantic.

Revolution : mechanism of ‘floating continents’ proposed by Hess and Dietz. –Consistent (based upon) convection theory of physics [exemplifying interdisciplinary collaboration] –Suggested vast new research projects –Explained earthquakes and volcanoes in ‘ring of fire’. –Explained ‘island arcs’ and mid-oceanic ridges.

Points of contact with previous theories 1.In revolutionary science, auxiliary hypotheses operate to restrict the range of phenomena to be explained (100) 2.The positivistic laws are genuinely incompatible between paradigms (101) [stated as a problem for positivists] 3.Paradigms include not only a cognitive aspect, but a normative one. (109)

Normative 2 claims: 1.A paradigm sets not only the criteria for a consistent theory, but the criteria for doing science. 2.Judgments about previous paradigms are generally made in terms of rightness – i.e. ‘I once saw the moon as a planet, but I was mistaken’. (Ch X)

Corollaries Interpretation can only articulate a paradigm – “paradigms are not corrigible by normal science at all.” (122) –Why?

Ch X Is filled with a whole bunch of what I consider bad philosophy of perception – extrapolating widely from empirical evidence of underdetermined perception. “The duck-rabbit shows that two men with the same retinal image can see different things”

Practicality The dominant model of training new scientists is the textbook. Textbooks truncate history and provide a sanitized story – almost Orwellian in nature – that the things that are true now have always been true, and will always continue to be true.

Effects Students feel a part of a long-standing tradition The set of problems addressed by contemporary science is viewed as the same set of problems always considered scientific [i.e. Alchemy as competitor to Chemistry] Scientific history is seen as a linear process arriving at the present position. (138)

Thus… Textbook are tools of a post-revolutionary Orwellian movement to construct ‘normal’ scientists: thinkers who take the contemporary paradigm as all that ever was – both cognitively and normatively. They are the basis of a ‘normal’ science.

Why would anyone rebel? [I.e. test a paradigm]: Same as political – a growing body of evidence that the system just isn’t working. (Matthew Dowd)

Side note (for Kuhn): During revolutionary periods, factors such as ‘elegance’ ‘neatness’ or ‘simplicity’ of a theory have a profound effect on its acceptance (155) But aesthetic considerations are not enough – there must be a crisis to get the problem started! (158)

Implications Falsification [Popper] is operative during periods of revolutionary science. Verificationism [Hempel] (or something like it) is operative during normal science

Progressive v Degenerative [although Kuhn doesn’t use these terms] matters for both revolutionary (settling which competitor will win) and normal (new avenues of research suggested). And, during revolutionary periods: ANYTHING GOES

So… Kuhn agrees with Everyone! Happy happy joy joy!.

Contemporary Examples: Behaviorism -> Cognitive science? Neuroscience replacing folk psychology? Linguistics! [Note: notice how the ID people have used Kuhn’s rhetoric to try to play the victim]