Communicability Patient factors Not infectious prior to symptoms Increases with increased severity of disease Increases post-onset symptoms (peak at day.

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Presentation transcript:

Communicability Patient factors Not infectious prior to symptoms Increases with increased severity of disease Increases post-onset symptoms (peak at day 7- 10) Not infectious after recover No evidence of prolonged carriage or relapse Setting Duration, degree of contact Contact with airway (?contact with stool)

Communicability: time in disease course Peiris et al. Lancet, 2003

NPA / TNS N=392 Onset (days) 0 – 2 3 – 5 6 – 8 9 – – – – – 23 % positive PCR: Time to positive %positive Stools N=50 Public Health - Hong Kong May 2003

Communicability Patient factors Not infectious prior to symptoms Increases with increased severity of disease Increases post-onset symptoms (peak at day 7- 10) Not infectious after recover No evidence of prolonged carriage or relapse Setting Duration, degree of contact Contact with airway (?contact with stool)

Exposure Risk in ICU Loeb et al. (ICAAC 2003) 8/32 entering room vs 0/11 others (P=0.09) Risks: assisting with intubation RR=4.2 (1.6, 11) suctioning prior to intubation RR=4.2 (1.6,11) manipulation O 2 mask RR=9.0 (1.3,65) Scales et al. (ICAAC 2003) - 6/31 entering room vs. 1/38 others RR=8.8 (1,420) - Risks: in room for >4 hrs RR=24 (1.2,311) present >30min with NIV RR=105 (3,3000)

SARS Control Identification of cases Isolation/quarantine

IP Varia et al. CMAJ 2003

Grace Division Emergency Department March 16; 22:45-23:30

Reported cases of SARS in cases linked to the BLD group March 20 to April 16, /03/0321/03/0323/03/0325/03/0327/03/0329/03/0331/03/0302/04/0304/04/0306/04/0308/04/0310/04/0312/04/0314/04/0316/04/03 Date of onset of symptoms Number of cases Health Care Worker BLD Family Mr. S Jr. Church meetings Funeral

Cluster of SARS in HCWs 54 y.o.m. physician April 1-2 saw 3 patients from BLD community April 4-5 became ill April 12 admitted to ICU April 13 Intubated RT-PCR positive in sputum and stool April HCW become ill including 6 involved with intubation MMWR 2003 May 16

Effectiveness of Precautions Seto et al. Lancet 2003: Case (n=13)/Control (241) Lower risk with handwashing OR 0.2 (.07,1) Lower risk with gloves OR 0.5 (.14,1.6) Lower risk with gown OR undef (P=.006) Lower with masks OR 0.08 (.02,.33) Loeb et al. ICAAC 2003: Cohort (43 nurses, 8 infected) Lower risk with gloves OR 0.45 (.44, 4.5) Lower risk with gown OR 0.36 (.10,1.2) Lower risk with masks OR 0.23 (.07,.78)

Number of SARs hospitalization days Mount Sinai Hospital 338 days of protected exposure (?1 staff infected ) March April March 31 hours of unprotected exposure (7 staff infected)

Transmission in the setting of any precautions, Toronto Phase I patients 22 HCW infected intubation, cardiac arrest, “pre-intubation” care Phase II – 129 patients 3 HCW infected cardiac arrest, bronchoscopy, “pre-intubation” care

Differences between Phase I and Phase II HCW training and awareness “Enhancements” Double gloves, hair & foot covering, greens Practice issues Minimize time in room Minimize contact with patient Medical therapy to reduce cough/vomiting Minimize procedures that increase risk of droplets

Protective Barriers: N95 masks, face shields, gown and gloves

Phase II What went wrong?

Relaxation of precautions

Impact on NYGH HCWs 39 Patients 30 Visitors 18

Conclusions Disease driven by exposure Transmission Primarily in health care settings Droplet/contact Heterogeneous between patients Control Unrecognized patients are the most important problem Precautions include not only barriers, but also practice Compliance with precautions is critical

Acknowledgements Allison McGeer and Karen Green The staff and patients of greater Toronto area hospitals and public health departments