Micropayments Revisited Ronald L. Rivest (with Silvio Micali) MIT Laboratory for Computer Science RSA Conference 2002.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
M-PAYMENT SYSTEM (e–WALLET ).
Advertisements

Micropayments Revisited Written by Silvio Micali and Ronald Rivest Presented by Charles Song and Michael Wasser.
Micropayments Revisited Ronald L. Rivest & Silvio Micali RSA Conference 2002 Seminar , CS Dept., Bar Ilan University By Sharon Haroni.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ E-Commerce: Fundamentals and Applications1.
PAYWORD, MICROMINT -TWO MICROPAYMENT SCHEMES PROJECT OF CS 265 SPRING, 2004 WRITTEN BY JIAN DAI.
Computer Science Dr. Peng NingCSC 774 Advanced Network Security1 Topic 3.2: Micro Payments.
Recoverable and Untraceable E-Cash Dr. Joseph K. Liu The Chinese University of HongKong.
Lect. 18: Cryptographic Protocols. 2 1.Cryptographic Protocols 2.Special Signatures 3.Secret Sharing and Threshold Cryptography 4.Zero-knowledge Proofs.
Chapter 13 Paying Via The Net. Agenda Digital Payment Requirements Fraud Detection Online Payment Methods Online Payment Types The Future Payment.
Digital Cash Present By Kevin, Hiren, Amit, Kai. What is Digital Cash?  A payment message bearing a digital signature which functions as a medium of.
Copyright 1996 RSA Data Security, Inc. All rights reserved.Revised 1/1/96 PayWord and MicroMint: Two Simple MicroPayment Schemes Ronald L. Rivest (MIT)
Slide 1 Vitaly Shmatikov CS 378 Digital Cash. slide 2 Digital Cash: Properties uDigital “payment message” with properties of cash uUnforgeable Users cannot.
Payment Systems 1. Electronic Payment Schemes Schemes for electronic payment are multi-party protocols Payment instrument modeled by electronic coin that.
1 Towards Decentralized and Secure Electronic Marketplace Yingying Chen, Naftaly Minsky, Constantin Serban, and Wenxuan Zhang Dept of Computer Science.
Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Lecture 13 Money Related Issues ($$$) and Odds and Ends.
Micro-Payment Protocols and Systems Speaker: Jerry Gao Ph.D. San Jose State University URL:
ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS FALL 2002COPYRIGHT © 2002 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Electronic Payment Systems Lecture 10 Micropayments II.
1 Formal Specification and Verification of a Micropayment Protocol Alex X. Liu The University of Texas at Austin, U.S.A. October 13, 2004 Co-author: Mohamed.
Your Presenter Amer Sharaf Electronic Payments: Where do we go from here? ByMarkus Jakobsson David Mraihi Yiannis Tsiounis Moti Yung.
Digital Cash Damodar Nagapuram. Overview ► Monetary Freedom ► Digital Cash and its importance ► Achieving Digital Cash ► Disadvantages with digital cash.
ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS SPRING 2004 COPYRIGHT © 2004 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS Electronic Payment Systems Lecture 9: Micropayments II.
Electronic Commerce: Payment Protocols and Fair Exchange Markus Jakobsson, RSA Labs DIMACS Tutorial on Applied Cryptography and.
ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMSFALL 2001COPYRIGHT © 2001 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS eCommerce Technology Lecture 10 Micropayments II.
ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS FALL 2002COPYRIGHT © 2002 MICHAEL I. SHAMOS eCommerce Technology Lecture 9 Micropayments I.
Check It Out 1. 2 Introductions Instructor and student introductions Module overview.
Ecommerce Applications 2009/10 Session 31 E-Commerce Applications E-payment.
Digital Payment Systems
Financial Transactions on Internet Financial transactions require the cooperation of more than two parties. Transaction must be very low cost so that small.
Conceptual Design of an E- commerce System Min Ding Smeal College of Business Administration Pennsylvania State University.
Traditional and Electronic Payment Methods Chapter 3.
WISA An Efficient On-line Electronic Cash with Unlinkable Exact Payments Toru Nakanishi, Mitsuaki Shiota and Yuji Sugiyama Dept. of Communication.
Check It Out 1. 2 Purpose Check It Out will teach you how to use a checking account responsibly.
Peppercorn Micropayments via better “Lottery Tickets” Ron Rivest (with Silvio Micali) MIT Laboratory for Computer Science Financial Cryptography Conference.
Digital Cash By Gaurav Shetty. Agenda Introduction. Introduction. Working. Working. Desired Properties. Desired Properties. Protocols for Digital Cash.
Copyright © 2002 Pearson Education, Inc. Slide 6-1.
Chris Olston, cs294-7, Spring Atomicity in Electronic Commerce J. D. Tygar -- UCB presented by Chris Olston.
Micropayments IOM599 - October 30, 2000 Allen Cinzori Dan Salenger Steve Vincent Raymond Yee.
Ecommerce Applications 2007/8 Session 61 E-commerce Applications Process views.
Electronic Payment Systems. How do we make an electronic payment? Credit and debit cards Smart cards Electronic cash (digital cash) Electronic wallets.
Traditional and Electronic Payment Methods Chapter 3.
Securing Electronic Transactions University of Palestine Eng. Wisam Zaqoot April 2010 ITSS 4201 Internet Insurance and Information Hiding.
E-commerce What are the relationships among: – Client (i.e. you) – Server – Bank – Certification authority Other things to consider: – How to set up your.
Security Protocols and E-commerce University of Palestine Eng. Wisam Zaqoot April 2010 ITSS 4201 Internet Insurance and Information Hiding.
An Authenticated Payword Scheme without Public Key Cryptosystems Author: Chia-Chi Wu, Chin-Chen Chang, and Iuon-Chang Lin. Source: International Journal.
Lecture 8 e-money. Today Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) CyberCash On line payment system using e-money ECash NetCash MilliCent CyberCoin.
Lecture 12 E-Commerce and Digital Cash. As communication technologies, such as the Internet and wireless networks, have advanced, new avenues of commerce.
Micropayments Revisited Background for Peppercoin scheme By Willer Travassos.
Clemente-Cuervo et al. A PDA Implementation of an Off-line e-Cash Protocol.
Authors:Weimin Lang, Zongkai Yang, Gan Liu, Wenqing Cheng and Yunmeng Tan Source:Ninth International Symposium on Computers and Communications 2004, Proceedings.
TM MilliCent Scrip, Security and Secrets TM Dr. Mark S. Manasse DIGITAL Systems Research Center, Palo Alto
Business Mathematics Seminar 2. Round to a Specific Decimal Place 1. Find the digit in the specified place. 2. Look at the next digit to the right. –If.
Electronic Money. What is Electronic Money? Scrip or money that is exchanged only through electronically is referred to as electronic money. Electronic.
Chapter 4 E-commerce Security and Payment.
Peppercoin Micropayments Ronald L. Rivest MIT CSAIL (joint work with Prof. Silvio Micali)
1. ◦ Intro ◦ Online shopping vs MOTO ◦ Credit card payments vs PayPal ◦ E-cash? 2.
Securing Passwords Against Dictionary Attacks Presented By Chad Frommeyer.
Module 9 Micropayment systems. Properties of micropayment systems Micropayments do not have a real-world cash equivalent – cash cannot be divided into.
Electronic Payment Systems Presented by Rufus Knight Veronica Ogle Chris Sullivan As eCommerce grows, so does our need to understand current methods of.
TOMIN: Trustworthy Mobile Cash with Expiration-date Attached Author: Rafael Martínez-Peláez and Francisco Rico-Novella. Source: Journal of Software, 2010,
多媒體網路安全實驗室 Private Information Retrieval Scheme Combined with E- Payment in Querying Valuable Information Date: Reporter: Chien-Wen Huang 出處:
1 E-cash Model Ecash Bank Client Wallet Merchant Software stores coins makes payments accepts payments Goods, Receipt Pay coins sells items accepts payments.
1 Original Message Scrambled Message Public Key receiver Internet Scrambled+Signed Message Original Message Private Key receiver The Process of Sending.
Mar 18, 2003Mårten Trolin1 Agenda Parts that need to be secured Card authentication Key management.
Micropayments Revisited
Entrepreneurship Secure Ordering Presented By Mrs. Bowden.
Peppercoin Micropayments
Chapter 4 E-commerce Security and Payment.
Presentation transcript:

Micropayments Revisited Ronald L. Rivest (with Silvio Micali) MIT Laboratory for Computer Science RSA Conference 2002

Outline u The need for micropayments u Dimensions in micropayment approaches u Previous work u The “Peppercorn” proposal

What is a “micropayment”? u A payment small enough that processing it is relatively costly. Note: processing one credit-card payment costs about 25¢ u A payment in the range 0.1¢ to $10. u Processing cost is the key issue for micropayment schemes. (There are of course other issues common to all payment schemes…)

The need for small payments u “Pay-per-click” purchases on Web: –Streaming music and video –Information services u Mobile commerce ($20G by 2005) –Geographically based info services –Gaming –Small “real world” purchases u Infrastructure accounting: –Paying for bandwidth

Payment schemes u Dominant today: –Credit cards –Subscriptions –Advertisements u Other possibilities: –Electronic checks –Anonymous digital cash –Micropayments FOR SALE

Why aren’t micropayments already here? u The market need is still nascent. u Rolling out a new payment system requires the coordination of many players. u Fundamentally: COST ! Existing micropayment schemes are too costly to implement.

Payment scheme costs: u Customer acquisition and support u Disputes and chargebacks: –User says he didn’t place order –User says goods were poor or missing u Overspending (more than authorized, or more than user can afford) u Communication, computation, equipment u Fraud/Attacks on system

Payment Framework: Payment System Provider (PSP) User Merchant Payment(s) Authori- zation Deposit(s)

Dimensions to consider: u Level and form of aggregation u On-line PSP vs. off-line PSP u Interactive vs. non-interactive u Ability to handle disputes u Ability to handle overspending u Computation/communication cost u Robustness against fraud

Level of Aggregation u To reduce processing costs, many small micropayments should be aggregated into fewer macropayments. u Possible levels of aggregation: –No aggregation: PSP sees every payment –Session-level aggregation: aggregate all payments in one user/merchant session –Global aggregation: Payments can be aggregated across users and merchants

Form of Aggregation u Deterministic aggregation: Accounting is exact. u Statistical aggregation: Value flow is accurately estimated (looks good for micropayments) u Our Peppercorn proposal makes aggregation look deterministic/non- existent to user but statistical to merchant and bank.

On-line PSP vs. Off-line PSP u On-line PSP: PSP authorizes each payment or each session. u Off-line PSP: User and merchant can initiate session and transact without participation of PSP. (e.g. pay taxi) u PSP should be off-line if scheme has global aggregation. u If multiple PSP’s involved, off-line is better.

Interactive vs. Non-interactive u Interactive: Payment protocol is two-way dialogue u Non-interactive: Payment protocol is one-way (e.g. anti-spam payment in ):

Ability to handle disputes u User claims he didn’t approve payment Solution: use digital signatures u User claims goods are poor quality or were never sent. Solution: let user complain to merchant directly. u A micropayment PSP can’t afford to handle any such disputes!

Ability to handle overspending u User may refuse to pay PSP for payments he has made. Solution: prepayment u User may spend more than he was authorized to spend. Solution: penalties/deterrence

Computation Cost u Digital signatures are still relatively “expensive” --- but much cheaper than they used to be! u Today, it seems reasonable to base a micropayment scheme on digital signatures. (E.g. Java card in cell phone) u User and merchant are anyways involved with each transaction; digital signatures only add a few milliseconds. u On-line/Off-line signature can also help.

Communication Cost u Communication costs can be minimized by: –Keeping PSP off-line; both authorization and deposits are aggregated, so PSP only has overall view of value flow –Making payment protocol non-interactive (e.g. reduce number of round-trips needed when buying with pay-per-click using browser)

Robustness against Fraud u Any party (user/merchant/ PSP) may try to cheat another. u Any two parties may try to cheat the third.

Previous Work: Digital Cash u Example: Chaum’s digital coins u Emphasis on anonymity: Withdrawals use blind signatures u Problem of double-spending handled by having doubler-spenders revealed (e.g. Brand’s protocol) u No aggregation: every coin spent is returned to the PSP.

Previous Work: PayWord u Rivest and Shamir ’96 u Emphasis on reducing public-key operations by using hash-chains instead: x 0 x 1 x 2 x 3 … x n u User signs x 0 and releases next x i for next payment u Session-level aggregation only.

Previous Work: MicroMint u Rivest and Shamir ’96 u Eliminates public-key operations entirely; each digital coin is a four-way hash collision: y x 0 x 1 x 2 x 3 u No aggregation: each coin is returned to PSP.

Previous Work: Millicent u Manasse et al. ’95 u User buys merchant-specific scrip from PSP for each session. u Requires PSP to be on-line for scrip purchase u Session-level aggregation only

Previous Work: Lottery Tickets u “Electronic Lottery Tickets as Micropayments” – Rivest ’97 (similar to “Transactions using Bets” proposal by Wheeler ’96; see also Lipton and Ostrovsky ’98) u Payments are probabilistic u First schemes to provide global aggregation: payments aggregated across all user/merchant pairs.

“Lottery Tickets” Explained u Merchant gives user hash value y = h(x) u User writes Merchant check: “This check is worth $10 if three low-order digits of h -1 (y) are 756.” (Signed by user, with certificate from PSP.) u Merchant “wins” $10 with probability 1/1000. Expected value of payment is 1 cent. u Bank sees only 1 out of every 1000 payments.

Our “Peppercorn” Proposal u Under English law, one peppercorn is the smallest amount that can be paid in consideration for value received. u Peppercorn scheme is an improvement of basic lottery ticket scheme, making it: –Non-interactive –Fair to user: user never “overcharged”

Non-interactive payment u Revised probabilistic payment: “This check is worth $10 if the three low-order digits of the hash of your digital signature on this check are 756.” u Merchant’s deterministic signature scheme is unpredictable to user. u Merchant can convince PSP to pay.

Non-interactive payment (cont) u Optimization: “This check is worth $10 if the three low-order digits of the hash of your digital signature on the date of this check are 756.” u Merchant’s server only needs to apply signature function once a day.

User Fairness: No “Overcharging” u With basic scheme, unlucky user might have to pay $20 for his first 2 cents of probabilistic payments! u We say payment scheme is user-fair if user never need pay more than he would if all payments were non-probabilistic checks for exactly expected value (e.g. 1 cent)

Achieving User-Fairness u Assume for the moment that all payments are for exactly one cent. u Require user to sequence number his payments: 1, 2, … u When merchant turns in winning payment with sequence number N PSP charges user N – (last N seen) cents User charged three cents for

User-Fairness (continued) u Note that merchant is still paid $10 for each winning payment, while user is charged by difference between sequence numbers seen by PSP. u Users severely penalized for using duplicate sequence numbers. If user’s payments win too often, he is converted to basic probabilistic scheme. PSP can manage risk.

Conclusions u Peppercorn micropayment scheme –Is highly scalable: bank can support billions of payments by processing only millions of transactions (1000x reduction) –Provides global aggregation –Supports off-line payments –Provides for non-interactive payments –Protects user from statistical variations –Uses digital signatures, but overhead for merchant and bank can be minimized

(The End)