STIR In-Band Signature Transport draft-kaplan-stir-ikes-out-00 Hadriel Kaplan.

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Presentation transcript:

STIR In-Band Signature Transport draft-kaplan-stir-ikes-out-00 Hadriel Kaplan

The Problem(s) SIP isn’t the only call control protocol – SS7/ISUP, ISDN, H.323, BICC, XMPP, etc. The originator and terminator can’t enforce everyone uses SIP Choices: ignore or accommodate Ent-A SSP-B SSP-C SSP-D How do we get STIR through here? Ent-E SIP SS7 SIP SS7

Proposed Solution: IKES Define rules for generating the info which must be signed, in a protocol-agnostic fashion – The resulting “info” is not specific to SIP, SS7, etc. Sign the information using a private key Define protocol-specific encoding rules for carrying the info and signature – E.g., a SIP header, or ISUP parameter Define rules for verifying the info

Passing STIRaight Through For SIP, XMPP: define the header/xml For SS7, ISDN, H.323: put it in a UUI Interworking can be done by gateways or SBCs But... this won’t always work: – UUI doesn’t normally survive across multiple SS7 domains – For ISDN, UUI is often used for inter-PBX calls Though we probably don’t need to care about that scenario for STIR

How is this different from 4474? 4474 is SIP-specific – To, From, Date, Contact, Call-ID, etc. are all SIP- specific fields (so is SDP obviously) IKES takes a minimalistic approach – only sign what is absolutely needed for caller-id 4474 tried to prevent MitM as well as replay – IKES doesn’t: replay is only prevented against different targets

What are the drawbacks? Only 128 bytes available in UUI – For ISUP we can also use the Call Reference parameter to get another 3 bytes, but not in ISDN This impacts signature algorithm and key size – With 1024-bit RSA that’s the signature size – ECC is smaller Key index size is also limited – Currently up to 8k indices in draft-01 No signing of SDP/body/random-stuff

What are the benefits? It’s not a lot of work to define it in a RFC – Even if no one implements it for SS7 or ISDN Forcing size restrictions keeps the SIP message size lower Keeps the information used for signing SIP- agnostic – Someday there may be a new protocol (SIPv3?) – Proprietary protocols can do it too E.g.: IAX, WebRTC-based, Facetime, TIP, Skype

The Questions Do we care about anything other than SIP? Do we care about SS7 or ISDN? How many indices do we need? Can we use ECC instead of RSA? What’s a better name than “IKES”?