Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 1 A Web Services Security Framework Jorgen Thelin Chief Scientist Cape Clear Software Inc.

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Presentation transcript:

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 1 A Web Services Security Framework Jorgen Thelin Chief Scientist Cape Clear Software Inc.

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 2 4 Main Concerns of a Security Framework Authentication – identity Who is the caller? How do we prove they are who they say they are? Authorization – access control What is the caller authorized to do? Is the caller permitted by perform the operation it is requesting? Confidentiality – encryption How do we prevent snoopers viewing our messages and data? Integrity – tamper-proofing How do we prevent messages being tampered with between sender and receiver?

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 3 Non-Repudiation This is ultimately the major business requirement for a security framework Can a trading partner possibly claim that: They didn't send a message They sent a different message from the one you received Requires framework support for: Authentication – we know who sent the message Integrity – the message did not change in transit Audit record storage – we can prove what happened

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 4 Security Challenges Confidentiality Can prying eyes see it? Authentication Are you who you say you are? Trust Have I agreed to work with you? Non-repudiation Can you claim that you didn't send or receive it even if you did? Integrity Was it altered before I got it? Authorization Are you allowed to have it? Auditing Can I prove what happened?

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 5 Security Technology to Address Challenges Confidentiality Key-based digital encryption and decryption. Authentication Username/password, key-based digital signing and signature verification, challenge-response, biometrics, smart cards, etc. Trust Key-based digital signing and signature verification. Non-repudiation Key-based digital signing and signature verification, message reliability Integrity Message Digest, itself authenticated with a digital signature. Authorization Application of policy, access control, digital rights management. Auditing Various forms of logging, themselves secured to avoid tampering.

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 6 Web Service Interaction Levels

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 7 Transport Level Security Uses existing Web tier technology such as HTTP and SSL Authentication HTTP authentication schemes – Basic or Digest SSL client side certificates Authorization URL access control policies in the web tier J2EE Servlet declarative security constraints Confidentiality SSL encrypted connections Integrity Point-to-point SSL encryption to avoid data interception

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 8 Message level security Security data built in to the XML message text – usually as additional SOAP header fields Authentication SSO (single sign-on) header tokens SAML authentication assertions Authorization SSO session details SAML attribute assertions Confidentiality XML Encryption specification Integrity XML Digital Signatures specification

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 9 Application level security A Web Service application handles its own security scheme – for example, UDDI Authentication App specific authentication messages App specific credential headers in other messages App maintains its own security domain Authorization App performs its own access control checks Confidentially App can apply an encryption scheme to some or all data fields Integrity XML Digital Signature can be used for tamper detection App specific integrity data such as MD5 hash can be sent for some or all data fields

Copyright © 2003 Jorgen Thelin / Cape Clear Software 10 Conclusions – Key Issues A Web Services security framework must support existing security products Must be an end-to-end framework to avoid any security gaps New XML security specifications are not yet stabilized or proven Use existing proven Web tier security infrastructure until XML security specifications and infrastructure is validated WS-I Basic Security Profile will deliver a standardized XML security infrastructure over time