By Rod Lykins.  Brief DDoS Introduction  Packet Marking Overview  Other DDoS Defense Mechanisms.

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Presentation transcript:

By Rod Lykins

 Brief DDoS Introduction  Packet Marking Overview  Other DDoS Defense Mechanisms

 Goal: ◦ Insert traceback data into an IP header ◦ Mark packet from attack source to victim host at various routers ◦ Attack source/path determined according to the traceback data  Two Types ◦ Probabilistic (PPM)  Requires all routers along attack path to mark  Requires higher computation load, high false positive spoofed marking, more packets to rebuild source ◦ Deterministic (DPM)  Marks only first ingress edge router  Much Simpler to implement  Typically utilizes a Bloom filter to store data  Important questions… ◦ Maximum # packets needed to reconstruct a source ◦ Maximum # of sources that can be identified

 Passive Defense ◦ Over-Provisioning ◦ Bandwidth Allocation ◦ Roaming Honeypots  Active Defense ◦ Ingress and Egress Filtering ◦ IP Hopping

 Various approaches  Most require collective teamwork ◦ Few can be handled by the victim alone  None are 100% effective

 A Taxonomy of DDoS Attack and DDoS Defense Mechanisms  IP Traceback with Deterministic Packet Marking  Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking: An IP Traceback System to Find the Real Source of Attacks  Topology-Assisted Deterministic Packet Marking for IP Traceback  Deterministic Packet Marking Based on the Coordination of Border Gateways  Modified Deterministic Packet Marking for DDoS Attack Traceback in IPv6 Network  Towards Stateless Single Packet IP Traceback  On the (In)Effectiveness of Probabilistic Marking for IP Traceback under DDoS Attacks  Linear and Remainder Packet Marking for Fast IP Traceback