802.1X & EAP State Machines (found at: Jim Burns Paul Congdon Nick Petroni John Vollbrecht.

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Presentation transcript:

802.1X & EAP State Machines (found at: Jim Burns Paul Congdon Nick Petroni John Vollbrecht

New Significant 802.1aa/D5 Changes Specification of interface between EAP/802.1X No more EAP packet processing in 802.1X Addition of controlled port in Supplicant Initial Authenticator request comes from EAP Ability for EAP to silently discard frames Proposed inclusion of EAP machines in 802.1X Annex EAPOL-Key exchange sequenced before EAP-Success Propose to include generic 4-way handshake within 802.1X

Issues to Discuss How to best incorporate into the 802.1X/EAP interface diagrams? What is the proper sequence for key exchange and sending final EAP-Success? What is the interface to generic 4-way handshake machine? Where to define the specification of EAPOL-Key message processing?

802.1x EAP Layer EAP Method port enabled/disabled eapResp eapReq eapFail eapSuccess eapNoReq eapRestart eapResp eapNoResp eapRcvd eapSuccess eapFail EAP / 802.1X Interface (excluding key exchange) port enabled/disabled Supplicant/PeerAuthenticator

802.1x EAP Layer EAP Method Link Secure (physical or crypto) keyAvailable portValid Key Interface with EAP 802.1X &

802.1x EAP Layer EAP Method rxMethodReq intCheck !intCheck Method-state Startmethod rcvRsp/NAK Method-state intCheck !intCheck EAP / EAP Method Interface

Supplicant Front-End LOGOFF txLogoff; logoffSent = TRUE; portStatus = Unauthorized; (userLogoff && !logoffSent) && !(initialize || !portEnabled) DISCONNECTED startCount = 0; logoffSent = FALSE; portStatus = Unauthorized; suppAbort = TRUE; HELD heldWhile = heldPeriod; portStatus = Unauthorized; CONNECTING startWhen = startPeriod; startCount = startCount + 1; eapRcvd = FALSE; txStart; AUTHENTICATED portStatus = Authorized; AUTHENTICATING startCount = 0; eapSuccess = FALSE; easFail = FALSE; suppTimeout = FALSE; suppStart = TRUE; eapRcvd = FALSE; Initialize || !portEnabled eapFail !userLogoff heldWhile == 0eapRcvd UTC eapRcvd && portValid !portValid (((startWhen == 0) && (startCount >= maxStart)) !! eapSuccess) && portValid eapRcvd (startWhen == 0) && (startCount < maxStart) suppTimeout eapSuccess && portValid

Supplicant Back-End INITIALIZE previousId = 256; abortSupp; suppAbort = FALSE; REQUEST authWhile = 0; getSuppRsp; RESPONSE txsuppRsp(receivedId, previousId); previousId = receivedId; eapResp = FALSE; RECEIVE authWhile = authPeriod; eapRcvd = FALSE; eapNoResp = FALSE; TIMEOUT suppTimeout = TRUE IDLE suppStart = FALSE; UTC eapNoResp eapResp UTC eapRcvd authWhile == 0 UTC suppStart eapSucess || eapFail (portControl! = Auto) || Initialize || suppAbort

EAP Peer

INITIALIZE portMode=auto; eapRestart=TRUE; DISCONNECTED portStatus=Unauthorized eapolLogoff=FALSE; HELD portSatus=Unauthorized quietWhile=quietPeriod; eapolLogoff=FALSE; CONNECTING eapolStart=FALSE; reAuthenticate=FALSE AUTHENTICATED portStatus=Authorized AUTHENTICATING authSuccess=FALSE; authFail=FALSE; authTimeout=FALSE; authStart=TRUE; ABORTING authAbort=TRUE; eapRestart=TRUE; ((portControl==auto) && (portMode != portControl)) || Initialize || !portEnabled eapolLogoff || !portValid eapolStart || reAuthenticate eapolLogoff UCT authSuccess && portValid UCT (eapReq || eapSuccess || eapFail) && (eapRestart == FALSE) (quietWhile == 0) !eapolLogoff && !authAbort eapolLogoff && !authAbort authFail reAuthenticate || eapolStart || eapolLogoff || authTimeout Authenticator Front-End

INITIALIZE abortAuth; eapNoRequest=FALSE; authAbort=FALSE; IGNORE eapNoReques t = FALSE; TIMEOUT authTimeout=TRUE; SUCCESS txReq(); authSuccess=TRUE; REQUEST txReq(); aWhileReq=suppTimeout; inc(reqCount); RESPONSE eapRequest=eapSuccess=FALSE; authTimeout=FALSE; eapResp=eapFail=FALSE; eapNoRequest=FALSE; aWhile=serverTimeout; reqCount=0; sendRespToServer(); FAIL txReq(); authFail=TRUE; IDLE authStart=FALSE; reqCount=0; UCT AuthStart && eapSuccess AuthStart && eapFail AuthStart && eapRequest eapSuccess && ((keyTxEnabled && !keyAvailable) || !keyTxEnabled) eapRequest (aWhileReq == 0) && (reqCount != maxReq) eapResp eapFail aWhile==0 eapNoRequest (aWhileReq==0) && (reqCount>=maxReq) UCT (aWhileReq==0) && (reqCount>=maxReq) eapResp (aWhileReq==0) && (reqCount != maxReq) UCT (portControl!=Auto)|| Initialize || authAbort Authenticator Backend

EAP Authenticator

Authenticator Key Tx Machine NO_KEY_TRANSMIT KEY_TRANSMIT txKey; keyAvailable = FALSE Initialize || (portControl != Auto) keyTxEnable && keyAvailable && eapSuccess keyAvailable !keyTxEnable || authFail || eapolLogoff

Supplicant Key Tx Machine NO_SUPP_KEY_TRANSMIT SUPP_KEY_TRANSMIT txSuppKey; suppKeyAvailable = FALSE Initialize keyTxEnable && suppkeyAvailable && eapSuccess suppKeyAvailable !keyTxEnable || eapFail || userlLogoff