Www.egi.eu EGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 EGI-InSPIRE www.egi.eu EGI-InSPIRE RI-261323 EGI Federated Cloud Security - what is needed Linda Cornwall (STFC) and the.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI - Identity Management Steven Newhouse Director, EGI.eu Federated Identity.
Advertisements

Grid Security Users, VOs, Sites OSG Collaboration Meeting University of Washington Bob Cowles August 23, 2006 Work supported.
WLCG Cloud Traceability Working Group progress Ian Collier Pre-GDB Amsterdam 10th March 2015.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI The EGI Software Vulnerability Group and EMI Dr Linda Cornwall, STFC, Rutherford.
EGI-Engage Recent Experiences in Operational Security: Incident prevention and incident handling in the EGI and WLCG infrastructure.
What if you suspect a security incident or software vulnerability? What if you suspect a security incident at your site? DON’T PANIC Immediately inform:
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI services for the long tail of science Peter Solagna Senior Operations.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI Pakiti.
EGI-Engage Recent Experiences in Operational Security: Incident prevention and incident handling in the EGI and WLCG infrastructure.
What if you suspect a security incident or software vulnerability? What if you suspect a security incident at your site? DON’T PANIC Immediately inform:
| nectar.org.au NECTAR TRAINING Module 5 The Research Cloud Lifecycle.
Security Update WLCG GDB CERN, 12 June 2013 David Kelsey STFC/RAL.
Cloud Use Cases, Required Standards, and Roadmaps Excerpts From Cloud Computing Use Cases White Paper
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI Federated Cloud F2F Security Issues in the cloud Introduction Linda Cornwall,
Evolution of the Open Science Grid Authentication Model Kevin Hill Fermilab OSG Security Team.
WLCG Cloud Traceability Working Group face to face report Ian Collier 11 February 2015.
EGEE-III INFSO-RI Enabling Grids for E-sciencE EGEE and gLite are registered trademarks David Kelsey RAL/STFC,
Virtual Workspaces Kate Keahey Argonne National Laboratory.
RI EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI Future activities Peter Solagna – EGI.eu.
Update on the Grid Security Vulnerability Group Linda Cornwall, MWSG7, Amsterdam 14 th December 2005
Security Vulnerabilities Linda Cornwall, GridPP15, RAL, 11 th January 2006
Virtualised Worker Nodes Where are we? What next? Tony Cass GDB /12/12.
Grid Security Vulnerability Group Linda Cornwall, GDB, CERN 7 th September 2005
EGI-Engage Recent Experiences in Operational Security: Incident prevention and incident handling in the EGI and WLCG infrastructure.
Trusted Virtual Machine Images a step towards Cloud Computing for HEP? Tony Cass on behalf of the HEPiX Virtualisation Working Group October 19 th 2010.
Security Policy Update David Kelsey UK HEP Sysman, RAL 1 Jul 2011.
Security Vulnerabilities in A Virtual Environment
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI Security Threat Risk Assessment Dr Linda Cornwall Rutherford Appleton.
Security Vulnerability Identification and Reduction Linda Cornwal, JRA1, Brno 20 th June 2005
Reflections “from around the block.” (Security) Ian Neilson GridPP Security Officer STFC RAL.
Security Policy: From EGEE to EGI David Kelsey (STFC-RAL) 21 Sep 2009 EGEE’09, Barcelona david.kelsey at stfc.ac.uk.
Workload management, virtualisation, clouds & multicore Andrew Lahiff.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI EGI-InSPIRE RI Service Operations Security Policy the new generalised site operations security policy.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI SPG future work EGI Technical Forum Lyon, 21 Sep 2011 David Kelsey, STFC/RAL.
Chapter 3 Pre-Incident Preparation Spring Incident Response & Computer Forensics.
WLCG Authentication & Authorisation LHCOPN/LHCONE Rome, 29 April 2014 David Kelsey STFC/RAL.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI VM Management Chair: Alexander Papaspyrou 2/25/
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI Evolution of AAI for e- infrastructures Peter Solagna Senior Operations Manager.
HEPiX Virtualisation Working Group Status, February 10 th 2010 April 21 st 2010 May 12 th 2010.
Why a Commercial Provider should Join the Academic Cloud Federation David Blundell Managing Director 100 Percent IT Ltd Simple, Flexible, Reliable.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI Draft Security Virtualisation Policy (for Romain Wartel – CERN) EGI Technical.
Ian Collier, STFC, Romain Wartel, CERN Maintaining Traceability in an Evolving Distributed Computing Environment Introduction Security.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI CSIRT Procedure for Compromised Certificates and Central Security Emergency.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI VOMS Proxy Lifetime UCB 21 Aug 2012 David Kelsey STFC.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI Federated Cloud and Software Vulnerabilities Linda Cornwall, STFC 20.
EGI-InSPIRE RI SPG Tasks for Year 2011 Jan 2011 Kelsey/Security Policy Group1.
EGI-InSPIRE RI SPG Tasks for Year 2011 Jan 2011 Kelsey/Security Policy Group1.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI Enabling SSO capabilities in the EGI Cloud services Peter Solagna – EGI.eu.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI Questionnaires to Cloud technology providers and sites Linda Cornwall, STFC,
Trusted Virtual Machine Images the HEPiX Point of View Tony Cass October 21 st 2011.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI /09/14 1 Appliance lifecycle services Marios Chatziangelou, et al.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI /04/14 1 EGI Community Forum 2014 Federated Cloud image management Marios.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI (IGTF Liaison Function) EGI-InSPIRE RI IGTF & EUGridPMA status update SHA-2 – and more (David Groep,
Computer Security: Principles and Practice First Edition by William Stallings and Lawrie Brown Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown Chapter 17 – IT Security.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI John Gordon EGI Virtualisation and Cloud Workshop Amsterdam 13 th May 2011.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI John Gordon EGI Virtualisation and Cloud Workshop Amsterdam 12 th May 2011.
HEPiX Virtualisation working group Andrea Chierici INFN-CNAF Workshop CCR 2010.
Cloud Security Session: Introduction 25 Sep 2014Cloud Security, Kelsey1 David Kelsey (STFC-RAL) EGI-Geant Symposium Amsterdam 25 Sep 2014.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI SA1.2 Plans 2013 Security Operations David Kelsey (STFC) 26/02/2013 Operations.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI D4.4 and the EGI review Dr Linda Cornwall 19 th Sept 2011 D4.41.
EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI SVG F2F Virtual Machines VM images, software run on VMS. 3 rd March 2015.
Directory/Inventory – info sharing for security people
WLCG Collaboration Workshop;
Solutions for federated services management EGI
EGI Security Risk Assessment
By Les Cottrell for UltraLight meeting, Caltech October 2005
Update - Security Policies
Software Vulnerability Group Status update
David Kelsey (STFC-RAL)
Dr Linda Cornwall STFC/RAL EGI OMB 27th September 2013
Presentation transcript:

EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI-InSPIRE EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI Federated Cloud Security - what is needed Linda Cornwall (STFC) and the EGI CSIRT team 20 th January

EGI-InSPIRE RI EGI Federated Cloud Model IaaS provided by distributed RPs Brokerage on top of this Endorsed VMs only allowed (provided in AppDB) ‘User’ is in change – which is what the policy group has called ‘VM Operator’ This has lead to some confusion in the past See Security Policy for the Endorsement and Operation of Virtual Machine Images 20 th January

EGI-InSPIRE RI main players RP = Resource Provider – Provides IaaS VM Operator – person instantiating VMs On behalf of the VO Would usually have ‘root’ access to VM Has appropriate high level of skills End User – User (e.g. scientist) who connects to VMs to carry out their work Less skilled

EGI-InSPIRE RI Lower level of skill VM Operator? Do we envisage a lower skilled level person instantiating VMs e.g. specialized ones which for certain applications? Probably NOT with User having root? Possibly with specific S/W installed? Would this be appropriate for small VOs?

EGI-InSPIRE RI Responsibility Fed Cloud view? RP agrees to support a VO. VM Operator instantiates VMs on behalf of a VO. AUP signed by VO VM Operator is then wholly responsible for the VM RP does NOT get to look at image Takes no action unless AUP or law broken Not updating for critical vulnerabilities does not trigger action Probably this is where security team disagrees with Fed Cloud people’s view Anyway how does RP know if AUP broken if can’t look at an image?

EGI-InSPIRE RI RP scanning VMs Commercial providers e.g. Amazon DO scan VMs Customers DO have to agree that Amazon has a right to scan VMs Probably necessary from a ‘due diligence’ legal point of view AUP should be modified so that VOs/VM Operators agree RPs have a right to scan VMs.

EGI-InSPIRE RI Highly confidential Data Is data to be stored or processed on the Fed Cloud which is highly confidential and hence RP scanning not acceptable? Heard called the ‘embassy cloud’ where RP has no access to data. General thought is that private data, e.g. biomed should be on private data server Is there any requirement to host e.g. private biomed in the cloud? Is RP scanning acceptable?

EGI-InSPIRE RI What can VM operator do? Fed Cloud wishes to define that the VM Operator can do anything they wish No restrictions as commercial operators do not have restrictions But commercial operators have their own large security teams We are likely to have a ‘due diligence’ legal responsibility issue Need to flag to management that there are legal issues which they should investigate

EGI-InSPIRE RI RPs and VOs and AAI EGI has AUP with VO RPs agree to support VO AAI is VOMS only at present DN and technology as Grid Need to ensure any new AAI is adequately secure Both from technical and trust view Getting something that works is one thing. Ensuring it is free from vulnerabilities is another. Building trust with other entities is another

EGI-InSPIRE RI VM Operator as service provider The VM Operator is effectively a service provider, providing services to the end user Hence Policies on the service provider are applicable to the VM Operator What Fed Cloud has called a ‘User’ IS therefore a service provider The VO, and the VM Operator is a service provider and has the same responsibilities as other service providers Service providers is like a site admin – can we trust them? Need to update policy on service operation

EGI-InSPIRE RI Logging and traceability We have policies on logging and traceability These effectively feed into requirements on the RPs and VM Operators to log and keep Essential for incident response Not clear what logging is in place at present Need to define more specific required logging and traceability What is logged How long logs are kept

EGI-InSPIRE RI ‘End User’ access VM Operator will need to give End Users access to resources. What methods does the EGI Fed Cloud use now? Does it depend on institute IDs? Institutes tend to have quite strict conditions. EGI Fed Cloud should provide recommended methods and criteria for End User access. Both concerning technology and trust

EGI-InSPIRE RI Security Incident Response What when an incident occurs? And they will Can an incident be traced to end user? If it cannot it is necessary to suspend the whole VO. After VO is suspended, will need to be able to investigate before can re-enable So incident response, whether via the VM operator/VO or by EGI CSIRT remains essential

EGI-InSPIRE RI ‘reasonable’ options EGI CSIRT has access to information This means logging and traceability policy/requirements must be met Need to trace to the end user Full co-operation from the VO, VM Operator VO has it’s own CSIRT/IRTF function and investigates Might be appropriate for large VO (e.g. probably netflicks has own security team) Not reasonable for small/medium VOs

EGI-InSPIRE RI What advantages are there to using Fed Cloud rather than commercial? One may be that a VO does NOT need to have it’s own security team As well as help with AAI, endorsed VMs etc., EGI Fed cloud can provide the security services

EGI-InSPIRE RI Problematic VMs There is a desire in Fed Cloud NOT to suspend VMs Commercial providers don’t do this What do we need to do? In case of multiple instances of a problematic VM. Need some way of quarantining images

EGI-InSPIRE RI Endorsed VM images Endorser is responsible for endorsed images This responsibility continues while image is available Includes ensuring they are up to date concerning vulnerabilities After VMs instantiated, are they updated? How do you ensure VMs which are in use are kept up to date? Or are they fairly short lived?

EGI-InSPIRE RI Problematic images If a VM has problems, do others having same VM Id get suspended? Only one may be problematic, due to a modification, how can it be quickly found whether a one off due to change to that image or whether a problem with all instances? How is data/work kept if images are problematic? I.e. how to quarantine and keep

EGI-InSPIRE RI VM requirements Requirements on endorsed images including patching Training/best practice needed for VM endorsers How do we endure images in operation are up to date concerning security patches? (short life or updates) Criteria for suspending and quarantining problematic images, including keeping work

EGI-InSPIRE RI General Need to write down usage model in detail Need to write down security model Responsibility/legal model, agreed with management Enough people to carry out work – some as part of EGI engage Security Threat Risk assessment – When more is documented and better info is available to carry this out

EGI-InSPIRE RI Questions and discussion. ??