I can be You: Questioning the use of Keystroke Dynamics as Biometrics —Paper by Tey Chee Meng, Payas Gupta, Debin Gao Presented by: Kai Li Department of.

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Presentation transcript:

I can be You: Questioning the use of Keystroke Dynamics as Biometrics —Paper by Tey Chee Meng, Payas Gupta, Debin Gao Presented by: Kai Li Department of Computer Science University of Central Florida Orlando FL 32816

Outline  Introduction  Approaches of keystroke biometric system –Keystroke features –Anomaly detection and accuracy measures  Experimental Design  Experimental Results  Conclusion  My Comments –Contributions –Weaknesses

Biometrics  Physiological biometric: biometric based on the physical trait of an individual –Facial features –Fingerprints –DNA  Behavioral biometric: biometric based on the behavioral trait of an individual –Signatures –Handwriting –Typing patterns (i.e. key stroke dynamics)

Keystroke biometrics  Using keystroke dynamics is based on the assumption that each person has a unique keystroke rhythm  Question the uniqueness property: –Is imitation possible ? –What information is needed to imitate? –How to effectively imitate ?

Keystroke features

Inter-keystroke time Hold time

Anomaly Detection

FAR FRR

Experiment Design  Attack scenarios –The attacker is able to acquire the victim patterns from a compromised biometrics database –The attacker is able to capture samples of the victim’s keystroke (e.g. by installing a key-logger)  Choice of password –Weak password: ‘serndele’ –Strong password: ‘ths.ouR2’

Experiment Design  Four sets of experiments are designed –Experiment 1 (e1) Goal: User Data Collection Details: 88 users were asked to submit 200 samples for each of the two passwords using an existing keystroke dynamics based authentication system.

Experiment Design  Four sets of experiments are designed –Experiment 2 (e2): Goal: Evaluate imitation results given partial user data as feedback Details: 84 participants played the role of attackers. 10 victims were randomly chosen from e1. Each attacker was randomly assigned one of the 10 victims, and was given the victim’s mean vector for 30 minutes imitation task. Attackers gets real-time feedback based on Euclidean distance based anomaly score.

Experiment Design  Four sets of experiments are designed –Experiment 3 (e3a): Goal: Investigate the effect an additional session has on the imitation performance Details: 14 best attackers were chosen from e2 to perform the same imitation task in e2 for only 20 minutes. –Experiment 4 (e3b): Goal: Investigate the imitation performance of highly motivated attackers in optimal environment (e.g. full victim parameters, extended time) Details:14 attackers are the same as in e3a. Feedback is based on full victim typing pattern information (Manhattan distance and absolute deviation)

Experiment Design  Feedback interface: Mimesis

Experiment Results  Typing profile of an attacker

Experiment Results  Results from e1: collision attack –Given a target organization with 10 high value targets, if a team of 84 attackers were to be assembled, we expect to find on average, one attacker with the same typing pattern as one of the high value targets.

Experiment Results  Imitation outcome of e2 –b20 data set: an attacker’s best 20 consecutive tries in an experiment Attackers with degraded performance Attackers with improved performance

Experiment Results  Results from e2: effect of password difficulty The effectiveness of keystroke biometrics in mitigating weak passwords is lesser than assumed

Experiment Results  Results from e2: effect of attacker consistency Imitation performance based on consistency in e1 Consistency scores in e1 and e2

Experiment Results  Results from e2: effect of training duration –56% attackers took no more than 20 minutes to reach their b20 performance. Time required to reach b20 performance

Experiment Results  Imitation outcome of e3a –6 attackers improved their b20 FAR –4 attackers unchanged –4 attackers worsened

Experiment Results  Imitation outcome of e3b Almost all attackers were able to achieve near perfect imitation of their victims The original FRR and FAR of a victim, and the FAR of his two assigned attackers

Experiment Results  Results from e3b: training time to achieve b20 FAR –64% attackers peak their performance in 20 minutes or less –Two highly motivated participants took nearly 2 hours

Experiment Results  Factors affecting imitation outcome –Gender: male performs significantly better than females –Initial typing similarity with the victim: weak correlation –Typing speed, keyboard, Number of trials per minute are not affecting factors

Conclusion  A user’s typing pattern can be imitated –Trained with incomplete model of the victim’s typing pattern, an attacker’s success rate is around 0.52 –The best attacker increases FAR to 1 after training –When the number of attackers and victims are sizeable, chance of natural collision is significant  Factors that affect the imitation performance –Easier passwords are easily imitated –Males are better imitators

Comments  Contributions –Extensive experiments are designed to study different keystroke dynamic imitation scenarios –Show by concrete results that keystroke dynamics biometric system can be compromised by attackers after imitation training –Design a friendly user interface for imitation training  Weakness –Deliberately exclude the key up-down timing, which might have an negative on the imitation –b20 performance do not actually represent real attacking performance –Too many experiments, some are not important. Technical contribution is limited.

Questions?