All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 2G IMS CAVE Based Security Replay Protection Alec Brusilovsky, Zhibi Wang Alcatel-Lucent, July 24, 2007.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
SIPPING 3GPP Requirements Ad Hoc Meeting Georg Mayer IETF#53, Minneapolis.
Advertisements

Presence, Security and Privacy. VON The Current Environment Many Faces of Security Authentication Verify someone is who they.
D1 - 16/05/2014 Le présent document contient des informations qui sont la propriété de France Télécom. L'acceptation de ce document par son destinataire.
Adding SASL to HTTP/1.1 draft-nystrom-http-sasl-07.txt Magnus Nyström, RSA Security Alexey Melnikov, Isode Limited
Company Confidential 1 © 2005 Nokia V1-Filename.ppt / yyyy-mm-dd / Initials Pre-Shared Key TLS with GBA support Thesis presentation ESPOO, Finland.
SIP and IMS Enabled Residential Gateway Sergio Romero Telefónica I+D Jan Önnegren Ericsson AB Alex De Smedt Thomson Telecom.
The Elbert HTTP Server HTTP Authentication, providing security in tough times By: Shawn M. Jones.
World Class Standards ANFOV - Milano, 14 November 2007 – Paolo DE LUTIIS ANFOV - Milano, 14 November 2007 Autore:Paolo DE LUTIIS Telecom Italia Security.
Replay protection in AKA with 2G RUIM Sarvar Patel and Zhibi Wang.
SIP and the application of SIP as used in 3GPP Keith Drage - Lucent Technologies.
SIPPING IETF51 3GPP Security and Authentication Peter Howard 3GPP SA3 (Security) delegate
SIP Security Matt Hsu.
Agenda Introduction to 3GPP Introduction to SIP IP Multimedia Subsystem Service Routing in IMS Implementation Conclusions.
SIP Session Initiation Protocol Short Introduction Artur Hecker, ENST.
SIP Authorization Framework Use Cases Rifaat Shekh-Yusef, Jon Peterson IETF 91, SIPCore WG Honolulu, Hawaii, USA November 13,
Ins and Outs of Authenticating Users Requests to IIS 6.0 and ASP.NET Chris Adams Program Manager IIS Product Unit Microsoft Corporation.
Understanding Integrated Authentication in IIS Chris Adams IIS Supportability Lead Microsoft Corp.
Interworking Architecture Between 3GPP and WLAN Systems 張憲忠, 何建民, 黃瑞銘, 紀嘉雄, 李有傑.
SIP OAuth Rifaat Shekh-Yusef IETF 90, SIPCore WG, Toronto, Canada July 21,
Page 1 SIP header reduction for supporting delay sensitive applications draft-akhtar-sipping-header-reduction-00.txt draft-akhtar-sipping-3g-static-dictionary-00.txt.
1 © NOKIA 1999 FILENAMs.PPT/ DATE / NN SIP Service Architecture Markus Isomäki Nokia Research Center.
Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP) Mingliang Pei Salah Machani IETF68 KeyProv WG Prague.
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). What is SIP? An application-layer protocol A control (signaling) protocol.
Identities and Network Access Identifier in M2M Page 1 © GPP2 3GPP2 and its Organizational Partners claim copyright in this document and individual.
QUALCOMM Incorporated 1 Protocol Options for BSN- BSMCS Controller Interface Jun Wang, Kirti Gupta 05/16/2005 Notice: Contributors grant a free, irrevocable.
Diameter SIP application IETF 64 Vancouver, 6-11 November, 2005
September 28, 2006 Page 1 3GPP2 MMD Status for IMS Workshop - draft - Jack Nasielski
CP-a Emergency call stage 2 requirements - A presentation of the requirements from 3GPP TS Keith Drage.
Department of Computer Science & Engineering San Jose State University
SIP Digest Access Authentication Rifaat Shekh-Yusef IETF 89, SIPCore WG, London March 6, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef - SIP Digest Auth.
1 Diameter SIP application draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-sip-app-03.txt 60 th IETF meeting August 3 rd, 2004 Status.
EAP Authentication for SIP & HTTP V. Torvinen (Ericsson), J. Arkko (Ericsson), A. Niemi (Nokia),
All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 1 | Presentation Title | January 2007 UMB Security Evolution Proposal Abstract: This contribution proposes.
Page 1 January 16, 2008 Source: 3GPP2 TSG-S WG4 (Security) Contacts: Anand Palanigounder, Chair, TSG-S WG4 ( Zhibi Wang,
IMS 架構與話務分析 網路管理維運資源中心 日期 : 2013/07/25 網路管理維運資源中心 日期 : 2013/07/25 限閱.
Web Server Design Week 11 Old Dominion University Department of Computer Science CS 495/595 Spring 2010 Martin Klein 3/24/10.
1 © NOKIA Presentation_Name.PPT / DD-MM-YYYY / Initials Company Confidential Issues with HTTP Authentication for SIP Hisham Khartabil SIP WG IETF 59, Seoul.
1 3GPP2 GBA Overview Adrian Escott Chair, TSG-S WG4 24 May 2006.
SIP working group IETF#70 Essential corrections Keith Drage.
Enhanced Digest (draft-undery-sip-auth-00.txt) Sanjoy Sen, Nortel Networks James Undery, Ubiquity Vesa Torvinen, Ericsson.
MWIF Confidential MWIF-Arch Security Task Force Task 5: Security for Signaling July 11, 2001 Baba, Shinichi Ready for MWIF Kansas.
All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 2G IMS CAVE Based Security Replay Protection Zhibi Wang January, 2007.
1 Access Authentication to IMS Systems in Next Generation Networks Authors: Silke Holtmanns, Son Phan-Anh ICN’07 IEEE Speaker: Wen-Jen Lin.
SIP Performance Benchmarking draft-ietf-bmwg-sip-bench-term-01 draft-ietf-bmwg-sip-bench-meth-01 March 22, 2010 Prof. Carol Davids, Illinois Inst. of Tech.
1 HRPD Roamer Authentication Zhibi Wang, Sarvar Patel, Simon Mizikovsky, Nancy Lee.
SAML for SIP Hannes Tschofenig, Jon Peterson, James Polk, Douglas Sicker, Marcus Tegnander.
1 Replay protection method for CAVE based AKA Anand Palanigounder Qualcomm Inc.
User Notification Protocol Nikolai Leung, QUALCOMM Incorporated (703) Notice: QUALCOMM Incorporated grants.
September 28, 2006 Page 1 3GPP2 MMD Status for IMS Workshop Jack Nasielski
1 3GPP2 GBA Overview Adrian Escott Chair, TSG-S WG4 24 May 2006.
3GPP GBA Overview Adrian Escott.
Requirements and Selection Process for RADIUS Crypto-Agility December 5, 2007 David B. Nelson IETF 70 Vancouver, BC.
COEN 350: Network Security E-Commerce Issues. Table of Content HTTP Authentication Cookies.
Web Server Design Week 12 Old Dominion University Department of Computer Science CS 495/595 Spring 2010 Martin Klein 3/31/10.
CS520 Web Programming Declarative Security (I) Chengyu Sun California State University, Los Angeles.
IP-NNI Joint Task Force Status Update
Kumiko Ono End-to-middle Security in SIP draft-ietf-sipping-e2m-sec-reqs-04 draft-ono-sipping-end2middle-security-03 Kumiko Ono.
IP-NNI Joint Task Force Status Update
Verstat Related Best Practices
RFC PASSporT Construction 6.2 Verifier Behavior
draft-ipdvb-sec-01.txt ULE Security Requirements
RFC PASSporT Construction 6.2 Verifier Behavior
IP Interconnection Profile
IMS Emergency Call Requirements & Emergency Call number support
RFC Verifier Behavior Step 4: Check the Freshness of Date
Chinese wall model in the internet Environment
3GPP and SIP-AAA requirements
Web Server Design Week 12 Old Dominion University
Web Server Design Week 12 Old Dominion University
IMS Emergency Call Requirements & Emergency Call number support
Presentation transcript:

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2006, ##### 2G IMS CAVE Based Security Replay Protection Alec Brusilovsky, Zhibi Wang Alcatel-Lucent, July 24, 2007

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 2 | Presentation Title | January 2007 What is in the IMS standards 1. IETF RFC 3261 (SIP): mandates the qop, i.e., use of the cnonce; 2. IETF RFC 3310 (HTTP Digest AKA): recommends to use the digest mechanism (in addition to the AKA) for message integrity; 3. 3GPP2 IMS Security Framework S.S0086B: Digest is one of the mechanisms that can be used for access security; 4. 3GPP Cx interface 3GPP TS : specifies the information element for qop, and SIP digest (cnonce); 5. 3GPP ISIM TS : supports HTTP Digest Security context; 6. 3GPP IMS stage 3 TS : describes UE procedure when receiving digest calculated with cnonce; 7. 3GPP TS : IMS Registration Message contains qop and cnonce; 8. CableLab’s PacketCable V2.0 standards: added SIP-Digest-Authenticate mechanism to all the corresponding standards from 3GPP, e.g. PKT-SP I ; 9. MultiService Forum Implementation Agreement for a MSFR3 SIP Server (MSF-IA-SIP.012- FINAL Aug 2006): mandates support at least either AKA or HTTP Digest, and SHOULD support both.

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 3 | Presentation Title | January 2007 SIP RFC 3261  In the SIP RFC 3261, section 22.4: "The Digest Authentication Scheme", item 8 states: "RFC 2617 notes that a cnonce value MUST NOT be sent in an Authorization (and by extension Proxy-Authorization) header field if no qop directive has been sent. Therefore, any algorithms that have a dependency on the cnonce (including "MD5-Sess") require that the qop directive be sent. Use of the "qop" parameter is optional in RFC 2617 for the purposes of backwards compatibility with RFC 2069; since RFC 2543 was based on RFC 2069, the "qop" parameter must unfortunately remain optional for clients and servers to receive. However, servers MUST always send a "qop" parameter in WWW-Authenticate and Proxy- Authenticate header field values. If a client receives a "qop" parameter in a challenge header field, it MUST send the "qop" parameter in any resulting authorization header field."

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 4 | Presentation Title | January 2007 RFC 3310 HTTP Digest AKA “Even though AKA provides inherent mutual authentication with the AKA AUTN token, mutual authentication mechanisms provided by Digest may still be useful in order to provide message integrity.” 1) Initial request REGISTER sip:home.mobile.biz SIP/2.0 2) Response containing a challenge SIP/ Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: Digest nonce="CjPk9mRqNuT25eRkajM09uTl9nM09uTl9nMz5OX25PZz==", qop="auth,auth-int", opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41", algorithm=AKAv1-MD5 3) Request containing credentials REGISTER sip:home.mobile.biz SIP/2.0 Authorization: Digest nonce="CjPk9mRqNuT25eRkajM09uTl9nM09uTl9nMz5OX25PZz==", uri="sip:home.mobile.biz", qop=auth-int, nc= , cnonce="0a4f113b", response="6629fae49393a c4ef1", opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41"

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 5 | Presentation Title | January GPP2 IMS Security Framework S.S Authentication of the subscriber and the network The user’s subscription is authenticated by the S-CSCF (home service provider). The security association between the UE and the first access point into the operator’s network (P-CSCF) is negotiated based on the protocol defined in RFC 3329 [12]. The options that may be negotiated using [12] are: tls, digest [23], ipsec-ike, ipsec-man, and ipsec-3gpp. When the negotiated protocol is not ipsec-3gpp, sections 5 through 8 do not apply. In this case a method other than AKA may be used to authenticate the UE, e.g. an appropriate method from the SIP RFC [2].

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 6 | Presentation Title | January GPP Cx interface 3GPP TS Information element contents Authentication Context This information element contains authentication-related information relevant for performing the authentication but that is not part of the SIP authentication headers. Some mechanisms (e.g. PGP, digest with quality of protection set to authint defined in IETF RFC 2617 [16], digest with predictive nonces or sip access digest) request that part or the whole SIP request (e.g. the SIP method) is passed to the entity performing the authentication. In such cases the SIPAuthentication-Context AVP shall be carrying such information.

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 7 | Presentation Title | January GPP ISIM TS supports HTTP Digest Security context HTTP Digest security context along with IMS AKA and GBA

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 8 | Presentation Title | January GPP IMS TS describes the procedure for UE Initial Registration On receiving the 200 (OK) response to the REGISTER request, the UE shall: store the expiration time of the registration for the public user identities found in the To header value; b) store as the default public user identity the first URI on the list of URIs present in the P- Associated-URI header; NOTE 4:The UE can utilize additional URIs contained in the P-Associated-URI header, e.g. for application purposes. c) treat the identity under registration as a barred public user identity, if it is not included in the P-Associated-URI header; d) store the list of Service-Route headers contained in the Service-Route header, in order to build a proper preloaded Route header value for new dialogs and standalone transactions; e) set the security association lifetime to the longest of either the previously existing security association lifetime (if available), or the lifetime of the just completed registration plus 30 seconds; and NOTE 5: If the UE receives Authentication-Info, it will proceed as described in RFC 3310 

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 9 | Presentation Title | January GPP TS IMS Registration Message IMS Registration Message contains QOP and CNONCE fields

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 10 | Presentation Title | January 2007 CableLab’s PacketCable V2.0 CableLab’s PacketCable V2.0 standards added SIP-Digest- Authenticate mechanism to all the corresponding standards from 3GPP, e.g. PKT- SP I

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 11 | Presentation Title | January 2007 MultiService Forum Implementation Agreement for a MSFR3 SIP Server (MSF-IA-SIP.012-FINAL Aug 2006)

All Rights Reserved © Alcatel-Lucent 2007, ##### 12 | Presentation Title | January 2007 Conclusion: turn qop on for replay protection  Existing IMS standards recommend to use qop mechanism to provide additional protection  Almost all the IMS standards support both, HTTP Digest and HTTP Digest AKA already. Therefore the mechanism to use cnonce is already supported by most IMS compliance equipment.  Turn on qop tag is only a provisional change for operator. There is no impact on the S-CSCF behavior baselined in “2G IMS Security based on R-UIM card”  Since the 2G IMS security relies on cnonce for replay protection, it is recommended that qop being turned on when the replay protection is desired.