Philosophy 224 Divine Persons Pt. 2

Legenhausen, “Is God a Person?” Legenhausen uses the little observed fact that Islam is a religion in which the majority of believers do not attribute personhood to God as an opportunity to consider some of the arguments for or against the claim that God is a person, with the aim of advancing an ecumenical agenda. For purposes of clarity, Legenhausen briefly considers the complications surrounding attributions of personhood (like that we’ve seen about the trinity), before setting on an inclusive (trinities count), but strict (personhood is a metaphysical, not merely rhetorical, assignment) account.

4 Arguments in Favor Legenhausen identifies 4 commitments from which an argument to the personal nature of God could be drawn. 1.The divinity of Christ. 2.The character of scripture. 3.What is required for an adequate account of revelation. 4.The requirements of worship and prayer.

The Argument from Christ Legenhausen reviews the history of the application of the concept of person to God by theologians, beginning with Clement of Alexandria, but skipping the medievals to jump right to the 19 th and 20 th centuries, when he claims the sense of personal God that we are familiar with now emerges (Buber, Brightman, Maritan, etc., the personalists). After reviewing the logical status of an argument from Jesus' personhood to God’s, Legenhausen concludes that it is unsuccessful. P1: Jesus is a person. P2: Jesus is God Conclusion: God is a person.

The Argument from Scripture The argument from scripture, as summarized by Hick (325c2) makes the case that the language employed by the biblical authors makes it clear that they assume the personhood of God and makes this assumption necessary for believers. Legenhausen the considers a couple of problems with this line of reasoning. Anthropomorphism counter-example. Contradiction in conception (Mainmonidean solution: radical transcendence). In other words, this argument fails as well.

The Argument from Revelation The argument is straightforward: Revelation is God’s communication to humans, only persons communicate, thus, God must be a person. Clearly, the second premise is the difficult one. Christians would be inclined to accept it; Muslims deny it. Without accepting the theology motivating it, the work of Muslim theologians clearly reveal that revelation doesn’t require a personal God, so this argument fails as well.

Argument from Prayer The final argument Legenhausen considers is based on the claim that only a person could be an appropriate object of worship or prayer. As Legenhausen shows, the argument ultimately seems to rest on a false dichotomy. Either God is a person, or he is the same as a rock (or, more appropriately for us, a table). The dichotomy is false because God could not be a person and not be equivalent to a rock, because both roles could be considered to confining for God. God could be a non-personal, non-inanimate entity. In other words, this one misses the mark as well.

Arguments Against As Legenhauen turns to the arguments against a personal God, he relies primarily on the work of muslim theolgoians. A common root of their arguments is that, as absolutely transcendent, “…personality is a limiting factor and is therefore incompatible with the infinite nature of God. God transcends such concepts such as ‘spirit,’ ‘soul,’ ‘self,’ and ‘person’” (329c1). Another root is their insistence that precisely as transcendent, God is immanent in the world (God is both everything and different from everything) and thus cannot be a person.

Arguments from Transcendence God is not created, God is not a substance, God does not admit of a genus/species categorization. These are all claims that serve a pivotal role in this form of argument. To the extent that persons would all seem to be affirmatively identified with these categories, God cannot be a person. As Legenhausen observes, all such types of argument seem open to the following (difficult to demonstrate) counters: Identification through these categories is not inconsistent with God’s transcendence; God’s transcendence is not incompatible with personhood.

Arguments from Immanence The Muslim conception of God’s immanence seems inconsistent with a personal God, inasmuch as this immanence seems to preclude the separated, distinctly relational character of persons. As the ‘ultimate ground,’ God is necessarily undifferentiated. Of course, a critic could merely reject this conception of divine immanence.

One Last Argument Legenhausen considers a final argument, not from Muslim theology, but from contemporary philosophy of mind. At it’s heart is a commonplace in this field, that minds presuppose embodiment (there are no minds without bodies). If we define persons, as many philosophers want to do, as things with certain sorts of minds, then it seems we have to conclude that, since God doesn’t have a body, he doesn’t have a mind; and since God doesn’t have a mind, he can’t be a person. Here too, there are clearly some basis for objecting to the conclusion.

Wrapping it up Legenhausen concludes that there is no winner here. None of the arguments for or against a personal God is conclusive. What’s significant according to Legenhausen is that both traditions have their dissenters, and these dissenters demonstrate the basis of an ecumenical ‘resolution’ of the controversy.